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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines four parts of production and inventory models for buyer-
supplier in the supply chain under deterministic conditions. The main objective is to 
find optimal lot-sizing decisions and inventory policies which derive from the classical 
inventory and Net Present Value (NPV) framework. Firstly, we study the production 
and inventory models from the classical framework to identify how to value the holding 
cost for buyer and supplier in the average profit or cost functions. Secondly, we 
propose the inventory model derived from the NPV framework to identify the incorrect 
model from the classical framework. It makes a clear distinction between physical 
inventory and opportunity costs and the supplier’s reward is identified as a lost term in 
the supplier’s profit function which it has been proved that the corrected supplier’s 
profit function does lead to a channel. Thirdly, we developed the quantity discount 
model derived from the NPV framework to help the supplier increase profits under 
constant demand. It is found that price discounts often lead to a solution very close to 
the joint optimal policy for buyer and supplier. Fourthly, four different VMI models are 
developed which derive from the NPV framework for single-supplier and single buyer 
under deterministic conditions. The experimental results show that the VMI+ Policy can 
guarantee to achieve the perfect channel coordination and gives the highest supply 
chain profit more than other VMI approaches and the classical framework.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Supply chain management has become a critical issue for modern business 
environments. An effective supply chain policy can help the company to reduce costs, 
which is one of the key components of supply chain management, i.e. the investment 
in reducing inventory holding costs in the manufacturing, wholesale and retail sectors 
(Simchi-Levi et al., 2000, Goyal, 1988). This fact implies that benefits can be 
achieved for all players in the supply chain by improving inventory management. 
Inventory is the highest cost in supply chain counting toward the total logistics costs. 
Individuals making decisions in order to reduce inventory costs may not lead to an 
overall optimal solution. Therefore, coordination by integrating the decision among 
the players in the supply chain is a method to achieve better decisions inventory 
management. 
The supply chain management (SCM) can be described as the management of 
materials and information across the entire supply chain, from the supplier (vendor) to 
buyers (retailers), and final customer. Inventory costs can be classified into two parts 
concluded of the cost of capital (or investment) and physical storage costs. The capital 
costs are the monetary expenses due to time delays between in and out payment 
streams in the companies including depreciation and interest charges (Grubbström and 
Thorstenson, 1986). The cost of holding inventory includes the money invested, 
expenses for managing warehouse, handling and other variable costs, insurance and 
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taxes, and loses from deterioration, damage, theft, and obsolescence (Silver et al., 
1998). 
In order to minimise total costs, or alternatively maximise total profits in a 
supply chain the cooperation of decisions among buyer and supplier would be 
applied, which leads to achieve benefits for all parties (Jaber and Zolfaghari, 2008). 
When there is no cooperation between the firms, each firm in the supply chain will 
focus on optimising its own cost or profit function based on the variables which are 
made independently and often sequentially by each member of the chain. Although 
each member of the supply chain has different operational goals, the performance of 
all members depends not only on how well each member manages its operational 
processes, but also on how well the members coordinate their decisions. 
The first aim of the research proposed is to analyse classical inventory 
management problems between independent actors in a supply chain from the Net 
Present Value (NPV) perspective. The classical inventory framework fails to 
incorporate some essential components in the profit functions of the independent 
actors in even a simple model of a single buyer and single supplier under classical 
assumptions of deterministic and conditions. Through the NPV analysis, 
shortcomings of the classical models can be identified. 
In particular, the focus of this research is to apply the NPV framework to a 
variety of coordination models in supply chains with different independent actors, and 
identifies in which type of models the classical inventory approach fails to find the 
optimal result from the NPV perspective. Secondly, the aim is to improve the existing 
classical models in order to build models that lead to solutions which are also 
15 
optimised from the NPV framework. The research will then propose practical 
recommendations for firms on how to improve decision making in the supply chain 
whenever these inventory management problems present themselves. Ultimately, the 
research thus aims to contribute towards developing a new theory of inventory 
management in supply chains based on the general concept of the NPV.  
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1.2, the research objectives are 
introduced, and expected research contributions are given in Section 1.3. The thesis 
outline is described in Section 1.4.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
This research is concerned with gaining a better understanding of the ways and 
policies to reach coordination between independent supply chain actors. The objective 
of supply chain coordination is to increase the profits for all parties involved. At this 
point, there are a number of questions that are raised: 
(1) How to value the holding cost for buyer and supplier in the average profit 
or cost functions?  
(2) Why the joint profit function from an independent buyer - supplier in the 
supply chain in the classical inventory models cannot lead to the correct 
models in the joint optimal policy? 
(3) Whether or not the price discount mechanism leads to solutions that are 
equal or close to the solution that would optimize the joint profit function?  
(4) Which VMI policy can achieve perfect coordination with solutions equal 
or close to the solutions that would optimize the joint optimal solution?  
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(5) Which VMI policies can achieve the best results in the supply chain? 
 
To answer these questions above, we will propose coordination mechanisms 
derived from the NPV framework and also demonstrate the channel perfect of 
coordination solutions can accept from actors who fully coordinate their operational 
planning or as benchmarks to identify the inefficiencies in the independent decision 
solution.  
In order to achieve our goals, the primary objectives are given as follows: 
• Identify how to correct the buyer-supplier model in the classical inventory 
framework and propose models that lead to solutions which are also 
optimised from the NPV framework. 
• Identify the optimal solutions in the joint optimal policies derived from the 
NPV framework and determine the fairness values to share the costs or 
benefits of adopting the joint optimal solution. 
• Develop the quantity pricing discount models with the NPV for single buyer-
supplier in the supply chain. 
• Develop inventory models derived from the NPV framework for four 
different VMI strategies with single-supplier and single buyer in supply 
chains. 
The research will then also lead to practical recommendations on how to 
improve decision making in the supply chain whenever these inventory management 
problems present themselves.  
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1.3 Expected research contributions 
Supply chain management is an important research topic with practical 
implications. An exciting new development comes from the realisation that the 
general economic principle of the NPV can be applied to inventory and supply chain 
management. Whenever two or more independent parties are involved, the classical 
inventory approach cannot find the optimal results, but an optimal solution may be 
found from the NPV viewpoint. The contribution of this research proposes the 
development, production and inventory model to improve the profit or cost function 
in existing models from the classical approach by using the NPV perspective. It is 
expected to lead to new management insights into supply chain management and 
coordination. From the perspective of academic and practical values, we expect that 
this research would make the following contributions as follows: 
Firstly, we propose the inventory models derived from the NPV framework to 
analyse and identify gaps of errors in the classical models in the literature and then 
introduce corrections to the inventory models. The outcome of this can also help us to 
get a better understanding of the true benefits or disadvantages that buyers and 
suppliers have when they transfer from an independent decision policy to a 
coordinated policy with the NPV approach. 
Secondly, we develop models from the NPV with Anchor Point decision to 
derive the independent and joint optimisation in single-buyer single-supplier 
inventory models. The contribution achieved is that the NPV model is leading to large 
numerical differences in the optimal policy variables and optimal profits. The 
classical models are not leading to the correct join optimal policy and cannot 
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adequately describe the relative gains or losses which could. The cost sharing and side 
payment can guarantee a rational fairness manner to induce a buyer to change policy 
from independent to coordinate policy. 
Thirdly, the contribution of the quantity price discount model derived from the 
NPV can help the supplier increase the profits under constant demand. The NPV 
approach expects that the positive financial effect of the larger lot-sizes for the 
supplier should be taken into account when determining the optimal price discount 
scheme and the impact on the profits of the firm. Furthermore, price discounts often 
lead to the solution very close to the joint optimal policy for buyer and supplier. 
Finally, another outcome of this research is also to provide the optimal 
solutions from the different VMI strategies of VMI and evaluate how coordination 
through VMI can affect the optimal lot-sizes and profit (or cost) functions for buyer, 
supplier, and supply chain. Since this study compares four different VMI approaches, 
including of Consignment Inventory (CI), Vendor managed Inventory Minus (VMI−), 
Vendor managed Inventory Plus (VMI+) and Vendor managed replenishment (VMR), 
as well as the classical framework. The comparison is to verify which VMI policy can 
get better off and worse off the outcome in the supply chain. 
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
The overview of the thesis chapters is given as follows: 
 Chapter 1: Introduction. The first chapter introduces an overview of this 
thesis, describes the context of supply chain management, inventory management and 
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the NPV concepts. Then, the research objectives, expected research contributions and 
overviews the structure of this thesis is presented. 
Chapter 2: It reviews concepts and applications of inventory models related to 
supply chain and relevant literature. This chapter looks at the importance of buyer-
supplier coordination in supply chain models. Scientific theories on supply chain 
coordination and decision making are reviewed, as well as some aspects of the fields 
of the inventory management, the classical buyer-supplier problem, independent and 
joint optimal policy, quantity pricing discount models and coordination mechanism 
particularly in VMI, and the NPV approach are introduced. 
Chapter 3: The concept of Net Present Value (NPV) framework is proposed 
for the coordination buyer-supplier of production and inventory models. Average 
Profit (AP) function from classical frameworks is investigated where holding cost 
parameters is refined. Then, the Annuity Stream model is applied to derive the simple 
models and their approximations compared with solutions derived from classical 
framework. 
Chapter 4: The mathematical model is developed from the NPV to analyse the 
inventory model from single-buyer single-supplier supply chain under deterministic 
conditions and constant demand. The model is based on two specific problems using 
the individual and coordination policies. Under independent policy, each player 
determines their optimal decisions without considering other companies. Under 
coordinated policy, all players in the supply chain determine their optimal decision 
integrally and simultaneously. The Net Present Value (NPV) with the anchor point 
decision approach is used as the new framework to develop the model for buyer and 
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supplier, annuity stream functions are derived inventory models from these policies. 
Numerical results are given that compare the proposed model with the classical 
framework. 
Chapter 5: The price discount model is developed from the classical 
framework to find the optimal lot-sizes and maximise profit functions for actors in the 
supply chain. In the first part of this chapter, the concept of the quantity pricing 
discount model from the classical framework is proposed. Secondly, we develop the 
NPV framework to derive the model of independent and joint optimal models to 
optimise profit function and analysis in the quantity pricing discount models for the 
buyer-supplier and supply chain. 
Chapter 6: Supply chain coordination mechanisms, particularly Vendor 
Managed Inventories (VMI) strategies are introduced in this chapter. VMI is to 
investigate the effect of supply chain performance when coordination has been 
applied. Four different types of VMI strategies are derived from the NPV framework, 
including Consignment inventory (CI), Vendor managed Inventory Minus (VMI−), 
Vendor Managed Inventory Plus (VMI+) and Vendor Inventory Replenishment 
(VMR). Then, the performances of those VMI policies are compared with each of 
them and compared with the classical framework based on numerical results and some 
findings are drawn from the outcomes. 
Chapter 7: This chapter concludes by discussing key findings, major 
contributions, and limitations of this research. At the beginning of this chapter, the 
key findings of this research obtained from the results analysis are discussed in detail 
based on research questions that are described in Chapter 1. Potential values of the 
21 
findings and corresponding managerial implications are discussed as major 
contributions of this study. Finally, this research points out, for the further research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at introducing and defining some concepts related to supply 
chain coordination used in this thesis. We begin by giving some insights into the 
supply chain management concept and some of the key components shown in Section 
2.2. Secondly, inventory management are summarised and discussed the concept of 
the buyer-supplier coordination models in supply chain in the literatures given in 
Section 2.3. Thirdly, the buyer-supplier coordination are explained consisting of the 
integrated buyer-supplier models, coordination with quantity price discount models, 
and coordination mechanism through Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) strategies 
described in Section 2.4. The concept of Net Present Value approach for inventory 
model is discussed in Section 2.5. Finally, summation is concluded with some of the 
major implications obtained from previous observations in the literature shown in 
Section 2.6. 
 
2.2 Supply chain management 
This section aims at introducing the concepts related to the supply chain used 
in this thesis. We begin by giving some of meaning logistics and supply chain. Then, 
we focus on some key components of supply chain management. 
A supply chain can described as a network where facilities and distribution 
perform the functions of procurement of materials, transformation of these materials 
into finished products, and then delivered these finished products to final customers. 
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More generally, a supply chain may be defined as the set of parties and agents (such 
as suppliers (vendor), manufacturers, transporters, buyers, etc.) involved, directly or 
indirectly, in fulfilling a customer's request (Chopra and Meindl, 2007, Sarmah et al., 
2006) 
Mentzer et al. (2001) determined a supply chain as a set of three or more 
entities (organizations or individuals) directly involved in the upstream and 
downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/ or information from a source 
to a customer as shown in Figure (2-1). To create an effective supply chain, we need 
to manage the supply chain to achieve the one of multiple objectives of the supply 
chain. The key objective of supply chain is to maximise the overall benefit value. The 
benefit value a supply chain generates is the difference between what the final product 
is worth to the customer and the costs the supply chain incurs in filling the customer's 
requests. Another objective would be the increase of the customer's service level in 
order to satisfy its requirements in an optimal manner. Both objectives could of course 
be connected via some costs (Simchi-Levi et al., 2000). 
 
Figure 2-1: A supply chain network. Source: (Chopra and Meindl, 2007) 
 
24 
2.3 Inventory management 
In this section, the inventory problems and the types of inventory are 
introduced. The simple questions for inventory models are described and linked to the 
inventory models including of Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) and Economic 
Production Quantity (EPQ) models are described in Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.  
Inventory management is one of the basic problems for a company to manage 
stocks which have been used in many sectors of organizations including business, 
industries, military etc. There are many reasons why the firms have to manage them. 
The common questions are used for the inventory control and management when the 
product or service is ordered and how many products or services are ordered (Hadley 
and Whitin, 1963)? 
Inventory can be classified into three types including raw materials, work in 
progress, and finished goods (Ghiani et al., 2004). An important role that inventory 
plays in the supply chain is to increase the amount of demand that can be satisfied by 
having a product ready and available when the customer wants to use it. Another 
significant role is to reduce costs by utilizing any economies of scale that may exist 
during both production and distribution. Inventory is a major source of cost in the 
supply chain and it has a huge impact on responsiveness (Chopra and Meindl, 2007). 
The types of inventory depend on the specifics of industry and business thus 
inventory found in distribution environments (mainly finished goods for resale) are 
fundamentally different from those found in manufacturing environments (raw 
materials and work in progress) (Muller, 2003). The finished goods are inventory 
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bearing at distribution or buyer’s (retailer) site (Muller, 2003). In the manufacturing 
site, an inventory deals with raw materials and sub-assemblies. Considerations of 
what to buy, when to buy it, in what quantities, and so on are dramatically different in 
these two worlds. In the distribution, you are concerned with having the right item, in 
the right quantity. Issues relating to having the item at the right time and place are 
often dealt with by simply increasing safety stock on-hand. Having too much 
inventory is not a good solution because it leads to wasted money and space. 
However, traditional inventory management used in computing inventory 
requirements in a distribution environment focused on item and quantity rather than 
place and time. In manufacturing, you are concerned with having the right item, in the 
right quantity, at the right time, in the right place (Muller, 2003). 
2.3.1 Inventory problems 
The inventory is the basic function to protect the supply of goods from 
demand changes. Since costs are associated with inventories, they need to be dealt 
with in an effective, efficient, and economic manner. The simple question that 
inventory theory attempts to answer is “How much inventory should be held?” and 
also there are two fundamental questions that are derived from the previous one which 
have to be addressed by inventory optimisation models for optimal inventory control 
are: “How much inventory should be ordered? And when inventory should be 
replenished? 
The ultimate purpose of inventory management is optimisation of the 
inventory policy for the whole production-distribution system to minimise total 
operating inventory costs while maximizing profits and maintaining a high level of 
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customer service. This means that the objective of optimal inventory control is to 
make a balance between the conflicting goals. Firstly, a model to determine the 
economic lot size or order quantity was introduced by (Harris, 1915). He developed a 
simple model that illustrates the trade-offs between ordering and storage costs. Then, 
(Wilson, 1934) derived independently the model known as economic order quantity 
(EOQ) model which is the classical model for solving such as this problem. There are 
two basic of deterministic inventory replenishment including of Economic Order 
Quantity (EOQ) and Economic Production Quantity (EPQ) used as replenish models 
for buyer-supplier in the supply chain. In particular, it will be presented as follows. 
2.3.2 Economic order quantity (EOQ) model 
The best-known mathematical optimisation problem in inventory theory is the 
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) originally developed by (Harris, 1915). The EOQ 
model determines the optimal lot size in which the combination of ordering costs and 
inventory holding cost is set to minimise total system costs. The result is the most cost 
effective quantity to produce/order. This relationship is presented in Figure (2-2). 
 
Figure 2-2: Inventory pattern of EOQ model  
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EOQ is a deterministic inventory model that addresses infinite inventory 
replenishment, without shortages. A firm orders its products in lots (or batches) of 
size 𝑄𝑄  in meeting annual sales 𝐷𝐷. The saw-tooth movement of the inventory 
stock 𝐼𝐼, that presents the cycle is given below in Figure (2-2). The cycle begins at time 
𝑡𝑡 = 0 with a first batch ordered. The batch is ordered, all at one time, causing the 
inventory to shoot from zero to 𝑄𝑄 instantaneously. The goods ordered in each batch 
are placed in inventory and gradually sold off at a continuous demand rate 𝐷𝐷. 
The basic assumption is that the goods are withdrawn in a continuous fashion, 
rather than in discrete units, so it is shown as the inventory level declining as a 
straight line. After a batch is sold off and inventory reduced to zero, another lot is 
ordered and the cycle repeats. 
There are some assumptions of the model.  
1.  Deterministic and constant rate demand (𝐷𝐷)  
2.  Lot sizes or order quantities (𝑄𝑄) are fixed per order. 
3.  Ordering/ setup cost (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) is fixed. 
4.  Holding cost (ℎ𝑖𝑖) 
5.  Lead time is zero (𝐿𝐿). 
6.  Initial inventory is zero. 
7.  Horizon period is infinite. 
 
The optimal lot-size minimises the sum of these holding and ordering costs. 
Let 𝐷𝐷 be annual sales and 𝑄𝑄 is a batch size. Then the set-up 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , the cost will be 𝐷𝐷/𝑄𝑄 
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for a year, is an ordering cost, then total setup costs for the year will be 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷/𝑄𝑄. 
Assuming sales take place at a roughly uniform rate throughout the year, inventory 
will range from zero to 𝑄𝑄 with an average level of 𝑄𝑄/2. If the cost of carrying a unit 
of output in inventory for a year is ℎ𝑖𝑖, then the yearly inventory cost will be ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄/2. 
For this model, a single decision variable is the lot size 𝑄𝑄 or the replenishment. All 
other quantities are a function of 𝑄𝑄. The inventory cost is a strictly convex function 
of 𝑄𝑄, so there is a unique global minimum with respect to 𝑄𝑄. For determination of the 
optimum lot size 𝑄𝑄∗ we write the expression for the cost rate for operating the 
inventory: 
 
 
Using derivative Eq.(2-1) with respect to 𝑄𝑄, we have a necessary condition for 
a maximum: 
 
 
Solving Eq.(2-2) for the optimum lot size,𝑄𝑄∗: 
 
 
 
Since 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is a convex function of 𝑄𝑄: 
𝑄𝑄∗ = � 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑄𝑄∗ < 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 ≤  𝑄𝑄∗ ≤  𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑄𝑄∗ > 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼  
 
(2-4) 
(2-1) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
𝑄𝑄
+ ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄2  
(2-2) 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄
 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
𝑄𝑄2
+ ℎ𝑖𝑖2 = 0 
(2-3) 𝑄𝑄
∗ = �(2𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷/ℎ𝑖𝑖) 
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To test convexity, we take the second derivative of Eq.(2-1): 
𝑑𝑑2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄2
 = 2𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
𝑄𝑄3
> 0 
Once the economic order quantity is known, the optimum time between orders, 𝑇𝑇∗, 
can be calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
Since the second derivative in Eq.(2-5) is positive for positive parameters, the 
inventory cost function is convex and the solution for 𝑄𝑄∗ is a global minimum. To 
construct a mathematical model describing the economic costs or profits associated 
with the inventory system. At the optimum point, the holding cost is equal to the order 
(setup) cost. It can be seen that the optimal inventory cost is a concave function of 
product flow through the inventory, indicating that there is an economy of scale 
associated with the flow through inventory. The optimal lot size increases with 
increasing order cost and flow rate and decreases with increasing holding cost. 
2.3.3 Economic production quantity (EPQ) model 
Economic Production Quantity (EPQ) is a deterministic inventory model with 
finite inventory replenishment (Tersine, 1994). This assumption is modified to take 
into consideration the production rate. The EPQ model is illustrated by Figure (2-3). 
Rather than arrive instantaneously, the lot-size is assumed to arrive continuously at a 
production rate 𝑅𝑅. In this situation, the production rate 𝑅𝑅 must be greater than the 
demand rate 𝐷𝐷. The inventory level will not exceed the maximum inventory level 
(2-5) 
𝑇𝑇∗ = 𝑄𝑄∗
𝐷𝐷
= �2𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑖
 (2-6) 
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because the material is withdrawn at the same time it is being replenished. 
Replenishment takes place at the beginning of the cycle time when the inventory 
grows at the rate R-D. At time T production stops. The supplier starts production run 
at rate 𝐴𝐴 when the buyer’s stock is at level 𝑞∗. During each cycle time the total system 
inventory increases at rate 𝐴𝐴 − 𝐷𝐷 during the uptime 𝑇𝑇. After production stops, the 
supplier deliveries goods to the buyer from his stock and the supply chain inventory 
decreases at a rate 𝐷𝐷 until the end of the supplier’s cycle (see Figure 2-3). 
 
Figure 2-3: Inventory with finite replenishment rate 
Source: (Gümüs, 2008) 
 
Since one of the main objectives of the supply chain is to reduce total system 
cost, the companies in the supply chain need to coordinate their own objectives with 
other companies. Particularly in inventory decisions, they need to coordinate their 
inventory cycles among all companies in the system. Therefore, inventory models 
which can coordinate inventory decisions in the supply chain are needed. 
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2.4 Buyer-supplier coordination 
The literature survey provided in this section relates to buyer-supplier 
coordination. We have identified three categories of literature that have ties to 
coordination buyer-supplier in the supply chain. The first concerns the integrated 
buyer-supplier models are described in Section 2.4.1. The second category 
coordination with quantity price discount models is reviewed in Section 2.4.2, while 
the third identifies literature that is more focused on cooperation with VMI contracts 
in Section 2.4.3.  
Buyer-supplier coordination is a major research area in the inventory 
management literature as well as in the supply chain management literature in 
general. There are many inventory management policies that are used in order to 
obtain coordination. One of the most studied inventory models in this context is based 
on the economic-order-quantity (EOQ) model, which it is the simplest and still a 
widely used policy in purchasing or producing a single product. Many streams of 
research study models of co-ordination which perform better than the individual 
independent policy in terms of the total system cost. Effective coordination plays an 
important role in the successful operation of modern manufacturing and distribution 
systems. To achieve effective coordination between the supplier and the buyers, we 
focus on investigating how the two parties can cooperate with each other in making 
decisions to increase the supply chain profitability. 
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Coordination mechanism models studied in this thesis have been categorized 
as follows: 
1. Joint (integrated) optimal policy whereby the buyer and supplier wish to 
determine the optimal lot-sizes and some variables simultaneously to maximise the 
profit (or minimise cost) function for the supply chain, which is defined as the sum of 
their individual profit functions. 
2. Coordination with quantity price discount models whereby the supplier may 
offer the buyer a price discount as to induce the buyer to change the lot-size. The 
supplier will determine his discount on the maximisation of his own profit function. 
3. Coordination through Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI) models whereby 
supplier is authorized to manage inventory for buyers. In VMI, the buyer instead 
provides the information to suppliers on a real time basis and then supplier will use 
this information to coordinate its own replenishment actions with the replenishment 
service provided to buyer. 
2.4.1 Integrated buyer-supplier models 
The classical inventory model as the economic order quantity (EOQ) has been 
widely used to determine the optimal lot-sizes that minimises the total costs in the 
supply chain. On an independent optimal policy, the buyer and supplier act to make 
their decisions independently, the buyer determines the optimal lot-size from her 
profit or cost function and then supplier accepts this optimal lot-size from buyer and 
determines optimal delivery frequencies to maximise his profit function. However, 
independent policy may not be optimal for the whole supply chain system. 
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In the joint (integrated) optimal buyer-supplier models, both actors agree to 
use the same optimal lot-size or some variables to maximise the supply chain profit 
functions. (Goyal, 1976) first developed the integrated inventory model for a single 
buyer and a single supplier problem. He suggested a joint economic lot size model 
where the objective is to minimise the total relevant costs for both the buyer and 
supplier. 
Goyal (1976) presented the coordination model for the single buyer and single 
supplier under the classical inventory assumptions. The demand is uniform with 
respect to time, and stock outs are not permitted. The production rate is assumed to be 
infinite, there is no lead time, and the objective of both vendor and buyer is the 
minimisation of total logistics costs. Both buyer and vendor need decide on the 
optimal order quantity. He also suggested that a joint economic lot size model is to 
minimise the total costs for both the buyer and the supplier. The model is appropriate 
when a collaborative arrangement between the buyer and the supplier is applied by 
some contractual agreement. 
Banerjee (1986) generalised Goyal (1976) model by incorporating a finite 
production rate. He studied a lot-for-lot model in which the supplier manufactures and 
each delivery as a separate batch. Goyal (1988) is extended from Banerjee’s model 
where a joint total-relevant-cost model is formulated for a single supplier and buyer 
production and inventory system. The supplier’s lot size is an integer multiple of the 
buyer’s order size. Moreover, he also shows that, in this setting, there may be cases 
where smaller order quantities from the buyer are better for increasing channel profits. 
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Goyal (1988) improved the solution procedure developed byLee and 
Rosenblatt (1986). As stated earlier, Lal and Staelin (1984) published one of the 
major studies in the early Operations Research literature on channel coordination. In 
this study, the authors investigate the channel coordination problem for the single 
supplier, multiple buyers’ case. They first analyses the problem assuming that the 
buyers are homogenous (i.e. they have the same cost and revenue parameters). This 
problem is equivalent to the single buyer, single supplier case. This is because the 
price schedule that is optimal for one buyer applies to all the others. In subsequent 
parts of the paper, they also analyses the heterogeneous buyers’ case. In both cases, 
they propose a price schedule that is continuous but changes at certain intervals. 
Goyal (1995) utilised the example which provided by Lu (1995) for the single 
supplier and the buyer, but his work showed that a different model from shipment 
policy where the supplier deliveries the buyer in batches of unequal-size, the result 
give a good solution better than an original model. The policy expected that each 
successive delivery within a production batch increases by a factor (ratio of 
production rate to demand rate). This condition was also based on Goyal (1976) who 
solved a similar problem but slightly different from setting parameters. 
Weng (1995) pointed out that there are two streams of research on the roles of 
quantity discounts in channel coordination in previous research. The first considers 
operating cost as a function of order quantities, but treats demand as constants, while 
the second considers the demand as a decreasing function of the selling price but 
treats operating costs as constants. He presented a general model by considering both 
channel coordination and operating cost minimization in one single work. This work 
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focused on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel 
coordination. With the assumption that the buyer will receive a fixed fraction of the 
incremental profit, the author has shown that a quantity discount for the buyer along 
with the franchise fee paid to the supplier is sufficient to induce the buyer to make the 
joint profit maximisation. Furthermore, this work showed that quantity discounts 
alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization. 
Hill (1997) considered the system where a single supplier is the manufacture 
who produce a product at a finite rate and in batches, and then deliveries the buyer in 
batches of unequal size. Each batch is delivered to the buyer in a number of 
shipments. The supplier incurs a setup cost per batch and a fixed ordering or delivery 
cost associated with each shipment. There are four parameters used his model 
including of inventory holding for the supplier and for the buyer, a fixed production 
set up cost, and fixed cost per shipment. 
Lu (1995) extended the model from Goyal (1988) where work by allowing the 
supplier to provide some quantity to the buyer before completing the entire lot. Lu 
studied for the case of multiple buyers, but using a different solution strategy in which 
the supplier, having bargaining power, but knowing only annual demand and 
historical shipping frequencies, aims to find a better solution based on the constraints 
imposed by buyers with their maximum annual costs.  
Viswanathan (1998) considered a model for infinite production rate 𝑅𝑅, the 
system is equivalent to that first presented in Goyal (1976) where the buyer and 
supplier coordination mechanisms are studied in order to minimise the sum of overall 
production costs such as setup cost, buyer ordering cost, and supplier’s and buyer’s 
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inventory carrying. He shows that the performance of Lu (1995) and Goyal (1995) 
policies depends on the problem parameters. 
Goyal and Nebebe (2000) suggested a method to improve the solutions 
obtained by the method given in Hill (1997). In this method, the model is based on 
first shipment size, which increases by the ratio of production rate to demand. For the 
remaining shipments, the production run is equally distributed. The resulting 
improvement was shown that a small number of experiments. He also showed that the 
structure of the optimal policy includes shipments increasing in size according to a 
geometric series followed by equal-sized shipments. He also suggested an exact 
iterative algorithm for solving the problem. 
Hill and Omar (2006) considered Joint Economic Lot-sizes Problem (JELSP) 
by relaxing an assumption regarding holding costs, which were allowed to decrease in 
the supply chain. The consignment stock is considered in this research by splitting of 
the holding costs into a financial component and a physical component. It is fairly 
natural to relate the financial component, the cost of capital tied up in stock, to 
average stock and to relate the physical storage component to the maximum inventory 
held, reflecting the need to allocate or rent storage space for a production. 
Zhou and Wang (2007) developed a production inventory model for a general 
of a single supplier and a single buyer with an integrated system. The model showed 
that it neither requires the buyer’s unit holding cost larger than the supplier’s, nor 
assumes the structure of delivery policy. This model extends to the situation where the 
shortage is permitted. They also showed that the supplier’s unit holding cost is more 
than the buyer’s holding cost, the optimal shipment policy is consisting of unequal-
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sized shipments for all successive shipment sizes increasing by a fixed factor equal to 
the ratio of the production rate of the demand rate. A significance of the model is 
shown that it is more beneficial for the integrated system to make the supplier’s 
holding cost higher than the buyer’s, than to make the supplier’s holding cost lower 
than the buyer’s if shortages are not permitted to occur otherwise it just the opposite. 
Chu and Leon (2008) considered the problem of coordinating a single-supplier 
and multiple buyers of inventory system where there are privacy restrictions in the 
information required to solve the problem. The objective functions and cost 
parameters are regarded as private information that no other facilities in the system 
have access. Additionally, each facility is responsible to specify its own 
replenishment policy. The objective function is to minimise the total average 
inventory costs. The methodology solutions under private and global information are 
developed in order to find two types of the power-of-two policies. In the first policy, 
all the buyers are replenished simultaneously. The second policy is a more general 
case where the common replenishment assumption is relaxed. A simple form of 
information exchange is uncovered that allows the solution methodologies for private 
and global information to yield the same results. The results showed that the 
performance of the proposed heuristics is equal or better than an existing method. 
Chan and Kingsman (2007) proposed a coordinated single-supplier and 
multiple buyers in supply chain model by synchronizing delivery and production 
cycles. The synchronization is achieved by scheduling the actual delivery days of the 
buyers and coordinating them with the supplier’s production cycle where buyers are 
allowed to select their own lot sizes and replenishment cycles. In addition, the 
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experimental results showed that the synchronized cycle policy is better than an 
individual optimisation and limits buyers to adopt a common order cycle. Moreover, 
they also pointed out that it is interesting in examining what price and quantity 
discounts are needed from the supplier to motivate the buyers to change their policies 
to allow the savings from coordination to be achieved. 
2.4.2 Coordination with quantity price discounts 
The quantity discount problem is prevalent in the inventory management 
realm. Traditional analyses of this problem considered primarily the viewpoint of the 
buyer: calculating the optimal order quantity, which minimises the buyer's total 
relevant costs. However, by switching to the perspective of the supplier, the situation 
becomes significantly different. 
Monahan (1984) considered a quantity discount pricing model for the special 
case of lot-for-lot production (𝑚𝑚 = 1) at an infinite rate (𝑅𝑅 → ∞) to maximise a 
supplier's incremental net profit and cash flow by adjusting the pricing structure. He 
suggested that a supplier policy to entice his major buyers to increase their order 
quantity from Economic Order Quantity (EOQ), 𝑄𝑄∗, by offering a price discount. 
Assuming constant in his model where the holding costs for the buyer, the price 
discount is determined as to ensure that the buyer’s annual costs are kept at the same 
level as they were in the initial equilibrium. Moreover, he showed that the factor 𝐾 by 
which the buyer should increase the order quantity (i.e., the optimal value of 𝐾) is 
independent of the opportunity cost of holding inventory for both the buyer and the 
vendor. One important issue here is that when the buyer is exactly compensated for 
the increase in cost due to a larger order size, the buyer will be indifferent towards 
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increasing his order quantity. The price discount schedule suggested by Monahan's 
model is equivalent to an all unit discount schedule with only one price break. 
Lal and Staelin (1984) addressed this problem by constructing a unified 
pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase the order quantity, so that the 
costs for both the buyer and supplier are decreased. Characterizing the range of order 
sizes and prices, which reduce costs for buyer and supplier, Dada and Srikanth (1987) 
studied and developed a model based upon Lal and Staelin's model. The model was 
extended to allow a price-dependent inventory holding cost, for which the 
corresponding calculation is more complicated than for an independent and constant 
holding cost. 
Lee and Rosenblatt (1986) extended the model from Monahan (1984) by 
focused on two insufficient factors: (i) an additional constraint on the minimum 
acceptable profit margin for the suppliers since no constraints are imposed on the 
amount of price discount offered in the model, it is possible that the model could 
generate a scenario in which the amount of price discount given by the supplier 
exceeds the selling price of the item; (ii) it may not be suitable for the supplier to use 
the lot-for-lot policy when the set-up cost of manufacturing is high. They formulated 
their model by assuming that the cost for the supplier to process the buyer's order is 
negligible, compared to the supplier's set-up cost. However, when this is not the case, 
then the processing cost of the buyer’s orders should be included. They allowed the 
supplier to the buyer an integer multiple (𝑘) of the buyer’s order quantity (𝑘𝑄𝑄), where 
(𝑘) is a positive integer, and maximise the supplier’s yearly net profit subject to the 
constraint on the discount amount offered to the buyer. The authors also developed an 
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efficient algorithm to determine the values of 𝑘 and 𝐾. They use the same price 
discount 𝑘𝐼𝐼  as in Monahan’s model.  
Kim and Hwang (1989) considered the multiple buyers in the case of 
determining the price discount rate and price break point. The mathematical model is 
focuses on the assumption that a supplier supplies a single product to multiple buyers 
where a major benefit for the supplier is directly related to the number of set-up cost 
when an incremental discount system is implemented. They also assumed that each 
buyer follows the order lot-size from EOQ model.  
Joglekar (1988) pointed out the assumption from Monahan (1984). His work is 
focused on price-sensitive demand models where the general system of 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1 and 
(in)finite production rates. He develops an analytic result for 𝛾𝛾 under the lot-for-lot 
assumption, which is equivalent to that in Banerjee (1986), and then presents the 
supplier’s profit function for the general case, but does not go as far as to incorporate 
the price discount policy. Furthermore, he argues that the very small price discounts 
(less than 1%) typically obtained from Monahan (1984), even after the relaxation to 
𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1, do not seem to offer the incentive the buyer needs for adopting the policy, and 
the inventory related benefits alone arising from price discount schemes cannot 
explain commonly observed discounts in the order of 10% of the unit price. He 
therefore argues for the consideration of marketing related factors rather than lot-size 
coordination explains price discount schemes. Joglekar extends Monahan’s model by 
using the optimal production lot-size policy and pointed that it is superior to the 
optimal price discount policy, particularly when the setup cost of the manufacturer is 
substantially larger than the ordering cost of the buyer. He also pointed that it is 
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possible and reasonable for the supplier to use both the optimal production lot-size 
policy and optimal price discount schemes. 
Chakravarty and Martin (1988) developed a pricing discount model, in which 
a single supplier has an infinite production rate, and a single buyer utilizes a periodic 
review system. Assuming all parameters are constants and the demand rate is uniform, 
a negotiation mechanism was introduced to assign a share of the cost savings. 
Chakravarty and Martin (1991) relaxed the assumption of constant demand to a 
demand that varies with respect to the retail price, which is addressed as an additional 
decision variable independent of the discounted wholesale price. 
Joglekar and Tharthare (1990) developed the Joint Economic Lot-sizes 
Problem (JELP) model by relaxing the lot-for-lot assumption, and separated the 
supplier’s setup cost into two parts, the first part is the standard production setup cost 
which used in every production run, and the second part is the supplier’s ordering and 
handling cost from shipping product to a buyer. They presented an alternative 
approach to minimise the total inventory holding and ordering costs for both with a 
single supplier and many buyers that is the Individually Responsible and Rational 
Decision (IRRD) approach. An algebraic proof of IRRD’s superiority over JELS is 
offered in the more general and realistic case of a supplier, dealing with 𝐼𝐼 buyers with 
reasonably predictable annual demand but uncertain order quantities and timings.  
 Banerjee and Burton (1994) developed an integrated production/inventory 
model by using a common cycle co-ordination system where a single supplier and 
multiple buyers are considered under deterministic conditions. They have shown that 
in multiple buyers’ cases in the classical economic lot-size model may not be able to 
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truly reflect the exact scenario due to discrete supplier’s inventory depletion. In 
particular, a stock out may occur, even under deterministic situations, in the absence 
of an adequate reorder point policy. In their model, they have considered the common 
replenishment cycle to all buyers, and the supplier’s manufacturing cycle time is an 
integer multiple of it. The results showed that such coordination was more desirable 
than independent optimisation from a system point of view.  
Weng (1995) attempted to combine the research of marketing and operations 
literature. He proposed a coordination mechanism using an order-quantity discount 
and a periodic franchise fee. Chen et al. (2001) considered a two-echelon system, in 
which a supplier distributes a single product to multiple buyers who in turn sell to the 
final consumers. They showed that Weng's scheme is not guaranteed to coordinate the 
channel when the buyers are not identical. Through comparison of a centralized and 
decentralized systems, they illustrated that the optimum level of channel wide profit 
can be also achieved when the system is decentralized, but only via periodically 
charged fixed fees and a non-traditional discount pricing scheme. That non-traditional 
discount is the sum of three discount components based on the buyer: 1) annual sales 
volume, 2) order quantity, and 3) order frequency. 
Li and Liu (2006) developed a price discount model for a supplier-buyer 
system with multiple periods and the demand rate is probabilistic. They showed the 
benefit of making joint decisions, and designed a method to divide this extra benefit 
between the buyer and supplier. That method can be used to obtain the optimal 
quantity discount policy. Lau et al. (2008) studied a situation in which a manufacturer 
sells products to a multiple buyers. This manufacturer does not need to coordinate the 
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replenishment cycle with the buyers, and the handling charge paid by the buyers can 
be reduced when orders are sufficiently large. 
2.4.3 Coordination mechanism through VMI 
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) is applied in many industrial and service 
cases as a partnership to coordinate replenishment decisions in a supply chain while 
maintaining the independence of chain members. An important part of the VMI also 
refers to the policy called as vendor-managed inventory, or direct replenishment. In 
this partnership between a supplier and buyer, where the supplier decides when and in 
what quantity the buyer’s stock should be replenished. With such an agreement, the 
supplier may be able to share the buyer’s point-of-sale and inventory-level data. From 
the supplier’s perspective: 
• Receiving information on buyer stock levels, sales, and any sales forecasts 
that have been made such as EDI, fax or the internet. 
• Generating replenishment orders as needed. 
• Sending dispatch advice to the buyer. 
Gümüş et al. (2008) has summarized the possible benefits under VMI policy. 
The buyer is not only achieved the benefits from placing order and manage his 
inventory from the supplier, but also he may achieve the benefit turns from the 
inventory increase while being guaranteed a service level. Moreover, the supplier can 
potentially enhance the gross margin by reducing the costs of manufacturing and 
transportation. 
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Characteristics of VMI-Consignment agreement 
VMI-consignment (CI) agreements in the strategy whereby the supplier has 
authorised to manage inventory at the buyer site, the buyer only pays for the supplier 
in the product price at the moment that the product has been sold to the final 
customer. In this section we are discussing in the characteristics of VMI-consignment. 
In a CI agreement, the buyer sends the quantity orders to the supplier for a specific 
time period. After that the product are delivered to a warehouse at the buyer’s site, the 
buyer then takes the required amount at any time from the supplier’s warehouse (the 
buyer does not pay for goods until they has been sold to the final customer). Hence, 
the CI is considered as most beneficial for the buyer: CI requires no information 
sharing; inventory management takes a minimum effort for the buyer, who pays no 
opportunity cost of capital in inventory. The buyer can order as much as storage 
space, permits, yet pay just upon used. The benefit can be expected for the supplier is 
a continued business with the buyer. If there is a VMI-agreement, however, the 
supplier is not controlled by the buyer. The supplier can simultaneously manage the 
total inventory, and produce more effectively because of increased flexibility in 
timing and quantity and supplier can use economies of scale in his operations. 
Aggarwal and Jaggi (1995) considered the consignment where the supplier 
allows a certain fixed period to settle the account with the buyer for the deteriorating 
items. During this period, no interest charges for delayed payment. Under a 
consignment arrangement, they formulate the inventory management problem as a 
deterministic model. They also develop a solution algorithm to obtain the optimal 
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order quantity under this special condition. Meanwhile, no further analyses had been 
conducted to compare the consignment with other systems.  
Hung et al. (1995) modeled for the consignment represents the real case of the 
industry wherein, the payment to the supplier is not made until stocks are actually 
moved to the buyer’s production line. Under this consignment arrangement, the 
warehouse space is provided by the buyer for a supplier to use for stocking. Since 
they assume that the stock in the buyer’s warehouse is managed by the supplier, this 
system is considered to be the combination of VMI and consignment. They formulate 
the model for the consignment as an inventory control model based on MRP runs and 
use non-linear programming to obtain optimal solutions of the delivery period and 
safety stock level with a time-period base. Their study does not conduct any in-depth 
analyses to examine the performance of the consignment system. Normally, the 
independent supply chain is not efficient as the coordination one, and the alternative 
performance measurement scheme is required to align the incentives and interests of 
multiple managers in the independent supply chain system.  
Based on Hill (1999) joint economic lot size model, Braglia and Zavanella 
(2003) develop the model for consignment stock strategy and compare its 
performance with one of non-consignment case. Under the consignment arrangement, 
the supplier keeps a certain amount of inventory at the buyer’s warehouse, in 
particular, between maximum levels (S) and a minimum level (s) and pays additional 
costs incurred by stock-out cases. The buyer does not pay for the capital-linked 
holding costs for inventories at his or her warehouse, and the supplier can use the 
buyer’s warehouse space as his or her own one. In their model assumption, the major 
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difference between Hill’s model and the consignment system is that stocks are located 
at the supplier’s warehouse but it is at the buyer’s in the consignment. The analyses of 
proposed models imply that, in general, the consignment policy outperforms the 
traditional non-consignment policy when the variances of demand and lead-times are 
high. The explicit form of optimal solutions for their consignment stock policy model 
is proposed by Zanoni and Grubbstrom* (2004) and it provides a convenient method 
for obtain the optimal solution of the amount of delivery, the number of deliveries, 
and the number of deliveries to be delayed.  
Corbett (2001) considered the consignment stock to be a mixture for typical 
problems of the traditional supply chain system - incentive conflicts and information 
asymmetries. In other words, the consignment scheme may reduce the system 
inefficiency caused by the information asymmetries by changing the incentive 
structure of the system. He formulates the order quantity and reorder point problem as 
a principal-agent model in two player context and examines the impact of 
consignment stock on the supply chain performance under information asymmetries 
about setup cost and backorder cost. According to his consignment scheme, the 
supplier owns the inventory held at the buyer’s warehouse until it is consumed and the 
supplier guarantees the base level of inventory enough to fulfill expected future 
demand. The analysis of his proposed model indicates that, when the setup cost is 
known to only the supplier, the consignment stock can decrease the impact of 
information asymmetry. In a case that the supplier does not know the buyer’s 
backorder cost, the supplier should overcompensate for buyer’s stock out in order to 
obtain the minimum system cost.  
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Valentini and Zavanella (2003) formulated the model for the consignment 
stock management based on Hill’s joint economic lot size model (1997), and examine 
the impact of the consignment on the supply chain performance. According to their 
model of consignment arrangement policy, the buyer pays only the stocking cost and 
the supplier pays the financial opportunity cost for inventory holding at the buyer’s 
warehouse. On the other hand, the buyer has a full responsibility to pay both costs for 
inventories at his or her warehouse in the non-consignment case. Their analyses of the 
proposed model show that the consignment policy results in a 6% reduction in the 
total cost compared with the classical policy. The consignment stock policy also 
benefits both the supplier and buyer in that it leads to the high minimum level of 
inventory at the buyer’s warehouse and then it improves the service level at 
reasonable costs.  
Characteristics of VMI agreement 
Under a VMI agreement, inventory costs for shipping goods to the buyer are 
generally charged from the buyer. However, in some cases, a strong buyer may force 
the supplier to assume those costs as well. The general opinion in industry seems to be 
that VMI is more favorable for the supplier, who would combine orders and deliveries 
in large amounts without worrying about the average inventory level of buyer. 
The independent firms cannot achieve the optimal overall supply-chain 
performance. Coordination within a supply chain is mainly referred to finding the 
optimal actions for chain members who need to align their decisions to achieve the 
minimise costs. There are several ways in coordination with VMI where the benefit 
for both parties can be identified by higher sales and better optimization of in-house 
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production and transportation to the buyers as advantages for the supplier, reduced 
costs of inventory management, less delivery problems, and better customer service 
(higher sales) for the buyer. Implementation of VMI programs are not always 
considered a success. It is ideally supported by an automated EDI-system between 
buyer and supplier, where Point-Of-Sales (POS) data and inventory status data are 
transmitted from buyer to supplier. The incentive to apply those optimal actions can 
be set by transfer payments. More on coordination can be found in Thomas and 
Griffin (1996), Corbett and Tang (1999), Gallego and Boyaci (2000), (Aviv, 2001), 
Agrawal and Seshadri (2000), and Chen et al. (2001).  
Narayanan and Raman (1997) analysed the VMI agreements between a single 
supplier and single buyer. They are compared between the traditional buyer-managed-
inventory and VMI in order to identify the situations where stocking-decision rights 
should be transferred from buyer to supplier.  
Aviv and Federgruen (1998) investigated the impacts of information sharing, 
by considering a single supplier and multiple buyers. VMI policy is assumed that 
leads to a fully centralised planning model where the supplier minimises the total cost 
of inventory holding and distribution. Moreover, they used a combination of Markov 
decision process and non-linear programming to construct approximate policies for 
the supplier and the buyers under both information-sharing alone and information 
sharing in conjunction with VMI. They find that the VMI with an information sharing 
is always more beneficial than information sharing alone.  
Çetinkaya and Lee (2000) considered the synchronize inventory and 
transportation models where the buyer demand is Poisson distribution. They are 
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analysed model based on renewal theory enables determination of the optimal 
replenishment quantity and delivery frequency. Their contribution is based on an 
idealised application of VMI, whereby the supplier has the autonomy of holding 
orders until an appropriate dispatch time at which orders can be economically 
consolidated. 
Fry et al. (2001) examined the VMI policy for a single supplier and single 
buyer with some of operational flexibility. The supplier follows a fixed production 
schedule plan, but the product cans deliveries to the buyer in each or any period. They 
assumed that VMI is initiated by a contract which transfers decision rights to the 
supplier, but that supplier must maintain certain stock levels at the buyer’s site. The 
experimental results are compared with the performance of traditional buyer-
managed-inventory with information sharing and VMI. Through a periodic review 
inventory model, the solution showed that VMI can give the beneficial in most 
scenarios but not all, and also that its effectiveness depends strongly on the initiating 
contract. 
Cachon (2001) studied VMI in a single supplier and multiple-buyers. Several 
different VMI strategies are analysed in order to aim for finding the optimal solution 
of coordinating the channel. In each case, he utilises the game theory to find the 
equilibrium for each party of the supply chain. With a VMI agreement, the supplier 
can determine all reorder points. Cachon remarks that VMI alone does not guarantee 
an optimal supply-chain solution, but both the suppliers and buyers must also agree to 
make fixed transfer payments to participate in the VMI contract, and then be willing 
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to share the benefits. The numerical experiments show that there is no improvement 
under VMI can be achieved if fixed payments are not allowed.  
Dong and Xu (2002) studied the economics of consignment inventory in the 
long-term and short-term, and others have taken VMI to be synonymous with the 
consignment arrangement. This paper examines the impacts of VMI on the 
performance of a supply channel, including buyer’s and supplier’s profits. As 
expected, the analytic models show that VMI improves the buyer’s profit in any case, 
but the supplier’s benefits vary depending on the duration of VMI implementation. 
The short-term effect of VMI is harmful to the supplier’s profit due to increased 
inventory costs under certain cost conditions. However, the supplier can realize 
favourable outcomes from VMI due to increased buyer’s demand levels in the long 
term. Therefore, this result implies that it is necessary to provide certain rewards to 
the supplier at the beginning of VMI implementation in order to compensate for the 
supplier’s loss due to increased inventory cost. The authors consider raising the 
purchase price as the compensation for the supplier who participates in the VMI 
program. Therefore, the study raises the issue of how to determine the optimal 
purchase price to achieve mutual benefits for both supplier and buyer during the entire 
period of the VMI program. 
Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) studied a VMI policy with the constant of 
the demand rate, by setting characterised as a partially centralised model where the 
buyer retains decision rights on pricing and sales target. The replenishment plan has 
been determined by the supplier. The experimental results show that channel 
coordination can be achieved under VMI.  
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Bernstein et al. (2006) presented VMI+ and  VMI− whereby the supplier 
determines lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 and integer multiplication𝑚𝑚simultaneously from his own profit 
function. They show how VMI partnerships create echelon operational autonomy 
(EOA) is the resulting coordinate pricing schemes. In particular, models have 
compared and contrasted in the coordination schemes with two different VMI 
strategies: (i) VMI+, where the supplier incurs all inventory costs and (ii) VMI−, 
where the buyers continue to incur the costs associated with their inventory. The main 
objective of this thesis is in order to achieve perfect coordination, where the supplier 
must choose his replenishment decisions to minimise supply chain wide 
replenishment costs. The result provides an argument for implementing VMI with full 
inventory consignment as in VMI+. 
Yao et al. (2007) analysed an inventory model to determine how key logistics 
parameters can affect to the benefits of VMI. Based on their model of a single 
supplier and a single buyer, they deduce the following conclusions. First, the supplier 
will order from its upstream supplier using the same order quantity in the VMI 
scenario as in the non-VMI scenario. Second, the supplier will replenish the buyer 
with an order quantity that is smaller in the VMI scenario than the quantity that the 
buyer will order in the non VMI scenario, leading to the confirmation of the 
conventional wisdom that implementing VMI leads to higher replenishment 
frequencies and smaller order quantities between the supplier and the buyer. The 
results of this paper show that the implementation of VMI will always lower the total 
amount of inventory in the system by lowering the average inventory levels at the 
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buyer and the optimal replenishment frequency in the VMI scenario giving an 
improvement in total costs of the supply chain. 
Gümüş et al. (2008) presented VMI and consignment inventory (CI) are 
supply-chain sourcing practices between a supplier and buyer. CI approach is 
analysed whereby the buyer only pays the supplier in wholesale price at the moment a 
sale is made to the final customer. In CI, it seems to favour the buyer because she 
pays for the goods only upon used. The results show that CI can create benefits for the 
supplier, and the buyer, and for the both parties together. 
Darwish and Odah (2010) presented a VMI model for single supplier multi 
buyers that allow the supplier to determine lot-size whereby buyer pays for the goods 
upon delivery, but the supplier pays the fixed and the supplier pays the fixed of 
delivery charges. This model explicitly includes the VMI contractual agreement 
between the supplier and buyers. The developed model can easily describe supply 
chains with capacity constraints by selecting high penalty cost. Moreover, an efficient 
algorithm is devised to find the globally optimal solution. This algorithm reduces the 
computational efforts significantly. In addition, numerical experiments are conducted 
to show the utility of the proposed model. 
 
2.5 Net present value for inventory models 
The concept the Net Present Value applied for inventory models and literature 
survey is described in this section. The Net Present Value (NPV) is widely accepted 
as an alternative valid framework for studying production and inventory systems. In 
the NPV analysis, all cash flows related to activities are valued by their time of 
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occurrence using one common discount rate, which represents the opportunity cost of 
the next best alternative for the firm. Grubbström (1980) demonstrated that the capital 
costs of inventories in the various stages of a supply chain can then be retrieved from 
the linearised NPV or Annuity Stream (AS) of this cash-flow function. The NPV has 
been used in this manner in quite a number of studies, see also Hadley and Whitin 
(1963); Trippi and Lewin (1974); Thompson (1975); G r u b b s t r ö m  a n d  
T h o r s t e n s o n ( 1 9 8 6 ) ; Grubbström (1998); Klein Haneveld and Teunter (1998); 
Hofmann (1998). 
Thompson (1975) argues for the need to view inventory decisions in the same 
way one would capital budgeting problems and derives results similar to Trippi and 
Lewin (1974). After examining the simple EOQ model in present value terms, the 
model accounts into payable and receivable policies, taxes, insurance, storage charges 
and deterioration. The result of the analyses is that these other issues are more 
naturally handled by modifying the cost parameters (unit cost and setup) rather than 
adjusting the carrying cost. 
Grubbström (1980) and Grubbström and Thorstenson (1981) look at how 
present value analysis of inventory systems leads to more accurate assessments of the 
capital costs of various inventories in the firm.  They consider a different way from 
the other approaches in which they use the annuity stream function to derive the 
inventory model that mirror the annual cost of the average cost model. The general 
conclusion of this work is that these costs are often understated by average cost 
models. Grubbström (1980) has shown that where the economic consequences of 
production planning decisions need to be known then the NPV should be applied 
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instead of the cost approach, which is rather used in practice. The author notes that in 
practice, inventory-holding costs usually value as an estimate of the costs laid down in 
the product up to current date, multiplied by an interest rate reflecting the cost of 
capital of the firm. 
Gurnani (1983) modelled inventory systems with present value analysis and 
develop exact expressions for a number of models. This paper compares the present 
value model with classical inventory framework and concludes that the results differ 
substantially, illustrating the difference with graphs and tables to show the effect of 
the discount rate on lot sizes. The classical model lead to inaccuracies since the 
holding cost of inventory is considered to be only items such as storage space, 
deterioration, etc. 
Teunter et al. (2000) introduced the way that the AC approach usually deals 
with the underestimation of the interest component for cash flows related to variable 
production costs is to add a certain factor to the out-of-pocket holding cost parameter. 
This factor is usually taken as the interest rate r times the value of the stocked item. 
This approach has a number of disadvantages. First, it assumes that the overestimation 
is proportional to average inventory, although this does not need to be the case, but in 
fact; the size and timing of cash flows are dependent on cycle times rather than the 
existence of physical stocks. Second, it only deals with an underestimation of the 
interest component and not with overestimation, since the value of a stocked item is 
usually taken to be positive. Third, this approach only considers the interest 
components of variable production costs, while interest components of all other cash 
flows (fixed costs, sales, etc.) are not taken into account. Finally, it is unclear what is 
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meant by the value of a stocked item, since this depends on the type of decision that 
has to be made. 
Van der Laan and Teunter (2002) concluded that although the NPV approach 
is the most appropriate framework, Average Cost (AC) models dominate the field of 
inventory control. In their paper “Average cost versus net present value: a comparison 
of multi-source inventory models”, the authors have shown that the traditional AC 
approach, which does not make a distinction between opportunity costs of holding 
inventories and physical inventory costs, leads to reasonable results for single-source 
systems, but not necessarily for multi-source systems. Single source systems are those 
in which inventories consist of products that all have generated the same cash flows, 
as compared to multi-source systems in which inventories consist of products that 
have been produced in different ways against different costs. For example, this is the 
case with products that can be both newly manufactured and re-manufactured from 
old products. On the other side, the NPV approach makes a clear distinction between 
physical inventory costs and opportunity costs, since the two are not directly related, 
and the latter does not depend on physical stocks at all, but only on the amount and 
timing of the investments. The traditional AC approach only takes the opportunity 
costs of holding inventories into account, but this should not be a general rule. 
According to the authors, all cash flows generate opportunity costs or yields that 
cannot be disregarded if the cash flows depend on decision parameters. As a 
conclusion, Laan notes that basically there are two classes of models: a class for 
which a holding cost transformation exists that does not depend on the decision 
variables, such that the NPV coincides with AC (up to a constant), and a class for 
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which such a transformation does not exist. A typical example of the latter class is a 
system with manufacturing, remanufacturing, and disposal. 
Naim et al. (2007) stated that a number of production planning studies have 
been undertaken with the aim of maximizing the NPV. The NPV approach in 
inventory theory has a root in a theory of Arrow et al. (1951) who introduced the 
concept of “net utility” noted that in the case of profit-making enterprises this “net 
utility” is “conveniently approximated by profit: the difference between gross money 
revenue and money cost” Arrow et al. (1951). The authors further state that the “net 
utility” to any policy maker (a holder of inventories) is, in general, a random variable 
that depends on certain conditions some of which he can control but others he cannot. 
Among those the policy maker can control are strategies and rules of action (such is 
the size of the order), and those that he cannot be represented by a joint probability 
distribution of non-controlled conditions (demand rate, lead-time, ordering costs, 
etc.). The authors conclude that a rational (inventory) policy consists in “fixing the 
controlled conditions so as to maximise the expected value of utility, given the 
probability distribution of non-controlled conditions” Arrow et al. (1951). 
Beullens and Janssens (2011) introduced the concept of Anchor Point (AP) in 
a supply chain and show using the NPV framework that its position in the supply 
chain can affected the valuation of capital costs of inventories in the different stages 
of a supply chain. In this paper, it is shown that the Annuity stream (AS) functions 
might be highly dependent on the way the NPV framework is constructed. By 
introducing the concept of Anchor Point, it is shown that the classical inventory 
framework makes (implicitly) different assumptions about the position of the Anchor 
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Point than the NPV models that have been used in the literature to point out the 
inferiority of the classical framework. 
For certain classes of production and inventory problems, however, the 
difference between the classical and the NPV framework seems large, as in e.g. 
Grubbström (1980); G r u b b s t r ö m  a n d  T h o r s t e n s o n  ( 1 9 8 6 ) ; Van der Laan 
and Teunter (2002). A somewhat unresolved issue here is explaining and 
understanding why this happens. One step forward is made in Grubbström (1980), and 
later in e.g. Klein Haneveld and Teunter (1998); Teunter et al. (2000) and Van der 
Laan and Teunter (2002), where it is shown how linearisations of AS functions can be 
directly compared with the functions derived in the traditional way. 
 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, research studies that had been carried out to coordinate 
production and inventory in the supply chain are reviewed. As described, there are 
three types of coordination in the supply chain. Firstly, many stream researches are 
studying in the integrated production and inventory models between supplier and 
buyer where both actors agree to join the optimal lot-sizes and some variables in 
multiple buyer cases in order to maximise the total profit function for both of them 
and supply chain. In addition, those classical models such as Goyal (1976); Banerjee 
(1986); Joglekar (1988) are analysed and compared with the model derived from the 
NPV framework in Chapter 4. 
Secondly, the quantity pricing discount scheme where a supplier aims to 
induce a buyer to change his ordering pattern as to increase the supplier’s profits. 
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Those classical models on price discounts are studied in the simple buyer-supplier 
inventory modes with constant deterministic demand. The quantity price discount 
models derived from the NPV framework are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Thirdly, the literature survey provides the coordination through VMI 
agreements in general. There are two categories of literature that have ties to VMI 
research. The first category depicts a VMI agreement as a mechanism to coordinate 
the supply chain, while the latter identifies literature that is focused on the benefits of 
VMI contracts. The strategies of VMI models for single supplier and single buyer 
derived from the NPV framework are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Finally, the NPV framework is discussed in this chapter. Most classical 
models in the production and inventory management from the literature have been 
focused around the physical properties of the systems but are different from the NPV 
approach. The model is derived from amount of timing investment where money is 
being paid out or received depends on the timing of cash flows. the NPV framework 
is applied to construct the models in this thesis and compared with the classical 
framework in order to analyse the contribution gap which is achieved for the buyer-
supplier and the supply chain. 
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Chapter 3: Net Present Value Framework for Production and 
Inventory Models 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter we proposed the concept of Net Present Value (NPV) framework 
for the coordination buyer-supplier of production and inventory models. The Average 
Profit (AP) function from classical frameworks is investigated where holding cost 
parameters are refined. Then, the Annuity Stream model is applied to derive simple 
models and their approximations compared with solutions derived from the classical 
framework. This chapter is concerned with gaining a better understanding of the ways 
and policies to reach coordination between independent supply chain actors. The 
objective of supply chain coordination is to increase the profits for all parties 
involved. The numerical result is solved by Excel spread sheet version 2010. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In this chapter, we present the 
proposed model of the Net Present Value (NPV) framework for deriving the 
coordination buyer-supplier of production and inventory models. In Section 3.2,         
a description of the inventory models with the NPV approach is provided. Section 3.3, 
assumptions and notations are provided. Section 3.4, the Average Profit (AP) function 
for inventory model is introduced where holding cost parameters are refined. Section 
3.5, supplier reward, the main missing link is identified. In Section 3.6, Annuity 
Stream function to derive inventory modelling is discussed. In Section 3.7, the 
discount problem explained. In Section 3.8, numerical examples and discussions are 
presented and the concluding remarks are given in section 3.9. 
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3.2 Net present value and inventory models 
The classical inventory modelling framework initiated by the Harris (1915) 
and Wilson (1934) and later adopted and extended in many articles and textbooks, 
Silver et al. (1998) and Hillier and Lieberman (2005). In this framework, the holding 
cost of keeping inventory is found by assuming a holding cost ℎ per product per time 
unit, such that if ℎ𝑞(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 represents the total holding cost in the infinitesimal time 
interval [𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡] during which 𝑞(𝑡𝑡) items are held in stock, the holding cost per 
year can be found by integration. In addition to other cost components, most notably 
set-up costs for every order placed, a total average cost function is obtained from 
which optimal decisions can be derived. In this chapter, the term of the AP function 
will be used to denote the negative of cost functions derived from the classical 
framework. 
According to Silver et al. (1998), the cost of holding inventory ℎ includes the 
opportunity cost of the money invested, expenses for running the warehouse, handling 
and other variable costs, insurance and taxes, and losses from deterioration, damage, 
theft, and obsolescence. Therefore, the holding cost is made up of the opportunity cost 
of capital (Silver et al., 1998), and thus in many models the following convention is 
adopted for the carrying cost per year (Silver et al., 1998): 
 
 
Where 𝛼𝛼 is the unit variable cost to be invested for every unit placed in 
inventory, 𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) is the average inventory in units, and α is the carrying charge or the 
cost of carrying 1 unit of money's worth of inventory for one year. This 𝛼𝛼 is defined 
(3-1) ℎ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)  =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼),  
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as the return on investment that could be earned on the next best alternative for the 
firm. When in addition variable ‘out-of-pocket’ costs are important, such as the cost 
of insurance or rental of warehouse space, Eq.(3-1) is typically changed to (Teunter et 
al., 2000; Sarmah et al., 2007): 
 
 
Where 𝑓𝑓 is the total sum per unit of such costs. Although often used, the 
questions related to which cost elements to consider and how to calculate from these 
the right values for 𝛼𝛼 and 𝑓𝑓 is still not very well answered. 
Net Present Value analysis (NPV) seems to hold the key to these answers. In 
the NPV, all cash-flows related to an activity are valued by their time of occurrence 
using one common discount factor 𝛼𝛼, which represents the opportunity cost of the 
next best alternative for the firm. The NPV framework provides Annuity Stream (AS) 
profit functions for an inventory model which can be analytically or numerically 
compared with the AP functions, see Grubbström (1980); Van der Laan and Teunter 
(2002). For some models, like the basic EOQ, AP functions provide indeed (near) 
optimal solutions from the NPV viewpoint, at least within a range of most common 
parameter values, see in Klein Haneveld and Teunter (1998). 
This close match of AP and AS functions is not guaranteed and in some 
models the gap can be wide. An early example is given by Grubbström (1980) for a 
model of production in which the production rate equals the constant demand rate and 
where the demand is fulfilled in batches. In the model, the inventory function over 
(3-2) (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 +  𝑓𝑓)𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼), 
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time at the production site is the mirror image of the saw-tooth function of the basic 
EOQ model. The classical approach would suggest valuing the holding cost of the 
production cost, but the NPV result in Grubbström (1980) says that it should be 
valued at the sales price. At least in such models, a reinterpretation of the traditional 
(holding) cost parameters can solve any conceptual contradictions between the AP 
functions and the NPV framework but this is not always possible. 
This chapter provides the mathematical models to justify in the result that 
presents from the NPV analysis for a particular set of inventory models commonly 
used to study the buyer and the supplier coordination problems. Many of these models 
do recognize the cost of early investments in inventories, but do not consider the 
rewards of early payments received. From the NPV point of view, this seems 
irrational. Two simple examples illustrate the main argument. When asked to choose 
between either paying out 1,200 pounds as a lump sum at the start of the year or in 
installments of 100 each month of that year (under normal economic circumstances), 
and this every year onwards, the logical answer should be to choose the latter option. 
Similarly, when the money would be received, the answer should be to take the lump 
sum. Lot-size decisions taken by the buyer have the same effect on his own carrying 
cost as that presented in the first example, but at the same time they also present to the 
supplier the effect as illustrated in the second example and this effect is not included 
in the models. This effect, however, can be of similar or even greater impact that the 
holding cost on the profitability of the supplier. 
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3.3 Assumptions and notations 
The structure of the Average profit (AP) functions for buyer, supplier, and 
joint supply chain, as they are commonly found in the literature, is presented in a 
relatively simple but widely studied system. Consider two independent parties: a 
buyer and a supplier (vendor). The buyer purchases a single product from the 
supplier. The assumptions are both parties have perfect information about the other 
player’s characteristics; final demand occurs at a constant rate; lead-time is zero; 
stock-outs are not allowed; the supplier produces at an infinite rate (or buys from 
external); and there are no capacity constraints. The following notation is introduced: 
𝐷𝐷:  The annual demand for the product at the buyer; 
𝑅𝑅:  The supplier’s production rate (𝑅𝑅 > 𝐷𝐷); 
𝑝𝑝:  The product’s reversed demand function (sales price); 
𝑤𝑤:  The contract purchase price (paid by the buyer); 
𝑐𝑐:  The production cost (paid by the supplier); 
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏:  The buyer’s fixed order processing cost; 
ℎ𝑏𝑏:  The buyer’s holding cost per product per year; 
𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏:  The buyer’s internal annual holding cost rate; 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏:  The lot-size between supplier and buyer; 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠:  The fixed order (set-up) processing cost per supplier’s acquiring order; 
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝:  The supplier’s fixed order processing cost per buyer’s order; 
ℎ𝑠𝑠:  The supplier’s holding cost per product per year; 
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠:  The supplier’s internal annual holding cost rate; 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠:  The supplier’s lot-size; 
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𝑚𝑚:  The integer multiplication (𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1); 
 
3.4 Average profit functions 
The basic problem is usually to find optimal values for the lot-sizes 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠, 
under either the assumption that both parties act independently and thus aim to 
maximise their individual profit function, or the assumption that they wish to find the 
optimal lot-sizes jointly from their channel function. 
The AP for buyer-supplier models have been widely studied in various 
settings. It corresponds directly to that first presented in Goyal (1976) and later used 
in numerous average cost based studies on buyer-supplier coordination mechanisms, 
as in Lee and Rosenblatt (1986); Goyal (1987b); Chiang et al. (1994); and Abad 
(1994); Viswanathan and Wang (2003). Imposing the condition that 𝑚𝑚 = 1 leads to 
the special case of lot-for-lot production, and then the model is directly comparable 
with the models in Monahan (1984); Chakravarty and Martin (1988); Kim and Hwang 
(1989); Li and Huang (1995); Li et al. (1996). Some models in the literature are more 
general in that the supplier is assumed to be producing the product at a finite 
production rate 𝑅𝑅, as in Goyal (1988); Weng (1995a, b); Munson and Rosenblatt 
(2001); Ben-Daya and Hariga (2004); Li and Liu (2006) and Joglekar et al. (2006) 
have deterministic demand. 
The fact that buyer and supplier are independent firms wanting to make a 
profit means that 𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐 > 0 and 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤 > 0 must be assumed. In fact, these per unit 
profits must be significantly larger than zero such that, at annual sales volume 𝐷𝐷, 
these can cover at least the companies’ other expenses, including the ordering, 
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transportation, and inventory costs, and the fixed annual attributed costs of overheads 
and capital investments. The flow of the lot-sizes follows the standard assumptions. 
The buyer receives items in batches of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 at equidistant points in time with cycle 
time 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/𝐷𝐷. The buyer’s inventory position over time follows the classical saw-
tooth function, as given in Figure 3-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Inventory at buyer and supplier 
 
3.4.1 Buyer’s profit function 
For facing constant uniform demand (see Figure 3-1). The buyer orders in 
fixed order quantities 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 at a cycle time 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/𝐷𝐷. The buyer’s average profit (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏) 
per unit of time for the buyer is typically calculated as the sum of the total marginal 
profits, set-up costs, and inventory costs, as (Goyal, 1976; Viswanathan and Wang, 
2003; Sarmah et al., 2006; Joglekar et al., 2006): 
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The first term in Eq.(3-3) represents the marginal profits on sales, the second 
the set-up costs, the third the holding costs. The buyer therefore orders according to 
the classical economic order quantity shown in Eq.(3-4): 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Supplier’s profit function 
For any given order quantity 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, the supplier will adopt the policy to produce 
in quantity 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, where 𝑚𝑚 is an integer at least 1. Williams (1982) shows that 
the integer ratio policy is optimal for the system studied in this chapter, but also that it 
is not necessarily optimal in the general systems. The supplier’s cycle time is thus 
𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/𝐷𝐷. The first batch of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 items are delivered to the buyer at the start of 
each cycle, and the other 𝑚𝑚 − 1 are dispatched in equal time intervals 𝑇𝑇. 
 
 
The supplier’s average profit (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠) function is typically given as the sum of 
marginal profits, the first term in Eq.(3-5), the second is set-up costs, and inventory 
holding costs in the last term as (Goyal, 1976; Lee and Rosenblatt, 1986; Weng, 
1995b; Viswanathan and Wang, 2003; Hillier and Lieberman, 2005): 
(3-3) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − ℎ𝑏𝑏 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
(3-5) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − ℎ𝑠𝑠 (𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗ = �2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
ℎ𝑏𝑏
 
  
(3-4) 
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To determine supplier’s optimal lot-size, the supplier will accept the buyer’s 
lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, and then determine the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚 based on his own profit 
function shown in Eq.(3-6): 
 
 
where 𝑚𝑚∗should be rounded up to 1 if it is smaller, and otherwise rounded to 
the nearest higher or lower integer, whichever gives the highest profit function value. 
3.4.3 Coordination profit function 
Another reason for buyer supplier coordination is that if the buyer and 
supplier, instead of determining their policies independently, would jointly determine 
the best policy for their supply chain and is able and willing to implement it; 
considerable cost savings across their supply chain can usually be made. The so-
called ‘channel profit’ or joint profit function, defined as the sum of the buyer’s and 
supplier’s profit functions in Eq.(3-3) and Eq.(3-5), respectively, should give the 
function from which the joint optimal policy can be found, as in Goyal (1976); Abad 
(1994); Weng (1995b); Ben-Daya and Hariga (2004). Coordination profit 
function (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) is: 
 
 
The optimal policy for the supply chain, when 𝐷𝐷 and 𝑤𝑤 are constant then the 
optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚 are determined simultaneously such that Eq.(3-7) is 
(3-7) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − ℎ𝑠𝑠 (𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − ℎ𝑏𝑏 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
(3-6) 𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ��𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠
, 1� 
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maximised (Goyal, 1976). The supply chain’s optimal result produces in general 
higher total profits at the expense of a drop in profits for buyer or supplier (Goyal, 
1976). The optimal lot-size for coordination 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ and 𝑚𝑚∗ can be derived as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
The above three equations in Eq.(3-3), Eq.(3-5), and Eq.(3-7) are, however, 
not consistent with that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠. There are theoretical different ways to 
make the sum of the individual profit functions equal to their supply chain profit 
function. It could be, perhaps, that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is wrong,  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 or 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠, or three functions. 
However,  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 specified above is compatible with the multi-echelon theory of Clark 
and Scarf (1960). It could also be that the sums of individual profit functions do not 
need to be equal to the supply chain profit function. 
It can be proven that the correct solution according to the NPV principle must 
indeed hold by 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠, and that the way to add a supplier’s reward to the 
supplier’s profit function as explained in the next section. 
3.4.4 Setting holding cost 
In the literature, many authors (Monahan, 1984; Banerjee, 1986; Lee and 
Rosenblatt, 1986; Chakravarty and Martin, 1988; Goyal, 1988; Kim and Hwang, 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
∗ = �2(𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚)𝐷𝐷
ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚 − 1) + ℎ𝑏𝑏  
  
(3-8) 
(3-9) 𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ��𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(ℎ𝑏𝑏 − ℎ𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠 , 1� 
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1989; Abad, 1994; Weng, 1995a; Li and Huang, 1995) set the holding cost for the 
buyer to ℎ𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤. In models of larger complexity (Munson and Rosenblatt, 2001; 
Viswanathan and Wang, 2003; Joglekar et al., 2006) authors prefer to keep the 
holding cost ℎ𝑏𝑏 as a fixed constant. Viswanathan and Wang (2003), however, point 
out that its interpretation is the same as above that is should be valued at 𝑤𝑤. The new 
optimal buyer’s profit function and lot-size  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 are changed as in Eq.(3-10) and Eq.(3-
11). 
 
   
 
This seems logical, as 𝑤𝑤 is the money tied up in goods over a period of time, 
money that could have been used to invest in other profit generating projects instead. 
In the same literature, those that further specify ℎ𝑠𝑠 in the holding cost term for 
the supplier (Banerjee, 1986; Lee and Rosenblatt, 1986; Goyal, 1988; Abad, 1994; 
Weng, 1995a; Lu, 1995), also value it at the money invested, i.e. ℎ𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐. This also 
corresponds with supplier’s profit function results in Eq.(3-5) is: 
 
   
(3-12) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 (𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗ = �2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏
 
  
(3-11) 
(3-10) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
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The joint profit function, as the sum of Eq.(3-10) and Eq.(3-12), as in e.g. 
Banerjee (1986); Goyal (1995); Chakravarty and Martin (1988); Abad (1994); Li et 
al. (1996): 
 
  
The joint optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ and 𝑚𝑚 are simultaneously determined from the 
channel function: 
 
 
 
 
where again 𝑚𝑚∗, should be rounded up to 1 if it is smaller, and otherwise 
rounded to the nearest higher or lower integer, whichever gives the highest profit 
function value. 
 
3.5 Supplier reward 
It is useful to formulate some intuitive understanding of the holding cost terms 
already presented in Section 3.4. The holding cost is valued at the level of 𝑤𝑤 in Eq.(3-
10), which can be interpreted that the final demand is uniform and constant, and since 
shortages are not allowed, the buyer’s income will be guaranteed to arrive in a 
constant stream. Thus, any inventory held means that buyer has invested too early 
(3-13) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 (𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
(3-15) 𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ��𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤 − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐)𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 , 1� 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
∗ = �2(𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚)𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1) + 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤 
  
(3-14) 
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with respect to the moment that the demand arrives that it needs to fulfill, and this 
investment is made at a rate of 𝑤𝑤 per unit of product. The larger the lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, 
means more that the buyer has invested too early; his average cost is thus increasing 
by 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/2. Indeed, it's not correct to say that holding inventory implies a delayed 
income at a rate of the final sales price. Similar argumentation may explain why the 
supplier values his holding cost of the rate 𝑐𝑐 in Eq.(3-12) and not at 𝑤𝑤. For any given 
lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏> 0, it will be guaranteed a certain pattern in which money comes in from 
the buyer, so any inventory held at the supplier’s site means products made too early 
in relation to this pattern; thus the investment cost 𝑐𝑐 represents the right valuation of 
any inventory held. 
The main missing link can now be identified. Final demand provides such that 
any inventory held by the buyer is an investment of 𝑤𝑤 made too early. The fact that 
the buyer invests too early by purchasing in the lot-sizes 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 means that the supplier 
sells early. Just like the money paid out too early is more costly for the buyer, money 
is worth more when received earlier from the supplier. If the supplier himself does not 
hold inventory, he will produce at the moment he makes the early sale, so may use the 
profit margin to invest and earn profits. If the supplier does hold inventory, the cost of 
too early production relative to a given buyer’s pattern of ordering is already included 
in the holding cost term of his profit function. However, the investment potential for 
marginal profits on early sales is not yet included. The early purchase disadvantage 
for the buyer is increasing with 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/2, the average early sales benefit for the supplier  
 (3-16) 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
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must also increase with 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/2. This means that a term must be added to the 
supplier’s average profit function Eq.(3-12): 
This term in Eq.(3-16) is called the ‘supplier’s reward’, is the missing 
ingredient that solves the paradox. Indeed, taking the sum of the buyer’s profit 
function and the supplier’s (corrected) profit function now gives a (corrected) 
‘channel profit’ function that is the same as the supply chain profit function as given 
by Eq.(3-13). 
 
3.6 Annuity stream functions 
The framework of the NPV of the cash-flows derives the model by Annuity 
Streams (AS) functions which linear approximations in the discount factor can be 
directly compared with the functions derived in the classical framework.  
3.6.1 Generalization 
Following Grubbström (1980), the NPV of an activity for firm 𝑗  is generally 
the Laplace transform of a cash-flow function 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) where the Laplace frequency is 
the continuous capital rate 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 of the firm: 
 
 
The cash-flow function represents all the costs and revenues, and their exact 
timing that will be incurred in relation to the executing of the activities of the firm in 
the context of the supply and delivery of these products. The annuity stream 
function 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, for an infinite horizon model, is then defined as  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗. The 
(3-17) 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 =  � 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
0
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Maclaurin expansion of the exponential terms in the decision variables leads to more 
tractable analytical models. In particular, the linear approximation in 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 is often 
leading to models of comparable complexity as those arrived at from the classical 
inventory modelling principles which it can be written as: 
 
 
This aim is to derive functions for buyer and supplier to evaluate their profit 
when they would act independently, and a profit function for their joint supply chain. 
These functions are defined as annuity streams and thus represent a continuous stream 
of cash-flows with the same the NPV as the real set of cash flows encountered. 
Linearisation of these functions in the discount rate can be directly compared with 
average profit models. The missing supplier’s reward term at the supplier’s individual 
average profit function can as such be identified. 
3.6.2 Buyer’s profit function 
The buyer orders a fixed order quantity 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, and the first batch arrives at time 
0. All successive batches arrive with an inter arrival time 𝑇𝑇 =  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/𝐷𝐷. The cash-flows 
for the buyer are as follows (see Figure 3-2). Final demand generates a continuous 
cash-flow 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 starting at time 0. Upon the arrival of every batch 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇, a fixed set-
up cost 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 occurs, the supplier is paid 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇. The annuity stream for the buyer is given 
by: 
   
(3-18) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼� 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∞
0
 
 
(3-19) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 = 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)(�𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
) 
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This can be rewritten as: 
 
 
 
The Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term with respect to 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇 gives: 
  
     
Giving the following linearization in 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 of the annuity stream:  
 
 
The buyer’s optimal lot-size is thus: 
 
 
In Eq.(3-22), and comparing the result with Eq.(3-3), it can be verified that the 
average profit function where ℎ𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 is equal to the first four terms of the annuity 
stream approximation. The last term −𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏/2 measures the average interest costs 
related to set-up payments. It is well known that such terms appear in annuity streams 
with set-up costs. Since it is a constant term, it is of lesser importance. 
3.6.3 Supplier’s profit function 
The supplier is produced in order quantities 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇, starting the 
first batch at time 0 and all successive batches separated by a time length 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇. Within 
(3-20) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 = 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)( 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇) 
(3-21) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 = 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)�1𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2 + 𝑂𝑂 �𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2 𝑇𝑇12�� 
(3-22) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏����� = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏2  
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗ = �2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤
 
  
(3-23) 
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every cycle, 𝑚𝑚 dispatches in batches of 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 items occur, where the first dispatch in 
every cycle occurs at the start of the cycle. The cash-flows for the supplier are as 
follows (see also Figure 3-2). For every batch dispatched to the supplier, he 
immediately pays a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 and receives 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 from the buyer. At the start of 
every cycle, he pays a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and a cost c𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Cash-flows for buyer and supplier 
 
 
 
 
76 
The annuity stream for the supplier is: 
 
      
or  
     
 
Maclaurin expansion of the exponential terms gives: 
 
      
 
 
Leading to the following linearisation in 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 of the annuity stream: 
 
 
 
which can also be written as: 
 
      
 
 
Comparing the model from Eq.(3-28) with Eq.(3-5), and again allowing for 
the necessary transformation of the holding cost parameter in the average profit 
(3-24) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = �−𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇���𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖−0
� − (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇)��𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖−0
� 
(3-25) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = �−𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇� � 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇� − (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇) � 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇� 
(3-26) 
                𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = �−𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇��1𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2 + 𝑂𝑂 �𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2 � 𝑇𝑇12��� 
−�𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇)( 1𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼22 + 𝑂𝑂 �𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2 �𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇12 ��� 
(3-27) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠����� = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 1𝑇𝑇 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇2 − (𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2  
(3-28) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠����� = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
−�𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
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function, it can be identified that the average profit function is equal to the first four 
terms of the annuity stream approximation.  
Note that the holding cost of the supplier can indeed be valued at his cost 𝑐𝑐. 
However, there is a fifth term in his annuity stream profit function that is not present 
in the average profit function in Eq.(3-5), this term is called the “supplier’s reward”, 
already discussed in Section 3.5. 
The supplier will accept this lot-size, and then determine the optimal value for 
𝑚𝑚 based on his own profit function: 
 
 
 
where 𝑚𝑚∗, as always, should be rounded up to 1 if it is smaller, and otherwise 
rounded to the nearest higher or lower integer, whichever gives the highest profit 
function value. 
Finally, the annuity stream for the whole supply chain is derived, assuming a 
discount factor Assuming 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼 is adopted: 
 
 
 
      
(3-30) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝� ��𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
� 
−(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇)��𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
� 
 
𝑚𝑚∗ = �𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�𝑤𝑤
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)  
  
(3-29) 
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or  
      
 
Note that the cash-flows related to the purchase price 𝑤𝑤 cancel out, and thus 
do not appear in the annuity stream. Repeating the above approach gives the 
following linearisation: 
 
      
 
which can be rewritten as: 
 
      
 
 
Assuming 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼, it can be verified that Eq.(3-31) is the sum of Eq.(3-
20) and Eq.(3-25), and this definition must be interpreted as the joint profit function. 
As Eq.(3-31) was derived from the viewpoint of the supply chain, it represents the 
supply chain profit function. This also holds for the linearisation of the annuity stream 
functions: the sum of Eq.(3-22) and Eq.(3-28) indeed gives Eq.(3-33). This proves 
that, if 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼, the joint profit function is the same as the supply chain profit 
function. 
(3-31) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝� � 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇� 
−(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇)( 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇) 
 
(3-32) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠������ = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 1𝑇𝑇 
−𝛼𝛼(𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇2 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)𝛼𝛼2 
 
(3-33) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠������ = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2
− 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)𝛼𝛼2 
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It is important to associate the correct interpretation of the channel function 
with respect to the profits for the supplier and buyer: even though the purchase price 
𝑤𝑤 is irrelevant in the determination of their joint optimum (indeed 𝑤𝑤 is not a 
parameter in Eq.(3-31) nor Eq.(3-33), their individual profits in this joint optimum are 
still given by their individual profit functions (in linearised form: Eq.(3-22) for buyer 
and Eq.(3-28) for the supplier. 
When aiming for the joint optimal policy 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚 are simultaneously 
determined from the channel function: 
 
 
 
     
 
 
where again 𝑚𝑚∗𝐶𝐶 should be rounded. 
 
3.7 The Discount Factor Problem 
The discount factor (𝛼𝛼) has been avoided by assuming that 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 =  𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼. 
However, it does deserve some attention. In the literature on buyer supplier 
coordination models, two approaches are found: 
• Assuming 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 ≠ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠, and keep using both in the channel profit function, as in 
(3-34) 
(3-35) 𝑚𝑚∗𝐶𝐶 = � 2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�(𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝)(𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 − 1) 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗𝐶𝐶 = � 2 �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅��𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1) − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2) 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 
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e.g. assuming 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼 from the start, as in Abad (1994). 
• Assuming 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 in buyer and supplier functions, and then assumes 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 
in the channel function, but says that ‘the analysis can be easily extended to 
the case when 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 ≠ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠. 
In most of the models in the literature, 𝛼𝛼 is defined as ‘the inventory carrying 
charge expressed as a percentage of the value of the item’. Both buyer and supplier 
either have their own discount factor (i.e. 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 ≠ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠), or one common discount factor is 
adopted from the start. 
A discount factor by a firm is adopted as it wishes to measure the time value 
of money (cash-flows). While the time value of money is expressed as an annuity 
stream or a net present value, the discount factor, since it equally applies to any finite 
of (in) or outgoing cash at whatever future times, could thus be interpreted as a 
monetary value of time for the firm. The main reasons why a firm prefers their own 
discount factor is that money paid out too early, or any delays in incoming cash-flows, 
represent a lost opportunity for investing earlier in the next best alternative (and vice 
versa). Furthermore, independent firms have independent stakeholders who may 
expect different minimum rates of return on their invested capital. It seems very 
reasonable to assume in general that 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 ≠ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠. 
In models of buyer supplier coordination in which they each have their own 
discount factor, a problem may now arise when the firms wish to determine their joint 
optimal policy as to maximise the profit function. If the profit function of the firm is 
considered with 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 ≠ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠, neither of the firms should be happy with the resulting 
optimal policy derived from it. Indeed, each firm has its own monetary value of time, 
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and thus each firm believes that the real optimal policy should be derived from a 
channel profit function with one common value for the discount factor. If they can’t 
agree, however, on the value that this common discount factor should take, then they 
will not accept the validity of the other firm’s proposal of the optimal policy. In other 
words, they can’t agree on one common goal to pursue; there is no supply chain 
optimisation. This applies to collaboration between 𝐼𝐼 independent firms as well. This 
problem can be formalized as follows: 
Theorem 1. (On the Discount Factor Problem) when 𝐼𝐼 independent firms with 
perfect information agree on the structure of the profit function of the virtual firm 
with the exception that each firm 𝑚𝑚believes that the monetary value of time for the 
virtual firm is 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗(𝑚𝑚 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑚𝑚, 𝑗 =  1, . . . ,𝐼𝐼), then: 
• Each firm will propose a different profit function for the virtual firm, and neither 
can agree with any other firm’s proposal;  
• In general, the firms cannot agree on a common goal to pursue (i.e. the optimal 
annuity stream value);  
• In general, each of the firms may propose a different joint optimal policy, and reject 
the optimality of any of the other firm’s proposals.  
The last two points only apply ‘in general’ for different profit functions may still lead 
to the same optimum or optimal policy. 
An example illustrates the problem. A firm operates as a buyer under classic 
EOQ assumptions, with 𝐷𝐷 = 10,000; 𝑤𝑤 = 3; 𝑝𝑝 = 4; 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 = 100. Company A and B 
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are two independent firms where Company A strongly believes the opportunity 
cost 𝛼𝛼 = 0.10, while Company B strongly believes it should be 𝛼𝛼 = 0.20. Then 
Company A also achieves that 𝑄𝑄∗=2582 while Company B that 𝑄𝑄∗=1826. Company A 
is only prepared to pay out 387 per year to the supplier for placing 3.87 orders per 
year; (Company B) wants to pay out 548 per year for 5.47 orders per year. With an 
AS value of 9220, according to his own optimal policy, Company A is slightly more 
optimistic in investing than Company B who values the firm at an AS of 8895 if his 
own optimal policy is applied. They both believe the other one’s policy is suboptimal. 
The facts that the economic order quantity model is fairly insensitive to sub-
optimal order quantities do not do justice to other cases where this effect might have a 
much greater impact. 
 
3.8 Numerical results 
For the proposed models there are 8 instances are used in this section. 
Instance 1 has been proposed by Goyal(1976), instance 3 is derived from Banerjee 
(1986), and other instances are derived by changing some parameters such as 
production rate 𝑅𝑅,  and purchase price𝑤𝑤. For each instance: 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 = 0.2, 𝑠𝑠p = 0; 
and other input parameters are listed in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Problem instance characteristics 
Instance 𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤 𝑐𝑐 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
1(a) 12000 10 1.5 1.2 100 ∞ 
2 12000 10 2.9 1.2 100 ∞ 
3(b) 1000 100 25 20 400 3200 
4 1000 100 34 20 400 3200 
5 12000 10 1.5 1.2 100 38400 
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6 12000 10 2.9 1.2 100 38400 
7 1000 100 25 20 400 38400 
8 1000 100 34 20 400 38400 
(a) Based on Goyal (1976), (b) Based on Banerjee (1986) 
 
Table 3-2: Optimal solution profit functions in classic and NPV models  
 
# 
 
Model 
Independent Joint optimal 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗  𝑚𝑚∗ Buyer Supplier SC 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠∗ Buyer Supplier SC 
1 Classic 894 3 5732 2943 8674 2966 2 5515 3042 8718 
  NPV 894 3 5732 2969 8701 3317 1 5466 3338 8804 
2 Classic 643 4 12827 19718 32545 991 4 12792 19741 32555 
  NPV 643 4 12827 19827 32654 3317 1 12202 20602 32804 
3 Classic 200 3 4000 3600 7600 447 1 3658 4106 7764 
  NPV 200 3 4000 3700 7700 500 1 3550 4450 8000 
4 Classic 171 2 4834 12537 17370 383 2 4435 12711 17454 
  NPV 171 2 4834 12777 17610 500 1 4100 13900 18000 
5 Classic 894 3 17732 2943 20674 2966 2 17515 3042 20718 
  NPV 894 3 17732 2969 20701 3317 1 17466 3338 20804 
6 Classic 643 4 12827 19718 32545 991 4 12792 19741 32555 
  NPV 643 4 12827 19827 32654 3317 1 12202 20602 32804 
7 Classic 200 3 4000 3600 7600 447 1 3658 4106 7764 
  NPV 200 3 4000 3700 7700 500 1 3550 4450 8000 
8 Classic 171 2 4834 12537 17370 383 2 4435 12711 17454 
  NPV 171 2 4834 12777 17610 500 1 4100 13900 18000 
SC = Supply chain profit 
 
Table 3-2 shows the numerical results show that the optimal profit function 
constructed from the classic and the NPV approaches. In independent case, the 
classical framework presents the buyer’s optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚∗ and also profit 
functions are equal to obtain in the NPV framework, but it is different in supplier’s 
and supply chain’s profit functions as the NPV framework gives higher profits more 
than a classical framework. Moreover, a comparison of the results confirmed that the 
NPV approach can be proved in the correct solution that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 But this 
84 
does not occur in the classical framework. It can be interpreted that the supplier’s 
reward term must be added to the supplier’s profit function. 
In the joint optimum the difference between the classic and the NPV function 
is very significant for both 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠∗ and 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠. The NPV functions achieve lower values for 𝑚𝑚 
and higher values for 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠. This can be expected from the effect of the supplier’s 
reward is to evaluate the cost of keeping stock at the buyer in the joint optimum at a 
lower value. For evaluating the profit functions in the joint optimisations, the 
comparison shows that the supplier’s and supply chain profits derived from the NPV 
framework give higher solution than the classical framework. However, the buyer’s 
profits are decreasing for all instances when buyer changed from the independent to 
be the joint optimal policy. Thus, the buyer may not agree to accept for changing to 
the joint optimum policy, except that the supplier will give some special offers to 
induce the buyer to accept this case such as share some profits costs or price discount 
for the buyer which will be presented in the next chapter. 
 
3.9 Concluding remarks 
For the single buyer single supplier system studied in this chapter, the 
supplier’s reward is identified as a lost term in the supplier’s profit function, 
representing his reward when the buyer orders in batches. The example models in the 
literature have recognized holding costs, or costs of early payments made, but not the 
supplier’s reward the financial reward of early payments received. Omitting this 
missing link leads to a channel function in which the transfer price between buyer and 
supplier is still a parameter. 
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For the system proposed, the supplier’s reward has been mathematically 
retrieved by deriving linear approximations of annuity stream functions of buyer and 
supplier. It has been proved that the corrected supplier’s profit function does lead to a 
channel function free of the transfer price and in agreement with the supply chain 
profit function. The apparent paradox that the subjective viewpoint seems to matter is 
thereby also resolved, and buyer-supplier coordination models including the 
supplier’s reward term are now also in agreement with inventory models. 
Following earlier successful applications in the literature, the annuity stream 
approach seems able to provide a good framework for constructing conceptual (and 
numerically) sound average profit models in this field of research. 
It is further argued that only one discount factor in the profit functions of the 
virtual firm should be used. However, the independence of buyer and supplier may 
result in a problem formalized in Theorem 1 for cooperation between 𝐼𝐼 independent 
firms; if there is disagreement on the common discount factor, there will in general be 
disagreement on what would be the best joint policy. 
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Chapter 4: Independent and Joint Profits in Single-Supplier Single-
Buyer Inventory Models from the NPV Framework 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a mathematical model derived from a Net Present Value 
(NPV) framework to analyse the capital costs of inventory and the replenishment 
policies under deterministic conditions and constant demand. Within this context, the 
classical models for single buyer single supplier from the literature are reviewed with 
respect to find optimal lot-sizing decisions and comparison of these models with a 
model derived from the NPV framework. This chapter is further separated into two 
cases of production and inventory policies, including individual and coordinated 
optimal policies are examined. In the first case, the buyer and the supplier act 
independently and sequentially so as to maximise their individual profits. In the 
second case, the supplier and buyer cooperated with each other in making decisions to 
maximise the total system profit. The analytical and numerical comparison of these 
models is a considerable gap between a model derived from a net present value 
approach and a model derived from the classical approach. The numerical result is 
solved by Excel spreadsheet version 2010. 
This chapter is further organised as follows. In Section 4.2, the problem 
definition is described, and assumption and notation is given in Section 4.3. The 
classical model is described in Section 4.4. NPV framework for buyer-supplier is 
described in Section 4.5. NPV models derived from an annuity stream from different 
places of the anchor point are analysed in Section 4.6 and Section 4.7. Numerical 
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experiments in Section 4.8 then cost sharing by Goyal’s (1976) rule and side payment 
are generalized in Section 4.9 and 4.10. Conclusions are discussed in Section 4.11. 
 
4.2 Problem definition 
In a supply chain between a buyer and a supplier, inventory management 
models are in essence aiming to capture such effects of timings of cash-flows by 
including in the holding cost of inventories the opportunity cost of capital. 
 
 
where 𝛼𝛼 is the unit variable cost to be invested in every unit placed in 
inventory, and 𝛼𝛼 is the carrying charge which can be given the interpretation as the 
return on investment that could be earned on the next best alternative for the firm. 
While ‘out-of-pocket’ costs may also need to be considered in calculating the holding 
costs, the opportunity cost of capital as given by Eq.(4-1) is by far the largest portion 
of the holding cost, see e.g. Silver et al. (1998). 
The well-known economic order quantity model (Harris, 1915; Wilson, 1934) 
has the following holding cost term per unit of time: 
 
 
 
It can be indicated that total holding costs increase with the average lot-
size 𝑄𝑄/2. It thus captures the situation as described for outgoing on cash-flows 
diagram: monthly installments (smaller lot-sizes) are better than annual payments 
(4-1) ℎ = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
(4-2) ℎ
𝑄𝑄2  =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑄𝑄2  
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(larger lot-sizes) when only considering holding costs. As these costs have to be 
balanced with set-up costs as well, hence, the property of an economic order quantity 
emerges. 
The Net Present Value (NPV) framework can be used to model inventory 
systems, and can fully capture the impact and interactions of various cash-flows 
implicitly present in the system. Grubbström (1980) was first to present a 
comprehensive methodology whereby an annuity stream function of the cash-flows 
associated with a production or inventory system can be used as an alternative     
approach to the classical framework for deriving a total profit or cost function, from    
which optimal (lot-size) decisions can be found. Furthermore, the linear 
approximation in the interest rate of the annuity stream function can be directly 
compared with the cost functions of the classical inventory models. 
In this chapter, the NPV approach use to derive inventory models where the 
Anchor Point in the NPV decision, see in Beullens and Janssens (2011), is applied and 
then a compares the optimal lot-sizes both analytically and numerically for a more 
general system of finite production rates.  
 
4.3 Assumptions and notations 
1.  The model studied in this chapter contains two independent parties: a buyer and a 
supplier (vendor). 
2.  The buyer purchases a single product from the supplier. 
3.  Both parties have perfect information about the other player’s characteristics. 
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4.  Final demand occurs at a constant rate. 
5.  Shortages are not allowed. 
6.  Lead-time is zero. 
7.  The supplier produces at (in) finite rate. 
8.  No capacity constraints. 
9. ‘Out-of-pocket’ holding costs for buyer and supplier are zero. 
Notations 
The following notational scheme is introduced (𝑗 = 𝑏 for buyer, 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑠 for supplier): 
𝐷𝐷:  demand rate; 
𝑅𝑅:  supplier’s production rate (𝑅𝑅 >  𝐷𝐷); 
𝑝𝑝:  sales price per product; 
𝑤𝑤:  contract purchase price (paid by the buyer) (𝑝𝑝 > 𝑤𝑤); 
𝑐𝑐:  supplier’s variable cost per product (paid by the supplier) (𝑤𝑤 > 𝑐𝑐); 
𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗:  fixed order (set-up) cost; 
ℎ𝑗𝑗:  holding cost per product per year; 
𝛼𝛼:  discount rate; 
𝑡𝑡:  variable transport cost per product; 
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗: buyer’s lot-size; 
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝: supplier’s fixed order processing cost per buyer’s order; 
𝑚𝑚: integer multiplication (𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1); 
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The buyer, facing deterministic demand at a constant rate, is assumed to order 
in batches of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 from the supplier at equidistant points in time with cycle time 𝑇𝑇 =
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/𝐷𝐷. The buyer’s inventory position over time follows the classic saw-tooth 
function, as given in Figure 4-1. 
The supplier is produced in batches of 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, where 𝑚𝑚 ∈  {1, 2, 3, . . . }, 
and ships the first batch 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 as soon as it is available, i.e. 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅 time after the start of 
the production run, and delivers all subsequent 𝑚𝑚 − 1 batches at equidistant points in 
time corresponding to the buyer’s cycle time 𝑇𝑇. The supplier’s cycle time, the time 
between the start of two subsequent production runs, is 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇. An illustration of the 
inventory position over time from the supplier is given in Figure 4-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Buyer and supplier inventory position over time 
 
Two cases are considered in this chapter. In the first case, they each act 
independently whereby the buyer makes the first move in establishing his optimal lot-
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size, and then the supplier follows. This is called the situation of independent 
(sequential) optimisation. The other case is when the buyer and supplier wish to 
determine both lots-sizes simultaneously as to maximise total profits for their supply 
chain. This is referred to as the situation of joint optimisation. 
 
4.4 Buyer-supplier model from classical framework 
The classical inventory models used in this section correspond to the buyer 
and supplier models from the literature, including of models of Goyal (1976) who 
studied infinite production rate 𝑅𝑅. For infinite production, Joglekar (1988) is studied 
which the model is included both finite (the supplier is a producer) and infinite 
production rates (the supplier buys products from outside), as in e.g.; Weng (1995); 
Joglekar et al. (2006). The average cost functions are used for derivation in the 
classical framework. 
The independent model is based on the status quo scenario (classical inventory 
EOQ model) where the buyer is the leader in the relationship. Within this general 
scheme, each player is to maximise profit (or minimise costs) in their own model 
without considering the interests of the other players. The buyer decides the optimal 
lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 based on her own profit function and then the supplier accepts the order 
quantities 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 from buyer and determines his optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 to maximise 
his profit function. The information flow and cost payment activities are shown in 
Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2: Information flow and payment activities of the independent model 
 
 
Figure 4-2 shows both material and information flows in the classical 
inventory policy. The domain of responsibilities and authorities that belong to the 
buyer and the supplier are described as the separate boxes. The buyer works only for 
the operations for managing inventory at his warehouse. The supplier has authorities 
for managing inventory including raw material warehouse, production, WIP, and 
finished goods only in her warehouse. 
Informational flow begins at the buyer’s site where the demand is made by the 
final customer. The buyer determines optimal lot-size of his profit function and then 
sends his optimal lot-sizes to the supplier. A supplier receives orders from the buyer 
and then makes production plans accordingly. The supplier lets the external vendor 
know about his production plan and deliver raw materials according to the production 
plan. As Figure 4-2 shows, the buyer’s order is the unique information that is 
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transferred between the buyer and the supplier, and any other information flows only 
within the buyer’s or supplier’s authority areas. 
4.4.1 Buyer’s profit function 
The model from Goyal (1976) is used to derive the buyer’s profit function. The 
elements of the buyer’s profit are: the annual marginal revenue from selling the 
product to the final customer; the buyer’s annual ordering cost; and annual holding 
cost of stock kept at the buyer’s site. 
 
 
The first term in Eq.(4-3) represents the marginal profits on sales, the second 
the set-up costs, the third the holding costs.  
4.4.2 Supplier’s profit function 
The model from Joglekar (1988) considers the supplier's profit function in the 
case of (in)finite production rate 𝑅𝑅, and 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1 and integer. The buyer is derived the 
optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 from Eq.(4-3) and then transfer this order quantity to the supplier. 
The supplier accepts this lot-size and optimizes his lot-size with 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 that will 
maximise the supplier’s profit function given by Eq.(4-4): 
 
 
 
(4-4) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 
−𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1) − (𝑚𝑚 − 2)𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
]𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
 
(4-3) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
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where ℎ𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 and ℎ𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤. 
The special case of lot-for-lot production at infinite rate can be derived from 
Eq.(4-4) by taking 𝑚𝑚 = 1 and 𝑅𝑅 → ∞, and then equals the supplier’s profit function 
first presented by Monahan (1984). The relaxation to lot-for-lot production at (in) 
finite rate 𝑅𝑅 is obtained by taking 𝑚𝑚 = 1, and then equals the function first considered 
in Banerjee (1986) and also Joglekar (1988). The special case of infinite production 
rate is obtained by taking 𝑅𝑅 → ∞, and then the function corresponds to the cost 
function first presented in Goyal (1976). 
In the classical framework, the buyer decides the order quantity based his own 
profit function. The optimal order quantity to maximise (or minimise the total costs) 
profits and the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚 from the supplier’s perspective can be obtained in 
Eq.(4-6), and Eq.(4-7). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Since 𝑚𝑚 should be an integer ≥ 1 the optimal value is in fact: 
 
(4-5) 
𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏
𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
= (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
(4-6) 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ = �2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤  
(4-7) 𝑚𝑚 = 1
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
�
2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷
𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
) = � 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅) 
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The index 𝑚𝑚 denotes that it is derived from the classical inventory framework. 
If the square root is larger than 1, one evaluates the supplier’s total cost 
formula with the largest integer smaller as well as with the smallest integer larger, and 
retains that integer value that returns the lowest local cost for the supplier. 
4.4.3 Joint profit function 
The joint function, as the sum of Eq.(4-3) and Eq.(4-4) is shown in Eq.(4-9), 
and the optimal lot-size, 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∗𝐶𝐶 and 𝑚𝑚 are simultaneously determined from the joint 
function: 
 
 
 
The first term in Eq.(4-9) represents marginal profits on sales, the second is 
the set-up costs, and the other three terms in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 are the inventory holding costs. 
 
 
 
 
where again 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗𝑠𝑠 should be rounded. 
 
(4-9) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
− 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 �(𝑚𝑚 − 1) − (𝑚𝑚− 2)𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
�
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
 
(4-8) 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �� 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅) , 1�  and integer 
(4-10) 
(4-11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
∗𝑠𝑠 = �𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) + 2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
𝑐𝑐(𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝)(1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)  
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
∗𝐶𝐶 = � 2 �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚�𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1) − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2) 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤 
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4.5 Buyer-supplier model of the NPV framework 
The NPV approach is flexible in determining the best profit function to use: by 
proper placement of the Anchor Point, which this approach is proposed by (Beullens 
and Janssens, 2011), the system will either push products through to final sales, or 
pull products from production for meeting a fixed due date for the start of sales. 
Taking the Anchor Point at start of production gives different results to those obtained 
in the classical framework, but taking the Anchor Point at the start of sales gives 
complete correspondence with the classical framework. It has to be concluded that the 
classical framework, thus (implicitly) assumes that when production occurs in batches 
or requires lead-time then this is to be interpreted as an investment in products made 
too early relative to some required moment of final sales of these products. 
In deriving annuity stream functions for the model, two different approaches 
can be taken with respect to the location of the Anchor Point. When the NPV model is 
constructed such that the Anchor Point is chosen to coincide with the start of 
production of the first batch, then the value of 𝑅𝑅 will influence the moment when the 
buyer will receive the first batch. In addition, the buyer’s profit function will contain 
the parameters 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑝𝑝, and these then also influences his individual optimal lot-size. 
This situation would be valid in situations where the supplier is to start production for 
the buyer at some pre-determined fixed point in (future) time. However, as decision 
variables and other parameters determine when the first batch arrives to the buyer, it 
cannot be avoided that the buyer may receive this first batch at an inconvenient time, 
either before he has run out of his current stock or, even worse, after that time. 
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An alternative situation, the Anchor Point is chosen at some time 𝐿𝐿 in the 
future, at which point the buyer wishes the first shipment to arrive for replenishing his 
current inventory, and thereby securing uninterrupted sales to his customers. The 
supplier will aim to start the production run at the time, which earlier than 𝐿𝐿 as to 
ensure meeting this due date in a profit maximising manner. (It is thus assumed that 𝐿𝐿 
is far enough into the future such that start of production can always be planned for.) 
For these reasons, the NPV model in this paper will also take the Anchor Point at start 
of sales 𝐿𝐿. 
 
4.6 Model with Anchor Point at start of production 
In the model derivation, the anchor point is chosen at the start of production 
see in Figure 4-3, called “NPV-I”, and the annuity stream functions are constructed 
for the following cash-flows see in Figure 4-4. The buyer receives income as an 
annuity stream 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 starting from the moment that the first product arrives. At the start 
of every cycle of length 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑄𝑄/𝐷𝐷, she pays the supplier 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 and incurs a set-up 
cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏. 
The supplier incurs set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 at the start of every production run, which 
will take place 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅 time units earlier than the delivery of the batch to the buyer. 
Upon delivery the supplier incurs another set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. It is assumed that the 
variable production cost is incurred at a continuous rate 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 per time unit for the time 
length of production 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅. 
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 Figure 4-3: The anchor point is chosen at the start of production 
 
Figure 4-4: Cash-flow diagrams for buyer 
 
 4.6.1 Buyer’s profit function 
Placing the Anchor Point at time zero, at which the first production run starts, 
gives the following annuity stream for the buyer: 
 
     
(4-12) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴0
𝑏𝑏 = �𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)�𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
� 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅  
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Giving the following linearisation in 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 of the annuity stream:  
 
 
 
The buyer’s optimal lot-size is thus: 
 
 
 
It appears in the fourth term of Eq.(4-14) that the buyer’s holding cost should 
be evaluated at the money invested 𝑤𝑤. However, there is an additional term which 
measures the cost of the profit delay as a result from the finite production rate 𝑅𝑅. This 
delay cost is relative to the size of 𝑄𝑄 and doubles in the first part 2(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤) of the 
holding cost term. 
Although the NPV model as such constructed is correct, it leads to a 
counterintuitive result that the buyer should value his own inventory holding cost 
function of the finite production rate 𝑅𝑅 that the supplier may have chosen.  
Furthermore, because the supplier has a finite production rate, the buyer now 
needs to value his holding cost also in function of his sales price 𝑝𝑝. This is the 
consequence of the choice of the anchor point at the start of production, implying that 
larger lot-sizes or a decrease of production rate postpones the moment that sales can 
start. 
 
(4-13) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴0𝑏𝑏����� = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏(1 − 2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅) 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 �2(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 + 𝑤𝑤�𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
𝑄𝑄0
𝑏𝑏∗ = � 2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏(2(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤) 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 + 𝑤𝑤) 
 
(4-14) 
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4.6.2 Supplier’s profit function 
The following assumptions on cash-flows, see in Figure (4-5) for the supplier 
are made: At the start of every production run, a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is incurred, and a 
variable production cost at rate 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷 starts, and stops 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅 time later in the 
supplier’s cycle. Every time the supplier ships a batch to the buyer, he incurs a set-up 
cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 and receives the income 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 from the buyer. The supplier’s annuity stream 
profit function is: 
 
Figure 4-5: Cash-flow diagrams for supplier 
 
 
 
 
The linear approximation can be written as 
 
 
 
(4-15) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴0𝑠𝑠 = [(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 − 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
− �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇�
𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
(4-16) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴0
𝑠𝑠����� = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2  
−𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 ]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
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The first term in Eq.(4-16) represents marginal profits on sales, the second the 
set-up costs, the third the average interest costs of set-up payments, and the other 
three terms in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏the inventory holding costs. Note that the set-up cost in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is function 
of 𝑅𝑅, and that the last inventory holding cost term in (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) actually implies the 
additional profit term for supplier which called as the ‘supplier’s reward’. 
The supplier will accept this lot-size from buyer, and then determine the 
optimal value for 𝑚𝑚 based on his own profit function: 
   
 
where 𝑚𝑚∗, as always, should be rounded up to 1 if it is smaller, and otherwise 
rounded to the nearest higher or lower integer, whichever gives the highest profit 
function value. 
4.6.3 Joint profit function 
The joint profit function is per the definition the sum of buyer’s and supplier’s 
profit functions. The linear approximation of the annuity stream profit function is 
thus: 
 
 
 
 
(4-18) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴0
𝑠𝑠����� = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏(1 − 2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ) + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2
− 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼[(2𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 − 𝑐𝑐]𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 ]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
 
(4-17) 𝑚𝑚0∗ = �𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�𝑤𝑤
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)  
102 
The joint optimal policy,𝑄𝑄0∗𝐶𝐶 and 𝑚𝑚∗𝐶𝐶 are simultaneously determined as: 
 
 
 
   
 
4.7 Model with Anchor Point at the start of sales to buyer 
An alternative approach will take the Anchor Point at an arbitrary time 𝐿𝐿 in the 
near future called “NPV-II”, at which the buyer wishes to receive the first batch of 
products from the supplier (see Figure 4-6). This may correspond with the point in 
time at which his current inventory is expected to drop to zero. When the supplier 
would lower his production rate 𝑅𝑅, he would have to start production earlier, but the 
buyer only cares about receiving the first batch at 𝐿𝐿. The annuity stream for the buyer-
supplier and joint profit function now becomes: 
4.7.1 Buyer’s profit function 
In order to derive the NPV results, the cash-flows need to be specified. The 
following assumptions are made (see also Figure 4-7). 
 
 
 
(4-21) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = [𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)�𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∞
𝑖𝑖=0
 
(4-19) 𝑄𝑄0∗𝐶𝐶 = � 2 �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅��𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1) − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2) 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
+ 𝛼𝛼(2𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐) 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 
 
(4-20) 𝑚𝑚0𝑠𝑠∗ = � 2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�(𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝)(𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 − 1) 
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The linear approximation: 
 
 
 
Inventory costs for the buyer are thus to be valued at 𝑤𝑤 in agreement with the 
traditional holding cost derivation. This function is the same as the one obtained from 
the NPV framework, Eq.(4-3), up to the constant −𝛼𝛼 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏
2
 
The buyer’s optimal lot-size is thus: 
 
 
The optimal lot-size in Eq.(4-23) is given the same as the function derived in 
the classical framework in Eq.(4-6).  
4.7.2 Supplier’s profit function 
The supplier has the following annuity stream function: 
 
 
 
 
which the linear approximation is: 
 
(4-22) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏����� = [(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄 − 𝛼𝛼 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄2]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
(4-24) 
�(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 − 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
− �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇�
𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇� 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
(4-23) 𝑄𝑄𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏∗ = �2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤  
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The first term in Eq.(4-25) represents marginal profits on sales, the second the 
set-up costs, the third the average interest costs of set-up payments, and the other 
three terms in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 the inventory holding costs. Note that the set-up cost in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is 
function of 𝑅𝑅, and that the last inventory holding cost term in (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) actually implies 
“supplier’s reward” term. 
The profit function for the special case of infinite production rate can be 
derived from Eq.(4-25) by taking 𝑅𝑅 → ∞. The special case of lot-for-lot for (in)finite 
production rates can be derived by (further) taking 𝑚𝑚 = 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6: The anchor point is chosen at the start of sales to the buyer 
 
 
(4-25) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼
𝑠𝑠����� = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2
− 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 ]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
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Figure 4-7: Cash-flow diagrams for buyer-supplier 
 
The different model derived from the classic and the NPV derived function in 
Eq.(4-4) and Eq.(4-25) is: 
 
 
Overall, the model in which the Anchor Point is the arbitrary moment in the 
future when the buyer wants the first delivery produces holding cost terms in close 
agreement with the traditional derivation, and in perfect agreement provided the 
supplier’s reward is also considered. 
 
 
(4-26) −
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑚𝑚
𝛼𝛼
𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
𝐷𝐷
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
− 𝛼𝛼
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝2 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
106 
4.7.3 Joint’s profit function 
The joint profit or ‘channel’ function is per definition the sum of buyer’s and 
supplier’s profit functions. The linear approximation of the annuity stream profit 
function is thus: 
 
 
 
   
Note that the supplier’s reward term, which is no longer explicitly present, has 
the effect that the last term, which can be interpreted as the holding cost term for the 
buyer’s inventory, is now valued this inventory at production cost 𝑐𝑐 rather that at 𝑤𝑤. 
The joint total profit, as well as the joint optimal policy, is independent of the transfer 
price 𝑤𝑤. 
The buyer’s and supplier’s profit functions, as well as their joint profit 
function, can be interpreted as annuity stream functions calculated for time 𝐿𝐿, and 
then transferred to the annuity stream at time 0 by multiplication with ‘delay’ term 
𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼. This delay term has no impact on optimal policies, and can thus be ignored. 
In addition, when comparing profit function values with the classical models, 
since L is arbitrary, this delay term should also be ignored. 
 
 
(4-27) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶����� = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2  
−𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 ]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
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4.7.4 Optimal policies 
The supplier will accept the lot-size from buyer, and then determine the 
optimal value for 𝑚𝑚 based on his own profit function. The supplier’s profit function is 
different, however, and the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚, before rounding is: 
 
 
where 𝑚𝑚∗, as always, should be rounded up to 1 if it is smaller, and otherwise 
rounded to the nearest higher or lower integer, whichever gives the highest profit 
function value. 
When aiming for the joint optimal policy,  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚 are simultaneously 
determined from the channel function: 
 
 
 
   
 
 
where again 𝑚𝑚∗𝐶𝐶 should be rounded. 
In the special case of an infinite production rate, it can be deduced from Eq. 
(4-27), by taking 𝑅𝑅 → ∞, that 𝑚𝑚∗𝐶𝐶 = 1. The optimal joint policy for an infinite 
(4-28) 𝑚𝑚∗ = �𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�𝑤𝑤
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)  
 
(4-29) 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝐶𝐶 = � 2 �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅��𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1) − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2) 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 
 
(4-30) 𝑚𝑚∗𝐶𝐶 = � 2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�(𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝)(𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 − 1) 
108 
production rate is thus a lot-for-lot production policy. When 𝑚𝑚∗𝐶𝐶 = 1, Eq. (4-29) 
becomes: 
   
 
 
4.8 Numerical examples 
The differences between using the classic functions and the functions derived 
from the NPV framework are illustrated by numerical experiments. The input 
parameters are listed in Table 4-1. 
Instance 1 has been proposed by Goyal (1976), and instance 3 by Banerjee 
(1986). The other instances are derived from these by changing the purchase price 𝑤𝑤 
or the production rate 𝑅𝑅 from finite to infinite or vice versa. The interest rate 𝛼𝛼 =  0.2 
of Banerjee (1986) is used to derive from the holding cost parameters ℎ𝑏𝑏 and ℎ𝑠𝑠 in 
Goyal (1976) a purchase price 𝑤𝑤 = 1.5 and production cost 𝑐𝑐 = 1.2, respectively. The 
ratio 𝑅𝑅/𝐷𝐷 = 3.2 of Banerjee (1986) is used for deriving finite production rate 
instances from the instance of Goyal (1976). 
 
 
 
 
(4-31) 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝐶𝐶 = �2 �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅��𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(1 + 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
)  
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Table 4-1: Problem instance characteristics 
 
Instances 
 
𝐷𝐷 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏  
 
𝑤𝑤 
 
𝑐𝑐 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  
 
𝑅𝑅 
1(a) 12000 10 1.5 1.2 100 ∞ 
2 12000 10 2.9 1.2 100 ∞ 
3(b) 1000 100 25 20 400 3200 
4 1000 100 34 20 400 3200 
5 12000 10 1.5 1.2 100 38400 
6 12000 10 2.9 1.2 100 38400 
7 1000 100 25 20 400 38400 
8 1000 100 34 20 400 38400 
For each instance:𝛼𝛼 = 0.2, 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0 
For all odd numbered instances apply the ratio 𝑤𝑤/𝑐𝑐 = 1.25 used by Goyal and 
Banerjee, the even numbered instances increase this ratio to 𝑤𝑤/𝑐𝑐 = 2.42 for instances 
2 and 6, and 𝑤𝑤/𝑐𝑐 =  1.7 for instances 4 and 8. Such higher ratios could be possible in 
certain practical settings. Note that the marginal profit(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) needs to ensure a net 
profit for the supplier, and thus cover at least all logistics costs from set-ups and 
inventory holding, as well as all fixed costs from assets and overheads. 
All instances adopt the assumption that set-up for the buyer are smaller than 
for the supplier, based on the instances of Goyal (1976) and Banerjee (1986).  
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Table 4-2: Optimal solution profit functions  
 
# 
 
Model 
Independent Joint optimisation 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗  𝑚𝑚∗ Buyer Supplier SC 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠∗ Buyer Supplier SC 
1 NPV-I 400 4 5640 2718 8358 3313 1 5467 3337 8803 
 NPV-II 894 4 5732 2970 8701 3317 1 5467 3337 8803 
2 NPV-I 287 5 12698 19475 32173 3265 1 12216 20582 32798 
 NPV-II 643 5 12827 19829 32656 3317 1 12206 20592 32798 
3 NPV-I 88 3 3620 3142 6762 269 2 3956 3807 7762 
 NPV-II 200 3 4000 3717 7717 500 2 3943 3820 7764 
4 NPV-I 76 3 4395 11983 16378 267 2 4717 13045 17762 
 NPV-II 171 3 4834 12835 17669 500 2 4692 13072 17764 
5 NPV-I 377 4 17590 2659 20248 1144 3 17723 3031 20755 
 NPV-II 894 4 17732 3016 20747 3317 3 17713 3049 20762 
6 NPV-I 281 6 12672 19565 32238 1180 1 12756 20002 32758 
 NPV-II 643 6 12827 19890 32716 3317 1 12731 20031 32762 
7 NPV-I 89 2 3658 2630 6288 500 1 3550 4450 8000 
 NPV-II 200 2 4000 3700 7700 500 1 3550 4450 8000 
8 NPV-I 77 3 4435 11346 15782 500 1 4100 13900 18000 
 NPV-II 171 3 4834 12731 17565 500 1 4100 13900 18000 
 
4.8.1 Comparison NPV models derived from different of Anchor point decision 
As shown in Table 4-2, the optimal solutions derived from two NPV models 
with different places of the Anchor Point. For the independent case, the optimal lot-
size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 generated from the NPV-I differs from the NPV-II while the value 𝑚𝑚  is the 
same. Comparing the profit function, the NPV-II model generates high profit, which 
is better than the NPV-I model in term of both buyer-supplier and also in a supply 
chain profit for all instances. 
In the joint optimisation case, comparison in the joint optimum 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠 Shows that 
both NPV-I and NPV-II is given the same values in instances 7 and 8 when 
comparing the profit function, instances 1, 2, 7, and 8 are given the same values in the 
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supply chain profit function and also given equal or slightly different in term of buyer 
and supplier profit functions. 
Note that the different values of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠 between NPV-I and NPV-II are incurred 
from taking the Anchor Point in different places. This can be interpreted that NPV-I 
taking the Anchor Point at start of production (push system) gives different results to 
obtain in the NPV-II model, but taking the Anchor Point at the start of sales (pull 
system) gives complete correspondence with the classical framework as will be 
described in the next section. 
4.8.2 Comparison individual and joint logistics costs 
Table 4-3 compares the logistics costs obtained in the classic and the NPV 
frameworks. The logistics costs are obtained from the profit functions by changing the 
signs and dropping the constant terms (i.e. the terms not in function of the lot-sizes). 
For example, the supplier’s profit on the NPV model gives the following logistics 
costs, derived from Eq.(4-25): 
 
 
 
In the independent optimisation case, the logistics costs reported in Table 4-2 
are simply based on the framework that was used to derive the optimal lot-sizes. The 
logistics costs in the case of joint optimisation, however, are given according to both 
the NPV-derived functions as well as the classical functions. 
(4-32) 
(𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 (1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅) 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  +𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2)𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
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Table 4-3: Comparison independent and joint logistics costs  
 
# 
 
Model 
Independent Joint optimal 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗  𝑚𝑚∗ Buyer Supplier SC 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠∗ Buyer Supplier SC 
1 Classic 894 4 268 657 925 1633 2 318 564 882 
 NPV-II 894 4 268 631 899 3317 1 534 262 796 
2 Classic 643 5 373 682 1055 806 4 382 663 1045 
 NPV-II 643 5 373 573 946 3317 1 998 -202 796 
3 Classic 200 3 1000 1342 2342 258 2 1033 1291 2324 
 NPV-II 200 3 1000 1283 2283 500 2 1057 1180 2236 
4 Classic 171 3 1166 1356 2522 186 3 1170 1345 2515 
 NPV-II 171 3 1166 1165 2331 500 2 1308 930 2236 
5 Classic 894 4 268 590 858 983 4 270 585 855 
 NPV-II 894 4 268 585 853 3317 3 287 551 838 
6 Classic 643 6 373 600 973 740 5 377 596 973 
 NPV-II 643 6 373 510 883 3317 1 469 369 838 
7 Classic 200 2 1000 1400 2400 447 1 1342 895 2236 
 NPV-II 200 2 1000 1300 2300 500 1 1450 550 2000 
8 Classic 171 3 1166 1463 2629 236 2 1226 1320 2546 
 NPV-II 171 3 1166 1223 2389 500 1 1900 100 2000 
 
This comparison shows that the optimal solution derived from the NPV-II 
framework is ‘suboptimal’ when evaluated with the classical framework. It also 
shows that the classical functions always overestimate the logistics cost for the 
supplier due to the omission of the supplier’s reward. The classical models 
consistently arrive at total joint costs that are too high (especially when evaluated 
according to the classical functions) compared to the logistics costs of the optimum 
found with the NPV model. 
When adopting a joint optimal policy, all models shift solutions towards more 
relative costs to bear for the buyer compared to the independent policy. This is what 
can be expected when comparing independent and joint optimisation. However, 
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columns 10 to 12 in Table 4-3, listing the true valuation according to the NPV 
framework, indicate that the classical models do not shift this balance as drastically as 
the NPV-II model. This is a consequence of the fact that lot-sizes 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 in the joint 
optimum of the classical models are typically much smaller compared to those 
obtained in the NPV model, whereas they are the same in the independent 
optimisation case. Instance 2 shows in particular this difference: whereas the classical 
model rather maintains the relative balance of costs between buyer and supplier, the 
NPV model substantially increases logistics costs for the buyer, from 373 to 998, 
whereas the supplier actually sees his cost drastically lowered, from 573 down 
towards a net profit of 202. Only by considering the positive effect of the supplier’s 
reward is it possible to arrive at such solutions. 
 
4.9 Cost sharing 
When the buyer and supplier agree to change policy from independent to joint 
optimal policy, the profit functions are increased for supplier and supply chain but it 
is not increased in buyer’s profit. However, changing the independent of the 
coordination policy is always making the situation for the buyer worse, so that the 
supplier should make some net payment to address the balance. 
Since it is assumed that an ideal case of coordination must prevail, then each 
player must have an equal pay return in the net benefit to share among the supplier 
and buyer in some equitable fashion. Goyal (1976), proposed the method to split the 
rewards or costs of adopting the joint optimal policy between buyer and supplier. 
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In Goyal (1976), the following approach is suggested for splitting these 
variable logistics costs. Let 𝑇𝑇∗𝑠𝑠 be the joint logistics costs in the joint optimal, and 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏
∗ and 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠∗ be the logistics cost for the buyer and supplier, respectively, in the case of 
independent sequential optimisation. Then Goyal’s splitting rule is to allocate the 
following costs to the supplier: 
   
and allocate to the buyer the cost: 
   
where 𝑍𝑍 is given by: 
   
 
 
Because the move from the independent approach to the joint approach is 
always making the situation for the buyer worse, the supplier should each time make 
some net payment to address the balance. Thus, the supplier should pay to the buyer 
the net difference between his real logistics costs in the joint optimum and the one 
identified in Eq.(4-33). 
Table 4-4 gives the results of applying Goyal’s rule to the solutions reported in 
Tables 4-3. For instance 1, for example, the classical model suggests a transfer of 63 
(the same result was found by Goyal (1976), since it is the same instance), while the 
NPV model finds that it should be 296. 
 
(4-33) 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇∗𝑠𝑠 
 
(4-34) (1 − 𝑍𝑍)𝑇𝑇∗𝑠𝑠 
 
(4-35) 
𝑍𝑍 = 𝑇𝑇∗𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏
∗ + 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠∗ 
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Table 4-4: Comparison independent and joint logistics costs  
 
# 
 
Model 
 
Z 
 
Buyer’s 
share 
 
Supplier’s 
share 
 
Supply 
chain cost 
 
Payment to 
buyer 
1 Classic 0.71 256 626 882 63 
 NPV-II 0.70 238 558 796 296 
2 Classic 0.65 370 675 1045 13 
 NPV-II 0.61 314 482 796 684 
3 Classic 0.57 992 1331 2323 40 
 NPV-II 0.56 979 1257 2236 77 
4 Classic 0.54 1163 1352 2515 7 
 NPV-II 0.50 1119 1117 2236 189 
5 Classic 0.69 267 588 855 2 
 NPV-II 0.69 264 575 838 24 
6 Classic 0.62 373 600 973 4 
 NPV-II 0.58 354 484 838 115 
7 Classic 0.58 932 1304 2236 410 
 NPV-II 0.57 870 1131 2000 580 
8 Classic 0.56 1129 1417 2545 97 
 NPV-II 0.51 976 1024 2000 924 
 
 
4.10 Determining the side-payments 
In order for both parties to accept the supply chain optimisation, side-
payments must be organised such that the final cost distribution vector is an 
imputation (a sufficient condition for a two-player cooperative game). It is denoted 
that 𝛱𝛱𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥 is the profit function, where 𝑚𝑚 refers to the particular policy, i.e. 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 = supply 
chain policy, 𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 = independent policy, and subscript 𝑗 = 𝑏 for buyer, 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑠 for the 
supplier. Because the simultaneous optimisation of the two variables over the joint 
optimal policy can never produce worse total profits than the independent policy over 
parts, it holds that 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≥ 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. 
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When will buyer and supplier, being independent, both are happy to accept the 
joint optimal policy? Only if 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≥ 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼and 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≥ 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. Since 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠 is in general no 
longer that quantity that maximises 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏, it holds that 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, where the equality 
only holds in the exceptional case that 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠 =  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ . The buyer will, in all but the 
exceptional case, not want to accept the joint optimal policy. Also, since 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≥ 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 
it must be that the supplier indeed gains from the joint optimal policy i.e. 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≥ 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. 
For the joint optimal policy to be accepted by both actors, the supplier must 
offer a “side-payment” to the buyer. Since 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≡ 𝛱𝛱 ≥ 0, this extra profit 𝛱𝛱 
offers the motivation to implement the joint optimal policy. Let 𝛿𝛿(0 ≤ 𝛿𝛿 ≤ 1) be the 
relative share for the buyer, and (1 − 𝛿𝛿) be the remainder for the supplier. We thus 
want to end up giving each, respectively: 
   
 
   
 
Which, if 𝛱𝛱 > 0 and (0 ≤ 𝛿𝛿 ≤ 1), will create a win-win situation.  
   The ‘right’ value for the parameter 𝛿𝛿 is typically obtained from negotiations 
between buyer and supplier. A “fair’ value seems to be 𝛿𝛿 = 0.5, but this value might 
not be achieved if one party has significantly more power in the relationship.          
For example, the buyer may be a large buyer-chain, having plenty of opportunities to 
find alternative suppliers for the product. It may then be that 𝛿𝛿 will be higher. 
(4-36) 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏′ = 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝛿𝛿𝛱𝛱 ≥ 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
 
(4-37) 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠′ = 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝛱𝛱 ≥ 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
 
117 
Once the value for 𝛿𝛿 is negotiated, the side-payment(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠) (£/year) that the 
supplier must offer the buyer is determined by. 
   
 
Table 4-5: Optimisation benefits and side-payments  
 
# 
 
Model 
 
∆𝛱𝛱(%) 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 
Final costs 
Buyer Supplier Supply 
Chain 
1 Classic -4.72 -72 72 246 635 882 
 NPV-II -11.37 -316 316 217 578 796 
2 Classic -0.94 -14 14 368 677 1045 
 NPV-II -15.75 -699 699 299 496 796 
3 Classic -0.76 -42 42 991 1333 2323 
 NPV-II -2.07 -80 80 976 1260 2236 
4 Classic -0.31 -8 8 1162 1352 2515 
 NPV-II -4.07 -189 189 1119 1117 2236 
5 Classic -0.44 -3 3 266 588 855 
 NPV-II -1.68 -26 26 261 577 838 
6 Classic -0.05 -4 4 373 600 973 
 NPV-II -5.10 -119 119 351 488 838 
7 Classic -6.83 -424 424 918 1318 2236 
 NPV-II -13.04 -600 600 850 1150 2000 
8 Classic -3.20 -101 101 1124 1421 2545 
 NPV-II -16.30 -929 929 971 1029 2000 
 
Table 4-5 gives the side payments and final costs for the parties. Column 3 
lists ∆𝛱𝛱 as a percentage relative to total costs in the independent policy, indicating the 
potential of the joint optimal policy. The NPV framework sees significantly more 
opportunity from joint optimal policy than a classic framework, and typically offers 
much larger side-payments. 
(4-38) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏′ − 𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
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4.11 Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on the inventory models from classical framework. 
The optimal lot-size models from the literature compare with the models derived from 
the NPV framework for a single buyer and single supplier under deterministic 
assumptions and (in) finite production rates. As indicated, these models form the basis 
for many other research papers reported in the literature. 
By introducing the NPV framework to derive models, it can be implied that an 
incorrect model is generated by missing the holding cost term in these classical 
inventory models. The NPV model with the proper choice of anchor point, 
automatically leads to the identification of what is to be corrected. It can easily model 
systems where products are either pushed from the moment that some production 
process starts, or pulled to meet some fixed due date of first delivery to a subsequent 
process or actor in the supply chain. 
The error that omission causes in term of supplier’s profit function were 
introduced in the classical models has been analysed by comparing the optimal 
decision variables analytically and presenting further numerical evidence through 
some particular examples based on instances previously used in the literature. The 
joint optimum, lot-sizes for the buyer are too small and lot-sizes for the supplier rather 
too large and the difference increases with the ratio of transfer price to variable 
production cost and the ratio of production rate to demand rate. Not only are the 
optimal decision variables different, the judgment of relative direct profits or costs 
incurred by the buyer and the supplier is affected as well, and may lead to completely 
misrepresent of how the overall gains from a joint optimal policy should be 
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distributed. Goyal’s (1976) rule and side payment to allocate for sharing the benefits 
of the joint policy is proposed in order to guarantee rational for the buyer to change 
from independent policy to joint optimal policy. 
Holding costs in this chapter are determined by the opportunity cost of capital, 
in accordance with the general approach taken in the inventory literature; see e.g. 
Silver et al. (1998). It is not difficult to incorporate the other inventory related cost 
elements to the net present value model while properly adjusting holding costs in the 
classical models as well. Although the numerical gaps between the classical models 
and the NPV model may be affected, the main finding of this chapter on the need to 
revise the classical models should still apply. 
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Chapter 5: Quantity Pricing Discount Model 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed from literature in Chapter 2, significant attention has been 
discussed in many streams of research toward the coordination among the members of 
a supply chain. As a useful coordinating mechanism, quantity discounts have been 
broadly analysed and explored, from the perspective of both operations management 
and marketing (Choi et al. 2005). Not only the two parties involved in a purchasing 
activity, but also the entire distribution channel, can benefit from employing quantity 
price discounts. The quantity discount problem primarily considers the viewpoint of 
the buyer: calculating the optimal order quantity, this minimises the buyer’s total 
relevant costs. However, upon switching to the perspective of the supplier, the 
situation may become significantly different. 
Through a quantity-discount pricing scheme, a supplier aims to induce a buyer 
to change the buyer’s lot-size in order to increase the supplier’s profits. In the classic 
literature on quantity pricing discounts the simple buyer-supplier inventory models 
with constant deterministic demand. It has not been clearly demonstrated that the 
impact on profits from optimal pricing do not arise from lot-size coordination but 
rather from an increase in final demand. 
The classical inventory models do not include all the relevant lot-size 
dependent terms in the supplier’s profit function. This not only leads to a supply chain 
model in conceptual disagreement with the basic economic principle that the NPV of 
cash-flows determine the value of profit generating activities for a firm. It is also 
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demonstrated to have a real practical impact on decision making whenever these firms 
decide to pursue the joint optimal strategy. This chapter uses the corrected profit 
functions of buyer and supplier to analyse price discount schemes and their financial 
impact. The general conclusion of this chapter is that quantity price discount can be 
useful under constant demand. The numerical result in this Chapter is solved by Excel 
spreadsheet version 2010. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, the general modelling 
assumption is described. The initial equilibrium for the NPV for buyer-supplier 
models is analysed in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, an initial equilibrium in classical 
framework is investigated. The optimal NPV strategies for buyer and supplier in the 
discount scheme are then presented in Section 5.5. Numerical experiments are given 
in Section 5.6 and the results compared with the proposed model. A discussion on the 
impact of various factors on the benefits of price discounts follows in section 5.7. 
General conclusion is described in Section 5.8. 
 
5.2 Modelling assumptions 
The system studied contains two independent parties: a buyer and a supplier. 
The buyer purchases a product from the supplier at the (initial) price 𝑤𝑤 per unit and 
sells to his customers at a fixed price 𝑝𝑝 per unit. The total annual customers demand 𝐷𝐷 
is constant. The other assumptions are: both parties have perfect information about the 
other player’s characteristics; final demand occurs at a constant rate; shortages are not 
allowed; lead-time is zero; the supplier produces at (in)finite rate; there are no 
capacity constants; ‘out-of-pocket’ holding cost for buyer and supplier are zero. The 
following notation is introduced (the index 𝑗 = 𝑏 for buyer, 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑠 for supplier): 
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𝐷𝐷:  demand rate; 
𝑅𝑅:  supplier’s production rate (𝑅𝑅 > 𝐷𝐷); 
𝑝𝑝:  sales price per product; 
𝑤𝑤:  contract purchase price (paid by the buyer) (𝑝𝑝 > 𝑤𝑤); 
𝑐𝑐:  supplier’s variable cost per product (paid by the supplier) (𝑤𝑤 > 𝑐𝑐); 
𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗:  fixed order (set-up) cost; 
ℎ𝑗𝑗:  holding cost per product per year; 
𝛼𝛼:  discount rate; 
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗: buyer’s lot-size; 
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝: supplier’s fixed order processing cost per buyer’s order; 
𝑚𝑚: integer multiplication (𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1); 
 
The behaviour of both buyer and supplier follows the standard assumptions. 
The buyer orders in batches of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 at the equidistant point in time to cycle time 𝑇𝑇 =
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷⁄ . The buyer’s inventory position over time follows the classical function. The 
supplier is produced in batches of 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, where 𝑚𝑚 ∈ {1, 2, 3, … }, and ships the 
first batch 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 as soon as it is available, i.e. 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅 time after the start of the production 
run, and delivers all subsequent 𝑚𝑚 − 1 batches at equidistant points in time 
corresponding to the buyer’s cycle time 𝑇𝑇. The supplier’s cycle time, the time 
between the start of two subsequent production runs, is 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇. An illustration of the 
inventory position over time from the supplier is given in Figure 5-1. 
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The system is analysed under two different scenarios: 
• Scenario 1: Initial equilibrium. This serves as the base-case scenario. The 
buyer, paying 𝑤𝑤 per unit of product to the supplier, establishes his optimal lot-
size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  based on his own profit function, and then the supplier follows 
in determining the optimal value of his lot-size (through 𝑚𝑚) based on his profit 
function. 
• Scenario 2: Quantity discount pricing. The supplier aims to increase his 
profits by introducing an all-unit price discount on all units bought in an order 
by having to pay only 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, where 𝑤𝑤 < 1. In return, however, the supplier must 
be willing to order at a level 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ , where typically 𝛾𝛾 > 1. The supplier aims to 
find the values for 𝑤𝑤 and 𝛾𝛾 that will optimise his own profit function, subject 
to the knowledge that the buyer is free to accept or reject the scheme. 
However, these studies were based on the classical framework in which set-up 
and inventory holding costs are the only lot-size dependent terms. 
 
5.3 Initial equilibrium for the NPV framework 
In the initial equilibrium, the buyer is free to choose the value of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏. He will 
thus choose a value that maximises his profit function. 
5.3.1 The buyer’s profit function 
Using the NPV framework, for the cash-flow structure depicted in Figure 5-2 
and taking the anchor point at the start of sales, the linearlise annuity stream profit 
function for the buyer is: 
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which the buyer’s (initial) unit inventory holding cost are 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 ≡ ℎ𝑏𝑏. The optimal lot-
size is equal to an EOQ: 
 
 
The buyer’s optimal profits are obtained by substitution of (the right-hand-side 
of) Eq.(5-2) into (the right-hand-side of) Eq.(5-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Buyer-supplier inventory model 
 
 
(5-1) 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
(5-2) 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ = �2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑏𝑏  
(5-3) 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏2 −�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷 
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Figure 5-2: Cash-flow diagrams for buyer-supplier 
 
5.3.2 The supplier’s profit function 
The supplier can specify the size of  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏. While impossible in the initial 
equilibrium, the comparison of the supplier’s optimal lot-size at unit price 𝑤𝑤 with 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 
may perhaps indicate whether the supplier wishes to increase or rather decrease the 
lot-size in the price discount scheme. 
The supplier can maximise his annual profits by simultaneously determining 
optimal values for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚. In the NPV framework, the linearised annuity stream 
profit function for the supplier is: 
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The last term in Eq.(5-4) is henceforth referred to the supplier’s reward. The 
optimal lot-size value 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ (in function of 𝑚𝑚) is found in the traditional manner from 
the first order condition defined: 
 
 
 
 
 
Then the lot-size, if ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗) − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) ≤ 0, is 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠 → ∞, and else: 
 
 
For determining the optimal integer multiplier 𝑚𝑚∗, the difference inequality 
technique of Munson and Rosenblatt (2001), p.375, is applied. This technique is based 
on the fact that 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗ + 1,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) and, if 𝑚𝑚∗ ≥ 1. This system of two 
(quadratic) inequalities produces a unique closed-form solution for 𝑚𝑚∗. 
Where ℎ𝑠𝑠 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐, and This gives: If 𝑅𝑅 ≥
2𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑠𝑠
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤
 or 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0, then 𝑚𝑚∗ = 1, and 
else: 
(5-4) 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2  
−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
(5-5) 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚)  = 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅� 
(5-6) ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚) = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐[(𝑚𝑚− 1) − (𝑚𝑚 − 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅] 
(5-7) 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
∗ = � 2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏(𝑚𝑚∗)𝐷𝐷
ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗) − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) 
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Substitution of Eq.(5-7) into Eq.(5-4) gives the supplier’s optimal profits as function 
of 𝑚𝑚∗when ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗) − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) > 0 and 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 > 0, and else 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗) → ∞. 
 
 
 
Note that the solution (𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ → ∞,𝑚𝑚∗= 1, 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗) → ∞) will not be 
attainable in real-life. This solution merely indicates the suppliers’ desire in those 
cases to stimulate the buyer to order in as large quantities as possible, naturally, there 
are constraints in practice that are not in the model (e.g. warehouse capacity 
constraints, production rate constraints) that will limit the size of the order. It is highly 
probable that the supplier’s optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ as derived in Eq.(5-8) cannot be 
realised in the initial equilibrium since the buyer will order 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  and it is very likely 
that 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ ≠ 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ 
In the initial equilibrium, the supplier’s optimal strategy is thus to determine 
the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚 in his profit function as given by Eq.(5-4) in which 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏. 
This gives: 
 
 
(5-8) 𝑚𝑚∗ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(1+𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 )(2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑠𝑠−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑠𝑠(1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
(5-9) 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗) = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2  
−�2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗)(ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗) − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐))𝐷𝐷 
(5-10) 𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(1+𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 )ℎ𝑏𝑏
𝑅𝑅2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
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Comparing Eq.(5-10) and Eq.(5-8) leads to the conclusion that in general 
𝑚𝑚∗ ≠ 𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏. It is thus conceptually wrong to assume that these optimal values are 
always equal, as done in Weng (1995b). 
Substitution of Eq.(5-2) into Eq.(5-4) gives the supplier’s optimal profits in 
the initial equilibrium in function of 𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏. 
 
 
 
 
It is of course that 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) ≤ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗). 
 
5.4 Initial equilibrium for classical framework 
5.4.1 The buyer’s profit function 
This section presents the buyer’s original profit function in classical 
framework, before any price adjustment, can be written as (Monahan, 1984; Lee and 
Rosenblatt, 1986; Joglekar, 1988). The buyer’s average profit function is: 
 
 
5.4.2 The supplier’s profit function 
The supplier’s profit function in the classical framework is given by Joglekar 
(1989). The supplier’s average profit function is: 
(5-12) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
(5-11) 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2  
−�
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏)
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
+ ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏) − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)
ℎ𝑏𝑏
�
�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷2  
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5.4.3 The optimal lot-size in classical framework 
The supplier would be free to choose a value for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, then the values for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 
and 𝑚𝑚 that maximise Eq.(5-13) are given below (the additional superscript ‘𝑚𝑚’ 
indicating that it is derived in the classical inventory framework). With ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚) ≤ 0,
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
∗𝑖𝑖 → ∞, and else:  
 
 
and 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 = 1 if 𝑅𝑅 ≥ 2𝐷𝐷 or 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0, else: 
 
 
 
 
where ℎ𝑠𝑠 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐, and: 
 
 
The supplier’s optimal profits in function of 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖would then be for ℎ𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖� >0 𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 > 0: 
 
 
(5-13) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 
−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
(5-14) 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖 = �2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖)𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖)  
(5-15) 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅−1)
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
(5-17) 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖� = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 −�2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖)ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖)𝐷𝐷 
(5-16) 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) = 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 
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and else 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖� → ∞ 
In the initial equilibrium, however, the buyer orders at 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ . The supplier’s 
optimal response is to determine the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚 from Eq.(5-13) in which 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗: 
 
 
 
Substitution of Eq.(5-2) into Eq.(5-13) gives the supplier’s optimal profits in 
the initial equilibrium in function of 𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 
 
 
 
Lemma 1.  In the initial equilibrium, the buyer’s optimal strategy (i.e. the value 
of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) in the NPV framework is equal to that in the classical framework. 
Proof of lemma 1.Comparison of Eq.(5-1) and Eq.(5-12) shows that the buyer’s 
profit in the classical framework is equal to his profit function in the NPV framework, 
up to a constant term −𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
2
. The optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  is thus equal to Eq.(5-2), which 
proves Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2. (a) The supplier’s optimal value 𝑚𝑚∗ in the NVP framework is never larger 
than the optimal value 𝑚𝑚∗ in the classical framework; (b) The supplier’s optimal value 
(5-18) 
𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠(1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
(5-19) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − [𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + ℎ𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�ℎ𝑏𝑏 ]�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷2  
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𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
∗ in the NPV framework, when finite, is strictly larger than the optimal value 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ in 
the classical framework. 
Proof.  Given in appendix A. 
Lemma 2 seems to indicate that supplier’s lot-size altering strategy will be 
dependent on the framework used if the classical framework indicates that the optimal 
lot-size for the supplier 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ is larger than the buyer’s optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗, then the NPV 
framework will indicate that it is even larger where 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 ∗ is explained the same in the 
NPV and classical frameworks from Section 5.3.1. Both frameworks this point 
towards introducing a policy to induce the buyer to order in larger quantities, but the 
policy is likely to be more possible in the NPV framework. Alternatively, if the 
classical framework indicates that 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗<𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ , and thus points towards introducing a lot-
size decreasing policy, then the NPV framework may lead to three different possible 
conclusions: (1) 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ < 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ , but since the difference is going to be less the supplier will 
likely develop a less lot-size decreasing policy, (2) 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ ≈ 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  and then the supplier 
might not find it interesting enough to introduce the policy, (3) 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ > 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  and then the 
supplier may wish to introduce a policy aiming for a lot-size increase rather than a 
decrease. Finally, if in the classical framework 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ ≈ 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ , a quantity discount policy 
can possibly achieve little benefits. 
However, in the NPV framework, it may still be that 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ > 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  and thus that a 
lot-size increasing policy may be worth introducing. 
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5.5 The quantity discount scheme 
Assume that the supplier has established a price discount scheme (𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾), 
where 𝑤𝑤 < 1 𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝛾𝛾 > 1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝛾𝛾 < 1. The supplier thus offers the buyer a 
reduced price 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 on all units in the order, if and only if the buyer would order in lot-
sizes either not smaller than 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  when 𝛾𝛾 > 1, or not larger than 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  when 𝛾𝛾 < 1 
Given the price discount 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, the buyer’s optimal lot-size, if not constrained 
by 𝛾𝛾, can be derived from substitution of 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 for 𝑤𝑤 in his profit function Eq.(5-1). 
This gives the following lot-size: 
 
 
If 𝛾𝛾 < 1 and the buyer accepts the discount scheme, then Eq.(5-20) implies 
that the buyer will necessarily want to order the lot-size 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ . If 𝛾𝛾 > 1, then Eq.(5-20) 
also implies that if the buyer accepts the discount scheme, he will want to order the 
lot-size given by: 
 
 
The optimal strategy of the buyer is, thus, based on some acceptance criterion 
to either not accept the scheme and keep ordering in the lot-sizes 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  at price 𝑤𝑤, or to 
accept the scheme and order the quantity 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  where 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 = 𝛾𝛾 if 𝛾𝛾 < 1 and 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏= 
maximum �𝛾𝛾, 1
�𝛽
� if𝛾𝛾 > 1. 
(5-20) �
2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
= 1
�𝑤𝑤
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗ > 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  
(5-21) 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ , 1
�𝑤𝑤
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗� = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝛾𝛾, 1
�𝑤𝑤
�𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗  
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The above derivation of the buyer’s optimal strategy is often simplified in the 
literature, as in Munson and Rosenblatt (2001), by assuming that the buyer’s optimal 
unconstrained lot-size as given by Eq.(5-20) is unaffected by the price discount, i.e. 
remains equal to 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ . This then results in the simpler policy that the buyer either 
rejects the price discount, or accepts it at the level of 𝛾𝛾 (i.e.𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 ≡ 𝛾𝛾). This simpler 
policy is automatically found when assuming that the buyer’s holding cost is 
unaffected by price discount, i.e. is still 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 ≡ ℎ𝑏𝑏. Under constant demand, feasible 
values for 𝑤𝑤 corresponding to any 𝛾𝛾 > 1 value are sufficiently small that 
maximum�𝛾𝛾, 1
�𝛽
� ≡ 𝛾𝛾. Furthermore, assuming constant holding costs for the buyer 
under constant demand produces results typically not far from the optimal results 
since the 𝑤𝑤 value tends to remain close to 1. The justification of these simplifications 
for constant demand in the NPV framework can be confirmed. Note that equal 
conclusion have been reached in the classical framework; as given by Munson and 
Rosenblatt (2001). 
The condition for the buyer to accept the price discount scheme is that his 
profits must at least be as large as when not accepting the scheme. The buyer’s profits 
under the discount scheme are given by:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Thus, in order to ensure that the buyer will accept the price discount scheme, 
the supplier must ensure that 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗)− 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) ≥ 0. Using Eq.(5-22) and 
Eq.(5-3) thus leads to the following upper bound on the value for 𝑤𝑤 (𝛾𝛾): 
(5-22) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗2  
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Eq.(5-23) is the acceptance criterion for the buyer. 
 
5.6 Price discount scheme in the NPV framework 
Profits earned by the supplier in the scheme (𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾), when the buyer accepts it 
and thus chooses the quantity 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ , are given by substitution of 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 for 𝑤𝑤 and 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  
For 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 in Eq.(5-4). The supplier will then determine the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚 
that maximises this profit: 
 
 
 
 
This shows that, if 𝛾𝛾 < 1, then 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏 ≥  𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏, and if 𝛾𝛾 > 1, then 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏. 
The fact that the optimal 𝑚𝑚 values in the initial equilibrium and the price discount 
scheme must in general be assumed to be different also holds in the classical 
framework. The supplier profits functions are equal to: 
 
 
 
(5-23) 𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾) ≤ 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 12𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏)�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
2
�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷  
(5-24) 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾
∗𝑏𝑏(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏) =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(1+𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 )ℎ𝑏𝑏
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠(1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
(5-25) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� = (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 − [𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏�𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏  + 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏(𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏� − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐))
ℎ𝑏𝑏
 ]�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷2  
 
135 
In order to propose a price discount scheme (𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾), the supplier’s profits, when 
the buyer accepts the scheme, must not be lower than the profits earned in the initial 
equilibrium as given by Eq.(5-11). It must thus be that 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) −
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� ≥ 0. Using Eq.(5-25) and Eq.(5-11) for these profits, thus leads to a 
lower bound for 𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾): 
 
 
 
 
Eq.(5-26) is the acceptance criterion for the supplier. Note the similarities 
between Eq.(5-23) and Eq.(5-26) are upper and lower bounds for supplier to accept 
the criteria to offer quantity price discount. 
 
5.7 Price discount scheme in classical framework 
When the scheme (𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾) is proposed and accepted by the buyer, the supplier 
will find this his optimal strategy by substitution of 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 for 𝑤𝑤 and 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏in 
Eq.(5-13), and deriving the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚: 
 
 
 
For giving profits in function of 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖equal to: 
 
(5-26) 
𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾)  ≥ 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + �
1
2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
�
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾
∗𝑏𝑏�
𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏
− 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏)� + 12ℎ𝑏𝑏 �𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏� − ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏) + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 + ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 − 1)�
⬚
��2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤
2ℎ𝑏𝑏
�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷  
(5-27) 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏) =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑏𝑏𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠�1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
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The lower bound for 𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾) is obtained from the condition that 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� −
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚
∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� ≥ 0: 
 
 
 
Since it is to assume that 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 =  𝛾𝛾, the following simple search procedure can 
be used for determining the supplier’s optimal strategy: 
1. Calculate 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 from Eq.(5-2). Set 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠∗ = 0, 𝛾𝛾∗ = 0,𝑤𝑤∗ = 0. 
2. For 𝛾𝛾 = 𝑚𝑚 to 𝑏 in steps of 𝛿𝛿 
2.1 Determine 𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾∗ = 𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾)from Eq.(5-23) 
2.2 Determine 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏from Eq.(5-27) 
2.3 Determine 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾∗𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� from Eq.(5-28) 
2.4 If 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾∗𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� > 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠∗,  set𝐴𝐴∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾∗𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗�,𝛾𝛾∗ = 𝛾𝛾,  
and  𝑤𝑤∗ = 𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾∗ 
3. If 𝛾𝛾 < 𝑏, return to step 2, else Stop. 
The following constants of experiments in Section 5.8 are used: 𝑚𝑚 = 0.05, 
𝑏 = 30, 𝛿𝛿 = 0.05. In addition, the lower bound on 𝑤𝑤 is also calculated from Eq.(5-
29) in step 2.1. 
(5-28) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� = (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − [𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)ℎ𝑏𝑏 ]�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷2  
(5-29) 
𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾) ≥ 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + ( 12𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 �𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 − 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�� + 12ℎ𝑏𝑏 �𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� − ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)�)�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷
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The above procedure, thus assigns the value for 𝑤𝑤 to its upper bound, and thus 
leads to the solution in which the buyer’s profit are kept at the same level as in the 
initial equilibrium, in line with the approaches developed in the original models of 
Monahan (1984); Banerjee (1986); Lee and Rosenblatt (1986); Joglekar (1988). This 
procedure is also used for reporting the solution given in Section 5.8. 
 
5.8 Numerical examples 
Tests are conducted on 8 instances. The numerical values for the input 
parameters are listed in Table 5-1. Instance 1 is taken from Goyal (1976) and instance 
3 from Banerjee (1986). The orders of the 8 instances are derived from these two by 
changing the value of the purchase price 𝑤𝑤, the production rate 𝑅𝑅, or altering the 
relative importance of set-up cost. 
Table 5-1: Problem instance characteristics 
Instance 𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤 𝑐𝑐 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑅 
1(a) 12000 2 10 1.5 1.2 0 100 ∞ 
2 12000 4 10 2.9 1.2 0 100 ∞ 
3(b) 1000 30 100 25 20 0 400 3200 
4 1000 40 100 34 20 0 400 3200 
5 12000 3 10 1.5 1.2 0 100 38400 
6 12000 4 10 2.9 1.2 0 100 38400 
7 1000 30 100 25 20 0 400 ∞ 
8 1000 40 100 34 20 0 400 ∞ 
For each instance: 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠= 𝛼𝛼 = 0.2; (a) based on Goyal (1976);  
(b) based on Banerjee (1986) 
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5.8.1 Results in the NPV framework 
Table 5-2 gives the results for the initial equilibrium. For most instances, 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ is 
significantly higher than 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ , pointing towards an incentive to increase the lot-size. 
Table 5-3 reports that the results of the optimal price discount strategy for the 
supplier, it can be seen that the lot-size increasing discount scheme does seem to pay 
off for all instances. 
The difference of lot-size policy would be explained that a lot-size decreasing 
policy reduces the positive impact of the supplier’s reward on his profits, may 
increase the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚, and this is in addition to the negative effect that a 
price reduction itself has. It is thus less likely to be adopted. On the other hand, a lot-
size increasing policy increases the supplier’s reward, and tends to decrease 𝑚𝑚. Lot-
size increasing policies are thus more likely to be adopted. 
Table 5-2: Initial Equilibrium (NPV framework) 
Instance 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏(𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) 𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗)  𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗)  
1 894 5731 1 ∞ ∞ 4 2961 
2 643 12826 1 ∞ ∞ 5 19819 
3 200 3990 1 1844 4499 3 3677 
4 172 4824 1 ∞ ∞ 3 12795 
5 894 17731 1 13038 3394 4 3006 
6 643 12826 1 ∞ ∞ 6 19880 
7 200 3990 1 ∞ ∞ 2 3660 
8 172 4824 1 ∞ ∞ 3 12737 
 
As can be observed in Table 5-3, the price discount policy can radically 
increase the lot-size and reduce the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚. The profits for the supplier 
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can be significantly increased. To interpret the last column, consider that the profit 
increase is defined here as the percent increase relative to the optimal profits in the 
initial equilibrium: 
 
 
 
For example, in instance 1, price reduction factors 𝑤𝑤 stay close to 1, as 
expected, with maximum values around 3.3 percent. The results do depend on the 
instance. An explanation for this is provided in Section 5.9. 
5.8.2 Comparison between the NPV and classical frameworks 
Similar results in the classical framework are reported in Tables 5-4 and 5-5.        
A comparison of Table 5-4 with Table 5-2 shows that values for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  (Column 2) are 
equal in confirming Lemma 1. Furthermore, profit function values for the  buyer 
(column 3) are slightly higher because the classical function does not take into 
account the interest cost of the set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 (Compare Eq.(5-1) and Eq.(5-12)). 
Profit function values for the supplier in the initial equilibrium (column 8) are often 
lower, but occasionally somewhat higher in comparison to the values obtained in the 
NPV framework. They are often lower since the optimal values for 𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏are the same 
and the positive effect of the supplier’s reward is not incorporated, but can 
occasionally be somewhat higher if the effect of the interest cost on 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is more 
remarkable in the NPV function (compares Eq.(5-4) and Eq.(5-13)). Comparing 
results reported in column 5 and 6 of Table 5-4 confirms Lemma 2. 
(5-30) 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 = 100𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� − 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗)
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗)  
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Table 5-3: Price discount scheme (NPV framework) 
Instance 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑏𝑏 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑏𝑏 Profit 
increase 
1 3.70 0.9857 1 3057 0.9805 3.225 
2 5.15 0.9826 1 19961 0.9786 0.717 
3 1.40 0.9978 2 3724 0.9959 1.285 
4 1.65 0.9957 2 12890 0.9930 0.740 
5 1.45 0.9990 3 3020 0.9982 0.476 
6 2.00 0.9973 3 19925 0.9961 0.227 
7 2.50 0.9829 1 3960 0.9714 8.194 
8 2.90 0.9797 1 13126 0.9688 3.057 
 
Table 5-5 lists the optimal price discount scheme for the supplier in the 
classical framework. The values for 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏(column 2) are always smaller than those found 
in the NPV framework. In all instances, the classical framework does not lead to as 
large lot-sizes as the NPV framework. While the upper bound values for 𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾) are the 
same in both frameworks. It is due to the typically much lower value for 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 that the 
optimal price reduction factors 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑏𝑏(column 3) are not as large in the classical 
framework. In addition, the optimal values for 𝑚𝑚 (column 4) are often not as low as 
those obtained in the NPV framework. The supplier’s optimal profits in the scheme 
(column 5) are consistently below what is found in the NPV framework. This is in 
part the results of differences in optimal values for 𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾, 𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚, but ultimately due to 
the difference in the profit function itself (Eq.(5-4) and Eq.(5-13)). The important 
result here is that lower profit values relative to the initial equilibrium obtained in the 
classical framework suggest that there is not so much benefit of a price discount 
scheme for the supplier. In other words, the NPV framework results provide stronger 
support for introducing price discount schemes for the supplier. 
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Table 5-4: Initial Equilibrium (classical framework) 
Instance 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏(𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) 𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗) 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗) 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) 
1 894 5732 1 ∞ 3574 4 2943 
2 643 12827 1 ∞ 20317 5 19721 
3 200 4000 1 800 4000 3 3658 
4 172 4834 1 ∞ 13000 3 12644 
5 894 17732 1 5657 3176 4 3010 
6 643 12827 1 ∞ 19976 6 19800 
7 200 4000 1 ∞ 4994 2 3600 
8 172 4834 1 ∞ 13994 3 12537 
 
5.9 Comparison with the joint optimal lot-size 
It is interesting to compare the above results with the joint optimal policy. The 
profit function from which to derive this policy is the sum of the individual profit 
functions for buyer and supplier shown in Chapter 4. In the NPV framework, it is thus 
given as the sum of Eq.(5-1) and Eq.(5-4), and in the classical framework as the sum 
of Eq.(5-12) and Eq.(5-13) 
Table 5-6 lists the value for the buyer’s lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∗ in the joint optimal policy 
according to the NPV framework (column 3) and the classical framework (column 5). 
Because the difference in the supplier’s profit functions, different results are obtained. 
In particular, the optimal lot-size of the NPV framework is independent of the transfer 
price 𝑤𝑤, while it is not in the classical framework. 
Indeed, Table 5-6 further reports the optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  in the initial 
equilibrium (column 1). Comparing 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  with 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗, it can be concluded that letting the 
buyer determine the lot-size at fixed price 𝑤𝑤 does in general not lead to solution close 
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to the joint optimum. Likewise, from the comparison of 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗ with 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ values reported in 
Table 5-2 and 5-4, letting the supplier decide on fixed price 𝑤𝑤 does not produce a 
solution close to the joint optimum. 
Table 5-5: Price discount scheme (classical framework) 
Instance 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑏𝑏 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗) 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑏𝑏 Profit increase 
1 1.85 0.9857 1 2987   
2 1.25 0.9826 1 19730 0.9786 0.717 
3 1.30 0.9978 2 3677 0.9959 1.285 
4 1.10 0.9957 2 12651 0.9930 0.740 
5 1.10 0.9990 3 3013 0.9982 0.476 
6 1.15 0.9973 3 19800 0.9961 0.227 
7 2.30 0.9860 1 3779 0.9714 8.194 
8 1.40 0.9981 1 12622 0.9688 3.057 
 
Indeed, Table 5-6 also lists the lot-size obtained from the optimal price 
discount policy for the NPV (column 4) and classical frameworks (Column 6). This 
lot-size is obtained by multiplication of 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 and 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ . As can be observed, the values of 
these lot-sizes are, in general, fairly close to 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗ in both frameworks. 
From this discussion, it appears that the joint optimal lot-size  𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗ is in general 
a good quantitative indicator for the optimal size of 𝛾𝛾. Conversely, if 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  are 
not that much different, a price discount policy is likely to be less beneficial. This 
explains why for some instances, the profit increase from the discount policy is small. 
Since the gap between 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗ and 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  is typically smaller in the classical framework 
compared to the NPV framework, there are more instances in the classical framework 
having little potential. 
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Table 5-6: Comparison of joint optimal lot-size 
  NPV NPV Classic Classic 
Instance 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗ 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑖𝑖 
1 94 3317 3309 1633 1655 
2 643 3317 3313 804 804 
3 200 276 280 258 260 
4 172 276 283 186 189 
5 894 1282 1297 983 984 
6 643 1282 1287 740 740 
7 200 500 500 447 460 
8 172 500 497 236 240 
 
 
5.10 Improvements in logistics 
In the previous section, the benefit of a price discount scheme is discussed in relation 
to its impact on profits. The benefits of the scheme are thus influenced by the relative 
importance of logistics in the contribution to overall profits of the firm. 
This section is focused on quantifying the benefits of the scheme in its ability 
to reduce the costs in absolute terms. The basic aim of this scheme is to reduce the 
cost of its logistics operations. Even if the cost reductions obtained are small relative 
to gross profits on sales but it can useful for a large company still be significant when 
compared to e.g. the average salary of an employee. It may thus still be worthwhile to 
save on these costs. 
Table 5-7 to this end extracts from the results obtained in the NPV framework 
the relevant cost elements. In the initial equilibrium (indicated by subscript 0), these 
are the annual cost of setup and holding inventory, and are thus given by: 
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In addition, the supplier’s reward adds a negative cost: 
 
 
The total relevant costs in the initial equilibrium are thus 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 = 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 + 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅0 
In the discount scheme (indicated by subscript 𝑝𝑝), these costs are affected such that: 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-7: Improvement in logistics (NPV framework) 
 
Instance 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅0 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑃 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑃 
 
GPL 
 
NR 
Cost 
decrease 
1 666 -27 639 378 -92 286 257 96 14.950 
2 690 -109 581 378 -546 -169 607 142 24.273 
3 1423 -100 1323 1359 -138 1220 56 47 3.571 
4 1445 -240 1205 1357 -392 965 145 95 7.862 
5 621 -27 594 600 -39 562 19 14 2.405 
6 630 -109 520 601 -218 383 92 45 8.652 
7 1440 -100 1340 840 -229 612 429 300 22.381 
8 1503 -240 1263 844 -662 182 691 389 30.882 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇: sum of set-up and holding costs; 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅: supplier’s reward; 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 = 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 + 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 
(5-31) 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 = �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2  +𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏 − 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗2  
 
(5-32) 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅0 = −𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏2  
(5-33) 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 = �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2  
+𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏 − 1� 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏 − 2�𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏2  
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𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 (gross profit margin loss) =(1 − 𝑤𝑤)𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷; 
𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 (net reduction) = 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 = 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 + 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 
 
 
and 
 
The total relevant cost in under the price scheme are thus: 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 = 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 +
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝. However, the scheme also reduces the gross profit margin on sales by an 
amount 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 = (1 − 𝑤𝑤)𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷, and this effect should also be incorporated when 
calculating the net reduction (𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅) in logistics cost of the scheme as: 
 
 
It can be verified that 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 = 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏� − 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏�, as it 
should be. Similar to the calculation of the profit increase introduced previously, a 
relative logistics cost decrease can be calculated as 
 
 
Results for the 8 instances are reported in Table 5-7. The effect of the 
supplier’s reward is in general significantly. It also plays an important role in 
justifying the positive effect of a price discount scheme. The cost decrease (last 
column) has been often rather large, and in general the larger 𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐 is smaller, the 
(5-34) Cost decrease = 100 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅|𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0| 
(5-35) 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝 = −𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏2  
(5-36) 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 =  𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 − 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 − 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 
(5-37) = 100 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅|𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0| 
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absolute cost reduction is larger when 𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐 increase. This is mainly due to the larger 
impact of the supplier’s reward. 
A similar analysis of the classical framework gives results reported in Table 5-
8. (There is a difference in the set-up cost terms for 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇, and since there is no 
supplier’s reward, 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇). A price discount scheme indeed appears much less 
promising. Observe that the net reduction now appears much lower in the case where 
𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐 is higher. Exactly the opposite conclusion is reached when comparing these 
instances through the NPV framework. 
Table 5-8: Improvement in Logistics (Classical framework) 
Instance 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑃 GPL NR Cost 
decrease 
1 655 561 52 42 6.410 
2 679 660 9 10 1.409 
3 1342 1289 34 19 1.394 
4 1356 1343 5 8 0.560 
5 590 585 1 4 0.642 
6 600 596 4 0 0.077 
7 1400 870 351 179 12.799 
8 1463 1313 65 85 5.821 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 (= 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇): sum of set-up and holding costs  
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 (gross profit margin loss) = (1 − 𝑤𝑤)𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷;  
𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 (net reduction) = 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇0 = 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 + 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 
Cost decrease = 100 𝑁𝑅𝑅|𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶0| 
 
It is thus important for logistics managers consider the impact of the 
framework used to take optimal decisions. The experimental results show that the 
NPV framework adds significant value to the better understanding of the impact of 
optimal decision about logistics on the firm. 
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5.11 Conclusion 
It has been written in the rationale for the supplier to introduce price discount 
schemes. Most analytical models that consider inventory-related cost, however, have 
been relying on the classical framework which only includes set-up costs and holding 
costs as relevant lot-size dependent terms in the profit functions. Based on a net 
present value analysis for the system with constant deterministic demand, this chapter 
shows that the positive financial effect of larger lot-sizes for the supplier should be 
taken into account when determining the optimal price discount scheme and its impact 
if a price discount scheme is context dependent, and some insights into the different 
factors affecting it are reported. In general, the impact of a price discount scheme can 
be expected to be significantly larger than what is derived in the classical inventory 
framework. The importance of the supplier’s reward for price discount policies is 
confirmed. The numerical experiments reported that the NPV framework also leads to 
a general conclusion that the optimal price discount scheme for the supplier gives lot-
sizes which are typically fairly close to the joint optimal policy for buyer and supplier. 
Besides the evaluation of the benefit of a price discount scheme relative to 
profits, it is shown that the evaluation of the gains is also important. In particular, 
since the total impact of logistics cost is smaller in the case when the supplier’s per 
unit sale price is large compared to his per unit cost the relative increase in profits 
from a price discount scheme is smaller. However, in this term the amount of money 
saved through the price discount scheme will in general be larger and this is often due 
to the relatively larger impact that the improvement of the supplier’s reward has. The 
classical framework, instead, leads to exactly the opposite conclusion. 
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Appendix A 
The classic approach 
The classic approach to quantity discount pricing derives average profit functions for 
buyer and supplier from the classic inventory holding cost framework, which accounts 
for profit margin, set-up costs, and holding costs. 
 
The supplier’s profit function 
This section gives results for the supplier in the classical framework, and proof of 
Lemma 2. The supplier’s profit function in the classical framework is given by 
Joglekar (1989): 
 
 
 
 
This supplier’s profit function in the classical framework is thus not equal to 
the one in the NPV framework Eq.(5-4), and the difference is not a constant term 
independent of his lot-size decision. 
 
Initial equilibrium 
If the supplier would be free to choose a value for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, then the values for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 
and 𝑚𝑚 that maximize Eq.(5-38) are given below (the additional superscript ‘i’)  
 
(5-38) 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  +𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
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indicating that it is derived in the classic inventory framework). With 
𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚) ≤ 0,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 → ∞, and else:  
and 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 = 1 if 𝑅𝑅 ≥ 2𝐷𝐷 or 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0, else: 
 
 
 
 
 
where ℎ𝑠𝑠 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐, and: 
 
 
The supplier’s optimal profits in function of 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 would then be for ℎ𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖� >0 𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 > 0: 
 
 
and else 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖� → ∞ 
 
[Proof Lemma 2] If 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0 then 𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 = 1. In the rest of the proof, it is thus 
assumed that 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 > 0. If 𝑅𝑅 ≥ 2𝐷𝐷 then 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 = 1, but also it must then be, since ℎ𝑠𝑠 <
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤, that 𝑅𝑅 ≥
2𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑠𝑠
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤
, and thus 𝑚𝑚∗ = 1. The reverse is not true, i.e. from 𝑅𝑅 > 2𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑠𝑠
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤
 it 
(5-39) 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
∗𝑖𝑖 = �2𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖)𝐷𝐷
𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖)  
𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅−1)
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) = 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖� = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �2𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖)ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖)𝐷𝐷 
(5-40) 
(5-41) 
(5-42) 
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cannot be concluded that 𝑅𝑅 ≥ 2𝐷𝐷, thus in that case 𝑚𝑚∗ < 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖is true if (comparing 
Eq.(5-8) and Eq(5-39)): 
 
 
 
 
 
The smallest root of the quadratic equation in 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
 on the left-hand-side, since (𝑤𝑤 > 𝑐𝑐), 
is always negative: 
 
 
 
The largest root of the left-hand-side is always larger than 1: 
 
 
 
It must be that 0≤ 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
≤ 1, and thus the quadratic equation in 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
 must always be ≤ 0, 
which concludes the proof for part (a) of Lemma 2. [Proof Lemma 2] Note that, 
since 𝑚𝑚∗ ≤ 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖: 
 
 
and  
 
�1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅� �2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ℎ𝑠𝑠 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤� ≤ ℎ𝑠𝑠 �2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 − 1� 
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 − �(𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)2 + 8ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)2ℎ𝑠𝑠 < 0 
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 − �(𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)2 + 8ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)2ℎ𝑠𝑠 > 1 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖� < 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗) 
ℎ𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚
∗𝑖𝑖� > ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚∗) − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) 
(5-43) 
2ℎ𝑠𝑠 �
𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
�
2
− 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤
𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
− (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) ≤ 0 (5-44) 
(5-45) 
(5-46) 
(5-48) 
(5-47) 
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This means that 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗ > 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖(Compare Eq.(5-7) and Eq.(5-39)), and concludes the proof 
of Lemma 2. 
In the initial equilibrium, however, the buyer orders at 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ . The supplier’s optimal 
response is to determine the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚 from Eq.(5-38) in which 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗: 
 
 
 
 
Substitution of Eq.(5-2) into Eq.(5-38) gives the supplier’s optimal profits in the 
initial equilibrium in function of 𝑚𝑚∗𝑖𝑖 
 
 
Price discount scheme 
When the scheme (𝑤𝑤, 𝛾𝛾) is proposed and accepted by the buyer, the supplier 
will find this his optimal strategy by substitution of 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 for 𝑤𝑤and 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 in 
Eq.(5-38), and deriving the optimal value for 𝑚𝑚: 
 
 
 
giving profits in function of 𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖equal to: 
 
 
𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠(1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − [𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�ℎ𝑏𝑏 ]�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷2  
𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾
∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏) =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑏𝑏𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠�1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� = (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − [𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)ℎ𝑏𝑏 ]�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷2  
(5-49) 
(5-50) 
(5-51) 
(5-52) 
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The lower bound for 𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾) is obtained from the condition that 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� −
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚
∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗� ≥ 0: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑤𝑤(𝛾𝛾) ≥ 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + ( 12𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 �𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 − 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�� + 12ℎ𝑏𝑏 �𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠�𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� − ℎ𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝛾𝛾∗𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)�)�2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷
 
(5-53) 
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Chapter 6: Coordination Buyer-Supplier under Vendor Managed 
Inventory for a Two-Echelon Supply Chain 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present the developed models for Vendor managed 
Inventory (VMI) policies. The four different VMI models are Consignment Inventory 
(CI), Vendor Managed Inventory Plus (VMI+), Vendor Managed Inventory 
minus (VMI−), and Vendor Managed Replenishment (VMR). All models are derived 
from Net Present Value (NPV) functions for the single-buyer single-supplier under 
deterministic conditions. The main objective is to analyse the benefit of each VMI 
strategy in terms of maximising profit function or minimising total costs for the buyer, 
supplier, and the supply chain. Those VMI models will be compared with each of 
them, and also compared with the model of the classical framework. The numerical 
results and preliminary insights are drawn from the outcomes. The numerical result in 
is solved by Excel spreadsheet version 2010. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, the problem definition is 
described and assumption and notation introduced in Section 6.3. In section 6.4, the 
classical model is proposed to find an optimal profit solution as based case. Section 
6.5 to 6.9, present the developed models for the four different VMI policies derived 
from the NPV approach and compare those solutions to the classical framework. 
Numerical results are provided in Section 6.10, while Section 6.11 the sensitivity 
analysis is applied to analyse the influence of the variables. Summary and conclusions 
are reported in Section 6.12. 
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6.2 Problem definition 
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) is a collaborative buyer-supplier 
partnership whereby the supplier is authorised to manage the buyer’s inventory. In 
VMI, the buyer instead provides the supplier with Point of Sale and inventory status 
data on a real time basis. The supplier will use this information to coordinate its own 
replenishment actions with the replenishment service provided to the buyer. The 
supplier takes responsibility for the operational management of the inventory within a 
mutually agreed framework of performance targets, which are constantly monitored 
and updated to create an environment of continuous improvement (Jame and Rich, 
1997). In a VMI system, the operations of the buyer and supplier can be integrated 
through information sharing by using the technologies such as electronic data 
interchange (EDI) or internet-based protocols. The supplier can use this information 
to plan production, schedule deliveries, and manage inventory levels at the buyer. It is 
sometimes also stated that VMI is not leading to more Just-In-Time deliveries to the 
buyer, but perhaps this is an unrealistic expectation (is VMI=JIT?). Just-In-Time 
deliveries to the buyer correspond with frequent deliveries in small lot-sizes and low 
inventory levels at the buyer which it can be implied that JIT corresponds with small 
values for the optimal lot-size. 
As a consequence, system cost can likely be reduced while capacity utilization 
will be increased. These benefits of VMI have been widely recognized in different 
industries, especially in the retail industry. There are several VMI strategies that have 
been proposed in the literature. Bernstein et al. (2006) presented VMI− and VMI+methods whereby the supplier determines his own production lot-size 
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as well as the shipments to the buyer simultaneously from his own profit function. 
They show how vendor-managed inventory (VMI) partnerships create echelon 
operational autonomy (EOA). They compare the resulting coordinates pricing 
schemes with those required in a traditional decentralized setting (without EOA). 
Gümüş et al. (2008) presented consignment inventory (CI) whereby the buyer only 
pays the supplier in wholesale price at the moment a sale is made to the final 
customer. Darwish and Odah (2010) presented a model called Vendor Managed 
Replenishment (VMR) that allows the supplier to determine the lot-size, whereby the 
buyer pays for these goods upon delivery and the supplier pays the fixed and variable 
delivery charges. Successful retailers such as Wal-Mart and K-mart were the 
pioneering firms to adopt the VMI system. The popularity of VMI has led to the claim 
that it is a vital policy for the future and that this concept will revolutionize the 
tactical decisions in the distribution channel, Andel (1996); Burrke (1996); and 
Cottrill (1997). For further discussion of the VMI system, we refer the reader to Dong 
and Xu et al. (2001), Waller et al. (1999) and Yao et al. (2005). 
The NPV is widely accepted as an alternative valid framework for studying 
production and inventory systems. In the NPV analysis, all cash flows related to 
activities are valued by their time of occurrence using discount rate, which represents 
the opportunity cost of the next best alternative for the firm. Grubbström (1980) 
demonstrated that the capital costs of inventories in the various stages of a supply 
chain can then be retrieved from the linearized NPV or Annuity Stream (AS) of this 
cash-flow function.  The NPV has been used in this manner in quite a number of 
studies, see also Hadley (1964); Trippi and Lewin (1974); Thompson (1975); 
Grubbström and Thorstenson (1986); Grubbström (1998, 2007); Haneveld and 
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Teunter (1986); Hofmann (1998). Beullens and Janssens (2011) introduce the concept 
of Anchor Point in a supply chain and show using the NPV framework that its 
position in the supply chain can affect the valuation of capital costs of inventories in 
the different stages of a supply chain. 
The different approaches in this chapter are studied with respect to who bears 
the costs and who makes the ordering decisions, as illustrated in Table 6-1.  
Table 6-1: Different approaches to inventory management in the buyer-supplier 
supply chain 
 
Aspect 
 
 
Classic 
 
CI 
 
VMR 
 VMI−  VMI+ 
Ordering decision is made by Buyer Buyer Supplier Supplier Supplier 
Party that bears the order costs Buyer Buyer Supplier Buyer Supplier 
Party that owns the inventory 
at the buyer’s site is 
Buyer Supplier Buyer Buyer Supplier 
The opportunity cost of capital 
is carried by 
Buyer Supplier Buyer Buyer Supplier 
 
 
6.3 Assumptions and notations 
The system studied contains two independent parties: a buyer and supplier 
(vendor). The buyer purchases a product from the supplier at the price 𝑤𝑤 per unit and 
sells to his final customers at a price 𝑝𝑝  per unit. Total annual customer demand 𝐷𝐷 is 
constant. The other assumptions are: both parties have perfect information about the 
other player’s characteristics and the transportation charges paid out to a third party 
3PL; the final demand occurs at a constant rate; shortages are not allowed; lead-time 
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is zero; the supplier produces at (in)finite production rate; there are no capacity 
constraints. 
The following notational scheme is made: 
𝐷𝐷: The annual demand for the product at the buyer; 
𝑅𝑅: The supplier’s production rate (𝑅𝑅 > 𝐷𝐷); 
𝑝𝑝: The product’s reversed demand function (sales price); 
𝑤𝑤:   The contract purchase price (𝑝𝑝 > 𝑤𝑤); 
𝑐𝑐: The supplier’s variable cost per product (𝑤𝑤 > 𝑐𝑐); 
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏:   The buyer’s fixed order processing cost; 
ℎ𝑏𝑏:   The buyer’s holding cost per product per year; 
𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏:   The buyer’s internal annual holding cost rate; 
𝑡𝑡:   The variable transport cost per product; 
𝐿𝐿:   The time for delivery of the first batch should arrive at the buyer’s site; 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏:   The lot-size between supplier and buyer; 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠:   The fixed order (set-up) processing cost per supplier’s acquiring order; 
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝:   The supplier’s fixed order processing cost per buyer’s order; 
ℎ𝑠𝑠:   The supplier’s holding cost per product per year; 
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠:   The supplier’s internal annual holding cost rate; 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠:   The supplier’s lot-size; 
𝑚𝑚:   The integer multiplication (𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏,𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1); 
 
In all models, the annuity stream for the buyer is denoted as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑥𝑥 and the 
annuity stream for supplier as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥, where 𝑚𝑚 refers to the particular strategy 𝑚𝑚. 𝑒𝑒. 𝑚𝑚 =
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(𝑡𝑡 = classic), ([−]  =  VMI−, ([+]  =  VMI+), (𝑇𝑇 = Consignment inventory), (𝑃𝑃 =VMR) and  (𝑗 = Joint optimization), respectively. Approximations of annuity stream 
functions are denoted as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝚤𝑥𝑥������. These approximations are obtained by Maclaurin 
expansion of the exponential terms in𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑇𝑇, where 𝑘 ∈ {1,𝐷𝐷/𝑅𝑅,𝑚𝑚}, and then 
linearisation of the expansion in𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑠𝑠}). 
 
6.4 Net Present Value Functions 
In order to derive profit functions for all inventory policies considered in this 
chapter, the Anchor Point is selected at an arbitrary time 𝐿𝐿 in the near future at which 
the buyer wishes to receive the first batch of products from the supplier (see Figure   
6-1). At this point the buyer wishes the first shipment to arrive for replenishing his 
current inventory, and thereby securing uninterrupted sales to his customers. The 
supplier, assumed to have flexibility for planning, production, will aim to start the 
production run in that time earlier that 𝐿𝐿 as to ensure meeting this due date in a profit 
maximising manner. It is thus assumed that 𝐿𝐿 is far enough into the future, such that 
the start of production can always be planned for. 
The profit functions for buyer and supplier are derived for each of the five 
strategies which are presented in the Section 6.5. These functions are defined as 
annuity streams and thus represent a continuous stream of cash-flows with the same 
net present value as the real set of cash-flow encountered. Linearisation of these 
functions in the discount can be directly compared with the profit functions proposed 
in the literature based on classical inventory modeling. The Anchor Point is placed at 
the point in time when the first item needs to be delivered to the buyer. 
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6.5 Classical inventory policy 
This policy is based on the status quo scenario (EOQ model) is used as based 
case to derive the profit function for buyer and supplier where the buyer is the leader 
in the relationship. Within this general scheme, each player is to maximise profit (or 
minimise costs) of its own model without considering the interests of other players. 
The buyer decides the optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 based on his own profit function and then 
the supplier accepts the order quantities 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 from buyer and determines his optimal lot-
size 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏to maximise his profit function. Upon receiving a batch 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, the buyer 
pays 𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 to the supplier and he incurs further the costs of 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏. The supplier 
receives the payments 𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and pays the costs of 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏. The information flow 
activities for this policy are shown in Figure 6-1. 
 
Figure 6-1: Information flow and payment activities of the classical model 
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Figure 6-1 shows both material and information flows in the classical 
inventory policy. The domain of responsibilities and authorities that belong to the 
buyer and the supplier are described as the separate boxes. The buyer works only for 
the operations for managing inventory at his warehouse. The supplier has authorities 
for managing inventory including raw material warehouse, production, WIP, and 
finished goods only in her warehouse. 
Informational flow begins at the buyer’s site where the demand is made by the 
final customer. The buyer determines optimal lot-size of his profit function and then 
sends his optimal lot-sizes to the supplier. A supplier receives orders from the buyer 
and then makes production plans accordingly. The supplier lets the external vendor 
know about her production plan and deliver raw materials according to the production 
plan. As Figure 6-1 shows, the buyer’s order is the unique information that is 
transferred between the buyer and the supplier, and any other information flows only 
within the buyer’s or supplier’s authority areas. 
Cost payment on the classical inventory policy follows the conventional 
principle regarding who pays certain costs and when the cost is paid. Under this 
policy, the supplier and the buyer pay for what they own. The supplier pays the 
production cost of his factory and inventory holding cost at his warehouse. The buyer 
pays the inventory holding cost at his own warehouse. The buyer also pays for the 
products received from the supplier. Payment of a certain cost is made right after the 
operation related to that cost is finished. The supplier pays the production cost when 
the product is manufactured. Supplier’s and buyer’s costs for inventory holding are 
paid during they hold inventories at their own warehouses. 
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6.5.1 Buyer’s profit function 
The model from Goyal (1976) represents the average buyer’s profit function. 
The buyer’s profit include of the annual marginal revenue from selling the product to 
the final customer 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷. The element of buyer’s costs consists of the buyer’s annual 
ordering cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏, annual holding cost from stock kept at the buyer’s site ℎ𝑏𝑏 𝑄𝑏𝑏2 . The 
buyer’s profit function is shown in Eq.(6-1): 
 
 
 
where holding costs of buyer and supplier is ℎ𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑤𝑤 + 𝑡𝑡) and ℎ𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐. 
The first term in Eq.(6-1) represents the marginal profits on sales, the second 
the set-up costs, the third the holding costs. The holding cost to the buyer is valued 
at𝑤𝑤 where the money is invested in keeping product at inventory stock. 
6.5.2 Supplier’s profit function 
The model from Joglekar (1988) considers the average supplier's profit function 
in the case of (in)finite production rate 𝑅𝑅, and 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1 and integer. The buyer, having 
derived the optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 from Eq.(6-4) will transfer this order quantity on to 
the supplier, who will look for the production lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 i.e. the optimal 
integer value close to the fractional value 𝑚𝑚∗as given by Eq.(6-5) that will maximise 
the supplier’s profit function given by Eq.(6-2): 
 
(6-1) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = (𝑝𝑝 − (𝑤𝑤 + 𝑡𝑡))𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − ℎ𝑏𝑏 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
162 
  
The first term in Eq.(6-2) represents marginal profits on sales, the second is 
the set-up costs, the third is the average interest costs of set-up payments, and the 
other three terms in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 are the inventory holding costs. 
6.5.3 Optimal policies 
For deriving optimal lot-size, the buyer will first determine the optimal lot-size 
of his own profit function, followed by the supplier accepting this lot-size from buyer. 
The optimal lot-size can be derived in the traditional way from first-order conditions 
on the profit functions. 
 
 
 
 
Where the buyer’s optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  is obtained by substitution of (the right-
hand-side of) Eq.(6-4) into (the right-hand-side of) Eq.(6-1) and Eq.(6-2). 
The supplier accepts the optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗  from buyer and then determines 
the optimal value of 𝑚𝑚 where is the number of shipments from supplier to buyer 
during the supplier’s production cycle based on his own profit function. 
 
(6-2) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = (𝑤𝑤 − (𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡))𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝) 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − ℎ𝑠𝑠[(𝑚𝑚 − 1) − (𝑚𝑚− 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅]𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2  
 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑡𝑡∗ = � 2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤 + 𝑡𝑡) 
  
(6-4) 
(6-3) 
𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏
𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
= −𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝐷𝐷.𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏−2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏(𝑤𝑤 + 𝑡𝑡)2 = 0 
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The supplier’s optimal 𝑚𝑚∗is thus: 
 
 
The index 𝑚𝑚 denotes that it is derived from the traditional sourcing framework. 
Where 𝑚𝑚∗, as always, should be again rounded up to 1 if it is smaller, and 
otherwise rounded to the nearest higher or lower integer, whichever gives the highest 
profit function value. For the infinite production rate, and lot-for-lot production 
policies, the profit function is also valid which it can be derived from Eq.(6-5) by 
taking 𝑅𝑅 → ∞ and taking 𝑚𝑚 = 1. 
 
6.6 Consignment inventory policy 
The consignment inventory (CI) policy is different from the status quo policy 
where buyer will pay for purchase price 𝑤𝑤 to the supplier when the product has been 
sold to the final customer. In CI, the buyer chooses 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 to maximise the buyer's profit 
function. The supplier accepts this lot-size, and finds the integer multiplier 𝑚𝑚 that 
maximise his own profit function. The information flow and cost payment activities 
for the consignment inventory policy are shown in Figure 6-2. 
(6-5) 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �� 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅) , 1� 
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 Figure 6-2: Information flow and payment activities of the CI model 
 
Figure 6-2 shows the information flow and payment activities of the CI policy. 
The materials and information move in a conventional way as the classical inventory 
policy. Cost payment regarding production cost, inventory holding cost at the 
supplier’s warehouse, and inventory holding cost at the buyer’s warehouses is 
responded by the supplier also the same as the classical inventory policy. However, 
the CI differs from the classical policy in that the buyer pays for the product that he 
orders when the product has been sold to the final customer instead of when the 
product is received from the supplier. 
The cash-flow structure is applied in the CI model similar as in the classical 
model with the exception that the supplier receives payments 𝑤𝑤 per item from the 
buyer at the rate which the product has been sold to the final customers (or uses the 
item in his own production process). The supplier pays set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 at the start of 
every production run and production cost  𝑐𝑐 when the product is manufactured. 
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Moreover, the supplier still pays for fixed ordering material cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 from external 
vendors, and transportation cost 𝑡𝑡 for product delivery to buyer. The buyer only pays 
to supplier for purchase price 𝑤𝑤 and fixed ordering cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 Which is made when she 
receives products from the supplier and also transportation charges paid for a third 
party logistics 3PL. This approach supplier is responsible for paying the cost of 
financing for carrying inventory in the buyer’s warehouse. The cash-flow structure is 
depicted in Figure 6-3. 
 
6.6.1 Buyer’s profit function 
In order to derive the NPV results, the cash-flows in the CI model need to be 
specified. The following assumptions are made (see also Figure 6-4). 
The buyer’s annuity stream function is thus: 
 
 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 
 
Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term with respect to 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇 gives: 
  
 
 
(6-6) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 = [(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)�𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠 = �(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇) � 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇�� 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 (6-7) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠 = �(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)(1𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2 + 𝑂𝑂 �𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2 𝑇𝑇12�� (6-8) 
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 Figure 6-3: Cash-flow diagrams for buyer-supplier in the CI policy 
 
The linear approximation can be written as: 
 
 
 
The first term in Eq.(6-9) represents the marginal profits on sales, the second 
is the ordering costs, the third is the average interest cost of set-up payments, and the 
fourth term is the holding costs.  
 
 
(6-9) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠����� = ��𝑝𝑝 − (𝑤𝑤 + 𝑡𝑡)�𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 � 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 
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6.6.2 Supplier’s profit function 
The following assumptions on cash-flows for the supplier are made: at the 
start of every production run, a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is incurred, and a variable production 
cost at rate 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷 starts, and stops 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅 time later in the supplier’s cycle. Every time 
the supplier ships a batch to the buyer, he incurs a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 and receives the 
income at the rate  𝑤𝑤 where the product has been sold to a customer. The linear 
approximation of the supplier’s annuity stream profit function is: 
 
 
 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 
 
 
Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term with respect to 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 gives: 
  
 
 
The linear approximation can be written as: 
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The supplier’s profit function from CI is composed of the marginal profits on 
product sales from supplier to buyer in the first term of Eq.(6-13), the second term is 
the set-up costs, the third term is the average interest costs of set-up payments, the 
other three terms in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 composed of the inventory holding costs, and the fourth terms 
are the holding costs are valued at rate 𝑐𝑐 in line with the traditional derivation. In this 
strategy the transfer price for the capital holding costs does not affect the profit 
function and the supplier rewards have become zero. 
Assuming for this model the buyer has authority to determine the optimal lot-
size based on his own profit function is obtained in Eq.(6-14):  
 
 
 
6.7 Vendor managed inventory (𝐕𝐌𝐈−) model 
The main feature of VMI− policy is similar to the status quo policy, with 
exception optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and delivery frequencies 𝑚𝑚 which is determined by 
supplier to maximise the supplier’s profit function. The physics and informational 
flows in this model are different from the classical inventory model where the optimal 
lot-size is defined by the buyer. The information flow and cost payment activities for 
the consignment inventory policy are shown in Figure 6-4. 
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− 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 � 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠∗ = �2𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡
 
  
(6-14) 
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 Figure 6-4: The payment activities of the VMI− model 
 
Figure 6-4 shows that both material and information flows in the VMI− policy 
is the same form with the classical inventory policy, except the supplier has 
authorities to determine the optimal lot-size from buyer where the optimal lot-size 
determined from his profit function. The supplier lets the external vendor know about 
his production plan and deliver raw materials according to the production plan. As 
Figure 6-4 shows, the buyer’s order are the unique information that is transferred 
between the buyer and the supplier, and any other information flows only within the 
buyer’s or supplier’s authority areas. 
Cost payment in the VMI−  inventory policy follows the conventional principle 
regarding who pays certain costs and when the cost is paid. The supplier pays the 
production cost of his factory and inventory holding cost at his warehouse. The buyer 
pays the inventory holding cost at his own warehouse. The buyer also pays for the 
products received from the supplier. Payment of a certain cost is made right after the 
170 
operation related to that cost is finished. The supplier pays the production cost when 
the product is manufactured. Supplier’s and buyer’s costs for inventory holding are 
paid during they hold inventories at their own warehouses. 
In order to derive the profit function the cash-flow in the model needs to be 
specified similar the classical inventory model. The supplier receives payment at a 
purchase price rate 𝑤𝑤 per item from selling the product to the buyer and pays for set-
up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 at the start every production run and production cost  𝑐𝑐 when the product is 
manufactured and also pays for fixed ordering material cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 from external vendors 
and transportation cost 𝑡𝑡 for delivering product to buyer. The buyer received payment 
from the customer at a product price rate  𝑝𝑝  per item and pays to supplier for purchase 
price  𝑤𝑤  and fixed ordering cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 which is made when she receives products from 
the supplier. The cash-flow structure is depicted in Figure 6-5. 
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 Figure 6-5: Cash-flow diagrams for buyer-supplier in theVMI− policy 
 
6.7.1 Buyer’s profit function 
In this strategy the buyer sells the product to final customers at a constant 
rate 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷, inventory starting at time 𝐿𝐿 when the first batch arrives. The buyer incurs the 
order processing cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 upon the arrival of every batch 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏, and pays the 
supplier 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇. The buyer's annuity stream 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖− function is thus: 
 
 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 
(6-15) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏− = [𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + (𝑤𝑤 + 𝑡𝑡)𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)�𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏
− = [𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + (𝑤𝑤 + 𝑡𝑡)𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇) � 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇�]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 (6-16) 
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Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term with respect to 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇 gives: 
  
 
The linear approximation can be written as: 
 
 
 
The first term in Eq.(6-19) represents the marginal profits on sales, the second 
is the ordering costs, the third the average is the interest cost of set-up payments, and 
the fourth is the holding costs. The holding cost to the buyer is valued at 𝑤𝑤 the money 
invested in keeping product in inventory. 
6.7.2 Supplier’s profit function 
The supplier incurs a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 with every production run, and a variable 
production cost at rate 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷, which will be started and stopped at 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅 time later in 
the supplier’s cycle. Every time the supplier delivers a batch to the buyer, he incurs a 
fixed order processing cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 and receives the income  𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 from the buyer. The 
linear approximation of the supplier’s annuity stream profit function is: 
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This can be rewritten as: 
 
 
 
Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term with respect to 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 gives: 
  
 
 
The linear approximation can be written as: 
 
 
 
 
The supplier’s profit function from VMI− are composed of the marginal profits 
on product sales from supplier to buyer shown in the first term, the second term is the 
set-up costs and the set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the function of production 𝑅𝑅, the third terms are 
the average interest costs of set-up payments, and the other three terms 
in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 composed of the inventory holding costs where the last inventory holding cost 
term in (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) actually implies the supplier’s reward. 
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Assuming from this policy, supplier has authority to determine the optimal      
lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏∗ based on his own profit function obtained in Eq.(6-25). 
 
 
 
6.8 Vendor managed inventory (𝐕𝐌𝐈+) model 
In aVMI+ policy, the supplier and buyer act based on a VMI and consignment 
agreement where supplier has fully authorized to manage inventory on behalf of the 
buyer. Supplier owns the goods at the buyer’s warehouse until product has been sold 
to the final customer. Supplier determines the optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and delivery 
frequencies 𝑚𝑚 simultaneously from his own profit function. The information flow and 
cost payment activities for the consignment inventory policy are shown in Figure 6-7. 
 
Figure 6-6: The payment activities of the VMI+ model 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
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(6-23) 
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As Figure 6-6 indicates, there is a difference of informational flow in 
the VMI+policy. Since the supplier is responsible for managing the inventories at the 
buyer’s warehouse, including ordering and inventory holding, she ought to receive the 
information about demand directly from the market. Since the supplier determines 
ordering instead of receiving orders from the buyer, there is no information flow of 
buyer’s orders in the VMI+ policy. 
The cash-flow structure is applied to this policy. The supplier receives 
payment purchase price 𝑤𝑤 per item from the buyer at a rate which the product has 
been sold to final customers (or uses the item in his own production process). The 
supplier is paying for set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 at the start every production run and production 
cost  𝑐𝑐 when the product is manufactured and also pays for fixed ordering material 
cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 from external vendors and transportation cost  𝑡𝑡  to 3PL for delivering product 
to buyer. The buyer receives payment from selling the product to final customer at a 
product price rate  𝑝𝑝  per unit and pays purchase price 𝑤𝑤  per item to the supplier but 
does not pay for a fixed ordering cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 which this cost is responded by the supplier. 
The cash-flow structure is depicted in Figure 6-7. 
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 Figure 6-7: Cash-flow diagrams for buyer-supplier in theVMI+ policy 
 
6.8.1 Buyer’s profit function 
In this strategy the buyer receives revenue from selling the product to 
customers at a constant rate 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷, and pays for purchasing price t the supplier at rate  𝑤𝑤  
but no payment for the order processing cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 which is transferred to the supplier. 
The buyer's annuity stream function is thus: 
 
 
The linear approximation can be rewritten as: 
 
 
(6-24) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏+ = [(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 
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The marginal profits achieved in product sales from buyer to final customer at 
rate  𝑝𝑝 and then pay to supplier for the purchasing price at rate 𝑤𝑤. In this strategy, all 
about delivery-related costs for buyer will be paid by the supplier. 
6.8.2 Supplier’s profit function 
The supplier is incurred a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 for every production run, and also 
pays a variable production cost at rate 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷, which starts and stops 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅 time later in 
the supplier’s cycle. Every time the supplier delivers a batch to the buyer, he incurs a 
set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 and set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 at buyer’s site and receives the income 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 from the 
buyer. The linear approximation of the supplier’s annuity stream profit function is: 
 
 
 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 
 
 
Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term with respect to 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 gives: 
  
 
(6-26) 
(6-27) 
(6-28) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
+ = �𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ��𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
− 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ) � 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∞
0
]� 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
+ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 − (𝑡𝑡 + 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝) 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇
−𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅
1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
+ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 − (𝑡𝑡 + 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝) �1𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2 � − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 � � 1𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2 �
−𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 �
𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇
𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇2𝑅𝑅 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚2𝐷𝐷2𝑇𝑇22𝑅𝑅2𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 � ⎦⎥⎥⎥
⎤
𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 
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The linear approximation can be written as: 
 
 
 
The supplier’s profit function from VMI+ is composed of the marginal profits 
on product sales from supplier to buyer at the first term in Eq.(6-32), the second term 
is the set-up costs from the buyer and supplier sites, the third is the average interest 
costs of set-up payments. There are three terms in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 composed of the inventory 
holding costs where the first term in the second line is the holding costs valued at 
rate 𝑐𝑐. Note that the effect of the transfer price  𝑤𝑤 on the capital holding costs has 
been removed and the supplier reward not incurred from this strategy. 
Assuming from this policy supplier has authority to determine the optimal lot-
size based on his own profit function obtained in Eq.(6-34). 
 
 
 
 
6.9 Vendor managed replenishment (VMR) policy 
The VMR policy is the first stage of VMI where the supplier takes control of 
ordering, inventory management, and replenishment. The buyer has given the 
responsibility for placing replenishment orders to the supplier. Having full visibility 
(6-29) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
+ = �(𝑤𝑤 − (𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡))𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2
− 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 � 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
∗ = � 2 �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅��𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1) − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2) 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) 
 
(6-30) 
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of the stock on the buyer’s site, the supplier is wholly responsible for managing the 
inventory. Under VMR, the supplier determines the optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 for the buyer 
and delivery frequencies 𝑚𝑚 simultaneously from his own profit function. The 
information flow and cost payment activities for this policy are shown in Figure 6-8. 
 
Figure 6-8: The payment activities of the VMR model 
 
Figure 6-9 shows the payment activities of VMR policy that there is no 
borderline that divides the buyer’s and the supplier’s authorities where the supplier 
has full authority to manage inventory for both sites. Regarding informational flow, 
there is no limitation to information transfer between the buyer’s and supplier’s 
domains. 
Similar to the VMI+ policy, the information about ordering is not transferred 
between the buyer and the supplier, because the ordering is jointly determined by both 
parties. The final demand is directly transferred to both the buyer and supplier. The 
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buyer also receives information about the production plan from the supplier and uses 
it to manage inbound processing and distribution. 
Although every operation is jointly managed by both supplier and buyer in 
the VMR policy, the cost payment follows conventional principles of the classic 
policy: the supplier pays production cost and inventory holding cost at his warehouse 
and the buyer pays the inventory holding cost at his warehouse and makes payment to 
the supplier for products. Meanwhile, the decisions about operations are jointly made 
by both supplier and buyer in order to minimise the total supply chain cost including 
both supplier’s and buyer’s costs. 
The cash-flow is constructed for this policy where the supplier receives 
incoming payment from selling the product to the buyer at the purchase price rate 𝑤𝑤 
per item. In supplier’s site, he is paying for set-up cost  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  at the start every production 
run and production cost  𝑐𝑐  when the product is manufactured. In addition, he pays for 
fixed ordering cost from external vendors, and transportation cost  𝑡𝑡  to 3PL for 
delivering product to the buyer and also pays for a fixed ordering cost 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 rather than 
buyer. The buyer receives payment from the final customer for selling goods at a 
product price rate  𝑝𝑝  per unit. The cash-flow structure is depicted in Figure 6-9. 
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 Figure 6-9: Cash-flow diagrams for buyer-supplier in the VMR policy 
 
6.9.1 Buyer’s profit function 
In this strategy the buyer achieves income from selling the product to 
customers at a constant rate 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷, and pays for product price to the supplier at rate 𝑤𝑤. 
The linear approximation of the buyer's annuity stream function is: 
 
 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 
 
(6-31) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 = [𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)�𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟 = [𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 � 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇�]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 (6-32) 
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Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term with respect to 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇 gives: 
  
 
The linear approximation can be written as: 
 
 
 
The first term in Eq.(6-39) represents the marginal profits on product sales at 
constant rate 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷, and pays the product price to the supplier at 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇, and the second 
term is holding costs. Note that the holding cost to the buyer is valued at 𝑤𝑤 the money 
invested in keeping products in inventory. 
6.9.2 Supplier’s profit function 
The supplier incurs a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 for every production run, and a variable 
production cost at rate 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷 starts, and stops 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇/𝑅𝑅 time later in the supplier’s cycle. 
Every time the supplier delivers a batch to the buyer, he incurs a set-up cost 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 and 
pay transportation cost to 3PL for sending the product to the buyer. The supplier 
receives the income 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 from the buyer. The linear approximation of the supplier’s 
annuity stream profit function is: 
 
 
 
 
(6-34) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟����� = �(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 � 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏
𝑟𝑟 = �𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − (𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)(1
𝑇𝑇
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2 + 𝑂𝑂 �𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏2 𝑇𝑇12�� (6-33) 
(6-35) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟 = �(𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑡𝑡)𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇)𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ��𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=0
− 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ) � 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∞
0
]� 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 
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This can be rewritten as: 
 
 
 
Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term with respect to 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 gives: 
 
  
 
 
The linear approximation can be written as: 
 
 
 
 
The supplier’s profit function in VMR is composed of the marginal profits on 
sales from supplier to buyer in the first term; the second term is the set-up costs. The 
third term is the average interest costs of set-up payments, and the other three terms 
in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏composed of the inventory holding costs. The transfer price for the capital 
holding costs does affect the profit function which the supplier’s reward has been 
incurred in the last inventory holding cost term at (𝑤𝑤 −  (𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡)). 
(6-38) 
(6-36) 
(6-37) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡(𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑡𝑡)𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇) 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇
−𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅
1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡(𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 − (𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑡𝑡)𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇) �1𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2 � − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 � � 1𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠2 �
−𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 �
𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇
𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇2𝑅𝑅 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚2𝐷𝐷2𝑇𝑇22𝑅𝑅2𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 � ⎦⎥⎥⎥
⎤
𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ �𝑤𝑤 − (𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡)�𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2+(𝑤𝑤 − (𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡))𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 
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Assuming from this policy supplier will thus aim to determine the optimal lot-
size based on his own profit function obtained by the following equations (6-39). 
 
 
 
 
6.10 Joint Optimal Policy 
When the buyer and supplier agree to adopt the discount rate 𝛼𝛼, the annuity 
stream function of the joint system, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is given by: 
 
 
 
The linear approximation can be written as: 
 
 
 
6.10.1 Optimal policies 
A strategy is said to achieve perfect channel coordination when it implements 
the joint optimal policy. The following can be established. 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠
∗ = � 2 �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅��𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 1) − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2) 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) 
 
(6-39) 
(6-41) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝚥𝚥���� = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷 − �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅�� 𝐷𝐷𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 − 𝛼𝛼 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2  
−𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1)𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 − 2)𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 + 𝛼𝛼[𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡]𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏2 ]𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
 
(6-40) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = �𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 − 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
− �(𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏+𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝) + 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇� 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇� 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 
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Theorem 1. (On Perfect Channel Coordination) If the buyer and supplier 
agree on a common discount factor 𝛼𝛼, for any arbitrary value of 𝑤𝑤, achieves perfect 
channel coordination. Perfect channel coordination is not guaranteed by 
Classic, VMI−, CI or VMR. 
Proof. Under VMI+, the supplier determines values for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚 
simultaneously from the profit function Eq.(6-20) or Eq.(6-22), which differs from the 
joint profit function Eq.(6-20) or Eq.(6-22) only by some constant term if and only 
if 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼. The supplier, thus automatically implements the joint optimal policy, 
provided that he adopts the agreed common discount factor 𝛼𝛼. As the terms in the 
decision variables (𝑇𝑇 and 𝑚𝑚, or 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚) in the supplier’s (or the joint) profit 
function are independent of 𝑤𝑤, the optimal policy is independent of the transfer 
price 𝑤𝑤. 
The supplier also determines 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚 simultaneously from his own profit 
function under VMI− and VMR, but these profit functions differ in the terms that are 
functions of the decision variables 𝑇𝑇 and 𝑚𝑚 (or 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚) from the joint profit 
function, and these terms are also a function of the transfer price 𝑤𝑤. VMI− and VMR 
therefore cannot guarantee perfect channel coordination, even if the buyer and 
supplier adopt a common discount rate 𝛼𝛼, and lead to policies that are dependent on 
the transfer price 𝑤𝑤. 
As a strategy to search for the optimal values of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚 simultaneously with 
respect to the sum of buyer and supplier’s individual profit function, Classic and CI 
solve the joint optimisation problem with two added constraints, namely that feasible 
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values for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 are restricted to those that optimize the buyer’s profit function, and 
feasible 𝑚𝑚 values are restricted to those that are optimizing his own profit function for 
buyer’s optimal 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 values. Values for 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 will be a function of 𝑤𝑤 will be a function 
of 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 𝑤𝑤. Classic and CI cannot guarantee perfect channel coordination, even if 
the buyer and supplier adopt a common discount rate 𝛼𝛼. 
6.10.2 The joint optimal lot-size 
The joint optimal policy,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗ and 𝑚𝑚∗ are simultaneously determined as: 
 
 
 
Note that this function is independent of the strategy chosen and of the transfer 
price 𝑤𝑤, the individual profit functions for buyer and supplier, however, are dependent 
on the cash-flow structure of the particular strategy and on the transfer price 𝑤𝑤, and 
are given by their annuity stream functions presented in the previous sections. This 
means that:  
 
 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗. The same relationships hold for the linear 
approximations. 
(6-42) 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗∗ = � 2 �𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 �1 + 𝛼𝛼 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅��𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 1) − 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚− 2) 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 
 
(6-43) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏
𝑗𝑗(𝛼𝛼) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑥𝑥(𝛼𝛼) 
(6-44) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑗𝑗(𝛼𝛼) = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥(𝛼𝛼) 
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6.11 Optimal integer multiplier 
For determining the optimal integer multiplier𝑚𝑚∗, the difference in equality 
technique of Munson and Rosenblatt (2001), p.375, is applied. This technique is based 
on the fact that 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗ + 1,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝑚𝑚∗,𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏) and, if 𝑚𝑚∗ ≥ 1. This system of two 
(quadratic) inequalities produces a unique closed-form solution for 𝑚𝑚∗. 
This gives: If 𝑅𝑅 ≥ 2𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑠𝑠
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤
 or𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = 0, then 𝑚𝑚∗ = 1, and else: 
 
 
 
 
Sometimes, it is highly probably that the supplier’s optimal lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠 cannot 
be used in the realised situation for the buyer will order 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 and it is very likely 
that 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 ≠ 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠. Therefore, the supplier’s optimal strategy is thus to determine the 
optimal value for 𝑚𝑚∗ in his profit function as given by Eq.(5-4) in which 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 = 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏. 
 
 
 
 
Comparing Eq.(5-10) and Eq.(5-8) leads to the conclusion that in general 
𝑚𝑚∗ ≠ 𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏. It is thus conceptually wrong to assume that these optimal values are 
always equal, as done in Weng (1995b). 
(6-45) 𝑚𝑚∗ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(1+𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 )(2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑠𝑠−𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑠𝑠(1−𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅)2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
(6-46) 
𝑚𝑚∗𝑏𝑏 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢1 + �1 + 4 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(1+𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 )ℎ𝑏𝑏
𝑅𝑅2
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
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6.12 Numerical Results 
The four different VMI strategies for a single-buyer single-supplier in the supply 
chain are examined through numerical examples. The optimal solutions are compared 
in each VMI model and also compared with the classical inventory framework to find 
the optimal lot sizes and profit (or cost) functions. 
This study attempts to answer, what kind of the VMI strategies can be 
achieved on the perfect channel coordination where coordination can be achieved by 
restructuring the costs and rewards between them, often through as well designed 
contract, to maximise their own profits with system-wide objective. If the profit 
results across the whole supply chain that are equal or better than the profit from joint 
optimisation, the coordination mechanism is said to be perfect. 
Table 6-2: Problem instance characteristics 
 
Instances 
 
𝐷𝐷 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏  
 
𝑤𝑤 
 
𝑐𝑐 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  
 
𝑅𝑅 
1(a) 12000 10 1.5 1.2 100 ∞ 
2 12000 10 2.9 1.2 100 ∞ 
3(b) 1000 100 25 20 400 3200 
4 1000 100 34 20 400 3200 
5 12000 10 1.5 1.2 100 38400 
6 12000 10 2.9 1.2 100 38400 
7 1000 100 25 20 400 38400 
8 1000 100 34 20 400 38400 
For each instance: 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 = 0, 𝑠𝑠p = 0;  𝑡𝑡 = 0.01 (a) Based on Goyal (1976)                                  
(b) Based on Banerjee (1986) 
There are 8 instances that have to analyse the numerical values which input 
parameters are listed in Table 6-3. Instance 1 is taken from Goyal (1976) and instance 
3 from Banerjee (1986). The other instances are derived from these two by changing 
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the value of the purchase price 𝑤𝑤, the production rate 𝑅𝑅, or altering the relative 
importance of set-up costs. 
The experimental results focus on the comparison between the performances 
of four different VMI strategies and another from classical framework. This study 
attempts to answer to the fundamental question, what kind of the channel coordination 
mechanisms (CI, VMR, VMI−, and VMI+) give the best system performance 
compared with each others? 
Table 6-3: comparison the optimal lot-sizes 
  
Classic 
 
Joint 
 VMI+  VMI−  CI  VMR 
# 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑏𝑏 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗𝑗𝑗 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗+ 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗− 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏∗𝑠𝑠 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗𝑟𝑟 
1 894 3315 3315 954 10954 1127 
2 643 3300 3300 887 10954 1084 
3 200 280 280 222 10000 290 
4 171 280 280 268 10000 350 
5 894 1300 1300 1118 10954 1309 
6 643 1300 1300 871 10954 1088 
7 200 500 500 365 10000 447 
8 171 500 500 226 10000 300 
 
 
6.12.1 Comparison optimal lot-size 
Numerical results in Table 6-3 shows the optimal lot-sizes derived from VMI 
models, the classical model and joint optimisation model. In general, the concept of 
the optimal lot-size of VMI models is defined by the supplier from his profit’s 
function where lot-size generates almost larger than optimal load-size derived from 
buyer which this can be implied that the benefit is given to the supplier to reduce 
production set-up cost but it is not for all cases. However, CI model, where the 
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optimal lot-size is derived from buyer similar to the classical framework, is smaller 
than other approaches for all instances. This can be implied that the small lot-size 
corresponds with the JIT concept where the buyer can achieve a higher profit than 
supplier from keeping lower stock and reducing holding cost. In the VMI−the model, 
the optimal lot-size is determined by supplier’s profit function. The optimal lot-size 
generated from VMI−is not too much different from classic’s lot-size, the supplier has 
an incentive to place as much stock at buyer as possible. The buyer has thus an 
incentive to demand that the order quantity will not be too high. The VMI+ policy 
generates the optimal lot-size with the same outcome as the joint optimisation model. 
It can be said that VMI+ achieves perfect coordination which is explained latter. 
Similarly, the optimal lot-size of VMR model is higher than the classical model, but 
smaller than other models where the optimal lot-size is determined by supply. The 
optimal lot size tends to 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 → ∞ 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤 − (𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡) > 0. The buyer will thus want to set 
a maximum value QM → 0 (desired JIT). No real coordination can be achieved, as the 
supplier and buyer will pull in different directions. 
6.12.2 Comparison with the costs and logistics supply chain profits 
Comparison the supply chain profit function in Table 6-4, the profit from 
theVMI+Policy generate the highest profit for supply chain compared to the other 
policies for all instances while classic, CI, VMI− and VMR models cannot guarantee 
which policies can give good solutions better than other policies. The results indicate 
that VMI+ generates higher total supply chain profit than any other systems. The rest 
of systems can be arranged as VMI−, VMR, a classical policy, and CI in the order of 
total supply chain profit. 
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Table 6-4: Comparison of the optimal solutions, logistics costs and supply chain profits 
 # 
 
 Optimal     
lot-size 
  
 Deliveries 
  
 
Logistics Costs 
  
Profits 
  
      
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗   𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠∗  𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏∗   
    
𝛱𝛱𝑏𝑏   
  
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠 𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
 
Classic 891 - 1 4 268 657 926 5612 2943 8554 
1 VMI− - 954 1 4 268 641 910 5611 2971 8582 
 
VMI+ - 3315 1 4 0 797 797 6000 2680 8680* 
 
CI 10954 - 1 4 22 1426 1448 5858 2174 8032 
 
VMR - 1129 1 4 169 745 915 5831 2735 8565 
 
Classic 642 - 1 5 373 600 974 12707 19721 32428 
 
VMI− - 887 1 5 373 581 955 12687 19858 32545 
2 VMI+ - 3300 1 5 0 802 802 13200 19475 32675* 
 
CI 10954 - 1 5 22 1440 1462 13058 18960 32018 
 
VMR - 1086 1 5 314 665 980 12886 19615 32500 
 
Classic 200 - 1 3 1000 1342 2342 3990 3658 7648 
 
VMI− - 222 1 3 1000 1323 2333 3985 3724 7708 
3 VMI+ - 280 1 3 0 2348 2348 5000 2754 7754* 
 
CI 1000 - 1 3 20 3050 3070 4970 1950 6920 
 
VMR - 290 1 3 725 1667 980 4275 3323 7598 
 
Classic 171 - 1 3 1166 1356 2522 4824 12644 17468 
 
VMI− - 268 1 3 1166 1205 2381 4706 12942 17648 
4 VMI+ - 280 1 3 0 2279 2279 6000 11754 17754* 
 
CI 1000 - 1 3 20 3050 3070 5970 10950 16920 
 
VMR - 350 1 3 1189 1382 2571 4811 12759 17570 
  Classic 891 - 1 4 268 591 859 17612 3009 20621 
 
VMI− - 1118 1 4 268 595 864 17605 3030 20635 
5  VMI+ - 1300 1 4 0 843 843 18000 2640 20640* 
  CI 10954 - 1 4 22 1842 1864 17858 1758 19616 
  VMR 
 
1312 1 4 196 670 867 17804 2822 20625 
  Classic 642 - 1 6 373 600 974 12707 19800 32506 
 
VMI− - 871 1 6 373 521 895 12690 19912 32602 
6  VMI+ - 1300 1 6 0 871 871 13200 19440 32640* 
  CI 10954 - 1 6 22 1842 1864 13058 18558 31616 
  VMR - 1090 1 6 315 611 927 12885 19669 32553 
  Classic 200 - 1 2 1000 1400 2400 3990 3600 7590 
 
VMI− - 365 1 2 1000 1340 2350 3803 3905 7708 
 7 VMI+ - 500 1 2 0 2000 2000 5000 2989 7989* 
  CI 1000 - 1 2 20 2400 2420 4970 2600 7570 
  VMR - 447 1 2 1118 1342 2460 3882 4095 7977 
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  Classic 171 -  1 2 1166 1463 2630 4824 12537 17360 
 
VMI−  - 226 1 2 1166 1263 2440 4778 12822 17601 
 8 VMI+  - 500 1 2 0 2000 2000 6000 11989 17989 
  CI 1000 -  1 2 20 2400 2420 5970 11600 17570 
  VMR  - 300 1 2 1018 1558 2576 4982 12740 17721 
 
When the profit function is analysed in details based on the supplier’s and 
buyer’s profits separately, further unique features of particular supply chain systems 
are revealed. According to Table 6-4, the buyer achieves much higher profits in VMI+ 
than other policies for all instances. The higher benefit for the buyer of this policy is 
incurred from all logistics and inventory costs from buyer are transferred to respond 
by the supplier, but meanwhile supplier is facing increasing costs at the same time. 
The profit function in CI is relatively small when compared with other policies 
for all instances. The buyer can earn higher profits than the classic policy and other 
VMI policies because he only pays for purchasing price to the supplier when the 
products have been sold to the final customer. Meanwhile, the supplier faced 
decreasing profit from this policy because he need pay in the financial holding cost to 
the buyer at the buyer’s warehouse. 
The results in VMR and VMI− almost are generated the higher profit for both 
supplier and buyer more than other policies excepting in VMI+ policy in the buyer’s 
profit function. However, the benefit from VMR and VMI− may prefer giving to a 
supplier who determined from his profit function. 
The profit function in CI is relatively small when compared with other policies 
for all instances. The buyer can earn higher profits than the classic policy and other 
VMI policies because he only pays for purchasing price to the supplier when the 
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products have been sold to the final customer. Meanwhile, the supplier faced 
decreasing profit from this policy because he need pay in the financial holding cost to 
the buyer at the buyer’s warehouse. 
 
6.12.3 Comparison with the profit increases 
Table 6-5: Profit increases compared with the classical model 
 
 
 
 
 
# 
VMI strategies  
 
CI 
 
VMR 
 VMI− 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
1 4.39% -26.11% -6.10% 3.91% -7.08% 0.13% -0.01% 0.96% 0.32% 
 
2 2.76% -3.86% -1.26% 1.41% -0.54% 0.22% -0.15% 0.69% 0.36% 
 
3 24.56% -46.70% -9.52% 7.15% -9.18% -0.66% -0.14% 1.78% 0.78% 
 
4 23.76% -13.40% -3.13% 
-
0.27% 0.92% 0.59% -2.44% 2.36% 1.03% 
 
5 1.40% -41.57% -4.87% 1.09% -6.23% 0.02% -0.04% 0.68% 0.07% 
 
6 2.76% -6.27% -2.74% 1.40% -0.66% 0.14% -0.14% 0.57% 0.29% 
 
7 24.56% -27.78% -0.26% 
-
2.70% 13.74% 5.10% -4.68% 8.46% 1.55% 
 
8 23.76% -7.47% 1.21% 3.27% 1.62% 2.08% -0.94% 2.28% 1.39% 
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Table 6-6: Profit increases from VMI+ compared with the classical model 
 
 
# 
 VMI+ 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
 
# 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
 
SC 
 
1 6.92% -8.93% 1.47% 
 
5 2.20% -12.41% 0.07% 
 
2 3.88% -1.25% 0.76% 
 
6 3.88% -1.97% 0.31% 
 
3 25.31% -25.91% 0.81% 
 
7 25.31% -16.96% 5.27% 
 
4 24.38% -7.38% 1.39% 
 
8 24.38% -4.36% 3.62% 
 
 
 
Table 6-7: Profit increases compared with the CI policy 
 
 
 
# 
VMI strategies  
 
VMR 
 VMI−  VMI+ 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
1 -0.46% 25.77% 6.64% -4.22% 36.64% 6.84% 2.42% 23.26% 8.06% 
 
2 -1.32% 3.45% 1.51% -2.84% 4.74% 1.65% 1.09% 2.72% 2.05% 
 
3 -13.98% 70.39% 9.80% -19.83% 90.95% 11.39% 0.60% 38.99% 11.42% 
 
4 -19.41% 16.52% 3.84% -21.17% 18.19% 4.30% 0.50% 6.94% 4.67% 
 
5 -0.31% 60.49% 5.14% -1.42% 72.32% 5.19% 0.79% 49.91% 5.20% 
 
6 -1.33% 5.98% 2.96% -2.82% 7.30% 3.12% 1.09% 4.58% 3.14% 
 
7 -21.88% 57.49% 5.38% -23.48% 50.18% 1.82% 0.60% 14.98% 5.54% 
 
8 -16.56% 9.82% 0.86% -19.96% 10.54% 0.18% 0.50% 3.36% 2.39% 
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Table 6-8: Profit increases compared with the VMR policy 
 
 
 
# 
VMI strategies 
 VMI−  VMI+ 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
 
Buyer 
 
 
Supplier 
 
Supply 
chain 
 
1 -3.77% 8.64% 0.19% 2.90% -1.99% 1.34% 
 
2 -1.54% 1.24% 0.14% 2.44% -0.71% 0.54% 
 
3 -6.80% 12.07% 1.45% 16.95% -18.43% 1.48% 
 
4 -2.18% 1.43% 0.44% 24.72% -8.22% 0.80% 
 
5 -1.12% 7.37% 0.05% 1.10% -6.59% 0.05% 
 
6 -1.51% 1.24% 0.15% 2.45% -1.32% 0.17% 
 
7 -2.04% -4.64% -3.37% 28.79% -26.99% 0.16% 
 
8 -4.08% 0.65% -0.68% 20.44% -5.89% 1.51% 
 
 
 
Table 6-9: Profit increases compared with the VMI− policy 
 
 
 
# 
 VMI+ 
 
Buyer 
 
Supplier 
 
SC 
 
# 
 
Buyer 
 
Supplier 
 
SC 
 
1 6.93% -9.79% 1.14% 
 
5 2.24% -13.00% 0.01% 
 
2 4.04% -1.93% 0.40% 
 
6 4.02% -2.53% 0.02% 
 
3 25.48% -27.21% 0.03% 
 
7 31.47% -23.44% 3.65% 
 
4 27.50% -9.52% 0.35% 
 
8 25.56% -6.50% 2.21% 
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Table 6-10: Comparison benefit VMI policies and classical model with side-payments  
 # 
 
  
Side-payments 
  
  
Final costs 
  
       
   
  
∆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 % 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
 
VMI− -2.98% 28 -28 279 601 898 
1 VMI+ -13.93% 204 -204 204 593 797 
 
CI 59.28% -662 662 -394 1302 909 
 
VMR -1.19% -39 39 130 784 915 
 
VMI− -11.16% 127 -127 520 415 935 
2 VMI+ -23.82% 248 -248 248 554 802 
 
CI 53.25% -684 684 -310 1265 954 
 
VMR -6.92% 43 -43 358 622 980 
 
VMI− -2.56% 63 -63 1068 1214 2282 
3 VMI+ 0.27% 1003 -1003 2003 339 2342 
 
CI 32.14% -1237 1237 -237 2560 2323 
 
VMR 2.15% -188 188 812 1530 2342 
 
VMI− -7.16% 239 -239 1523 818 2342 
4 VMI+ -9.64% 1045 -1045 1045 1235 2279 
 
CI 29.48% -1272 1272 -106 2477 2371 
 
VMR 1.93% -37 37 1129 1393 2522 
 
VMI− -1.59% 17 -17 292 553 845 
5  VMI+ -1.84% 260 -260 260 583 843 
  CI 115.89% -1124 1124 -855 1719 863 
  VMR 0.89% -44 44 225 634 859 
 
VMI− -9.79% 104 -104 494 384 878 
6  VMI+ -10.56% 322 -322 322 549 871 
  CI 108.47% -1145 1145 -772 1666 894 
  VMR -4.80% 18 -18 333 593 927 
 
VMI− -4.91% 211 -211 1398 884 2282 
7  VMI+ -16.67% 800 -800 800 1200 2000 
  CI 3.41% -570 570 430 1910 2340 
  VMR 2.48% -1 1 999 1401 2400 
 
VMI− -9.15% 263 -263 1475 914 2389 
8  VMI+ -23.94% 851 -851 851 1149 2000 
  CI -0.39% -564 5640 -544 2964 2420 
  VMR -2.02% -21 21 998 1579 2576 
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6.13 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we perform sensitivity analysis to study the influence of parameters 
affected by the average cost of buyer-supplier and supply chain when certain 
parameters are varied. Using the problem instances from Table 6-2, we vary the 
parameters of holding ratio cost 𝜑 = 𝑤𝑤/𝑐𝑐.  Basically, we want to know if each VMI 
can help us achieve some of the following: 
• 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠: Cost saving for the supplier 
• 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑥𝑥 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠: Cost saving for the buyer 
• 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠: Supply chain cost saving 
where  𝑚𝑚 ∈ {−, +, 𝑐𝑐, 𝑃𝑃},  
 
6.13.1 Influence of holding cost variables 
This section proposed the sensitivity analysis to analyse the influence of 𝜑 to 
the average cost of the difference of VMI policies. The average cost for buyer-
supplier and supply chain costs from VMI policies are compared from each of them 
and also compared with the classical model to investigate the contribution of saving 
cost.  In the next ten figures, we vary the production cost 𝑐𝑐 for changing the ratio of 
𝜑 = 𝑤𝑤/𝑐𝑐 over ranging between 1.15 and 3.6 in step of 0.05. 
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 Figure 6-10: Comparison cost saving between VMI− and Classical models  
 
Figure 6-10 shows the comparison of cost saving between VMI− and classical 
models when the parameter of production cost 𝑐𝑐 is varied. The benefit of saving costs 
are given to the supplier when the ratio of 𝜑 is increasing where the highest saving 
gives for the supplier is £1471 at the ratio 𝜑 = 2. 65, but the buyer cannot achieve the 
benefit from this. However, the 𝜑 ratio increase can also give the benefit for the 
supply chain when 1.15 ≤ 𝜑 ≤ 2.35 but it is no longer when 𝜑 ≥ 2.35. 
When we compare VMI+ and classical models for varying of 𝜑 (Fig. 6-11), the 
benefit from cost saving for buyer underVMI+ is fixed. It means that changing the 
ratio of 𝜑 is not affected to the buyer cost saving, but the ratio of 𝑐𝑐 increases leads to 
the benefit of saving cost is given to both supplier and supply chain which it can be 
implied that implement VMI+, the supplier can get the benefit from cost saving if she 
can reduce the production cost 𝑐𝑐 or increase purchasing price at rate𝑤𝑤 to increase the 
ratio of 𝜑. 
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 Figure 6-11: Comparison cost saving between VMI+ and Classical models  
 
Figure 6-12: Comparison cost saving CI and Classic models 
We see in Figure 6-12 that the buyer’s cost savings under CI is fixed, yet the 
supply chain and supplier’s savings are increased as 𝜑 increases. CI is beneficial for 
the supplier and supply chain when the production cost 𝑐𝑐 decrease or purchasing 
price 𝑤𝑤 increase. 
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 Figure 6-13: Comparison cost saving VMR and Classical models 
 
Comparing between VMR and Classical policy in Figure 6-13, the cost saving 
is possible for the buyer when 𝜑 is very low at 𝜑 < 1.30. The supplier can achieve 
the benefit from cost saving when 𝜑 ≥ 1. 95 but supply chain cost saving cannot 
achieve from changing 𝜑. In VMR policy, when 𝜑 is varied, the result shows that no 
trend of cost saving gives to one side of the buyer or supplier and also no benefit 
generates for supply chain.  
When we compare VMI+ and VMI− for varying values of 𝜑 in Fig.6-14, we 
observe thatVMI+ almost always generates cost saving to buyer and supply chain 
when 𝜑 increase. The benefit of cost saving is given to both buyer and supply chain 
when the value of 𝜑 ranges between 1.15 ≤ 𝜑 ≤ 2. 65. From general VMI+ almost 
generated worse off benefit for a supplier which this can be implied that the supplier 
will not get benefit from cost saving even though she can get lower production 
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cost 𝑐𝑐which supplier may not happy to agree with this policy. Thus, a fairness of cost 
sharing is that buyers should be adopted side payment to compensate the benefit from 
cost saving to the supplier. 
 
Figure 6-14: Comparison cost saving VMI+ and VMI− models 
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 Figure 6-15: Comparison cost saving CI and VMI− models 
 
Figure 6-15 shows the cost saving when compares betweenVMI−and CI by 
changing the value  𝜑. The buyer never achieves the benefit from cost saving 
when 𝜑 increase, but the cost saving is incurred for the supplier and supply chain. 
However, increase value 𝜑 that leads to the cost saving for both supplier and supply 
chain is decreased. The supplier and supply chain is better off when the range of value 
𝜑 is 1.15 ≤ 𝜑 ≤2.65. 
Figure 6-16 compares VMI− and VMR. In general, the benefit of cost saving 
can achieve for both buyer and supply chain when the value 𝜑 is less than 1.5. 
However, increase the value 𝜑 lead to decrease the benefit from cost saving, but it 
still generates for them even though the value 𝜑 is high. 
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 Figure 6-16: Comparison cost saving VMI− and VMR models 
 
 
 
Figure 6-17: Comparison cost saving VMI+ and CI models 
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When we compare VMI+ to CI for varying of 𝜑 in Fig. 6-17, we observe 
that VMI+ almost always generates the benefit from cost saving more for supply 
chain. Compared to CI, the buyer’s cost saving from VMI+ is fixed and it is small 
better off than CI. The cost saving is decreased when the value 𝜑 increased. This can 
be implied that the cost saving is decreased if the production cost 𝑐𝑐 is the high or 
purchasing price 𝑤𝑤 is low. 
Fig.6-18 shows the comparison VMI+ and VMR by varying values of 𝜑, VMI+generates cost saving to buyer and supply chain when 𝜑 increase. The value 
of 𝜑 should be ranged between 1.15 ≤ 𝜑 ≤ 2. 65 which this can be implied that the 
smallest value of production cost 𝑐𝑐 or high value of purchasing price 𝑤𝑤 can increase 
the benefit from cost saving to buyer and supply chain. The supplier is not achieved 
the benefit from cost saving in this policy, however, the buyer will offer the benefit 
from cost saving to the supplier where side payment is adopted. 
 
Figure 6-18: Comparison cost saving VMI+ and VMR models 
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6.14 Conclusions 
This chapter proposed an inventory model for single-buyer and single-
supplier with VMI policy derived from the NPV approach. This chapter focused on 
implicit costs associated with the opportunity cost of capital to managing inventory. 
Deriving profit function from the NPV approach, the mathematical modelling has been 
developed from cash-flows in order to derive the optimal lot-size for buyer 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and 
supplier 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 and maximise profit for supply chain system as the performance measure. 
The NPV approach makes a clear distinction between physical inventory and 
opportunity costs, since the two are not related. The latter does not depend on 
physical stocks at all, but on the amount and timing of the investment. The NPV is an 
interesting financial method to derive the inventory model and investigate the optimal 
lot-size and profit function. 
The numerical result shows that the positive financial effect of the NPV 
framework gives the largest lot-size, which results in the highest profit in the supply 
chain and the buyer’s profit function. VMI+ achieves the optimal lot-size as derived 
from the joint optimal solution. It is said that VMI+ achieves perfect coordination. 
Other policies from VMI−, CI and VMR cannot guarantee an efficient 
coordination, but VMI+ can definitely achieve an efficient perfect coordination. 
This model from VMI+can guarantees that the profit function for both players 
remains the same as classical framework and increases as a result of policy. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
The conclusions of this study are related back to the original research 
questions raised in Chapter 1.3. The conclusion of this thesis is concluded in Section 
7.1. The major contributions of this study are discussed in Section 7.2 and limitation 
and future study is explained in Section 7.3. 
 
7.1 Conclusion of this study  
Deriving profit function from the NPV approach, the mathematical modelling has 
been developed from cash-flows in order to derive the optimal lot-size for buyer  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 
and supplier 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 and maximise profit for supply chain system as the performance 
measure. The NPV approach makes a clear distinction between physical inventory 
and opportunity costs, since the two are not related. The latter does not depend on 
physical stocks at all, but on the amount and timing of the investment. The NPV is an 
interesting financial method to derive the inventory model and investigate the optimal 
lot-size and profit function. As discussed in Chapter 1, the research questions are 
answered and summarised as follows. 
Research question 1. How to value the holding cost for buyer and supplier in the 
average profit or cost functions?  
To answer the question, the buyer’s holding cost should be valued at the level 
of purchasing price rate 𝑤𝑤 not sale price rate 𝑝𝑝 under the assumption that the final 
demand is uniform and constant, and since shortages are not allowed, the buyer’s 
income will be guaranteed to arrive in a constant stream. Thus, any inventory held 
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means that the buyer has invested too early with respect to the moment that the 
demand to fulfill arrived, and this investment is made at a rate of 𝑤𝑤 per unit of 
product.  The larger lot-size 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/2 can be implied that the buyer invests more cost and 
his average cost is thus increasing in 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/2. 
Similar argumentation may explain how the supplier values his holding costs 
at the production cost rate 𝑐𝑐 not purchasing price rate 𝑤𝑤. For any given lot-size 
𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 > 0, she will be guaranteed a certain pattern in which money comes in from the 
buyer, so any inventory held at the supplier’s site means products has been made too 
early in relation to the pattern. Thus, the investment cost from production cost 𝑐𝑐 
represents the right valuation of any inventory held. 
The main contribution is identified where the final demand provides that any 
inventory held by the buyer is an investment of 𝑤𝑤 made too early. The fact that the 
buyer invests too early by purchasing in the lot-sizes 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 means that the supplier sells 
too early. Just like the money paid out too early is more costly for the buyer and 
money is worth more when received earlier from the supplier. If the supplier himself 
does not hold inventory, then he will produce at the moment he makes the early sale, 
then may use the profit margin to invest and earn profits. If the supplier does hold 
inventory, then the cost of too early production relative to a given buyer’s pattern of 
ordering is already included in the holding cost of his profit function. However, the 
investment potential for marginal profits on early sales is not yet included. As the 
early purchase un-satisfaction for the buyer is increasing with inventory stock 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/2, 
the average early sales benefit for the supplier must also increase with inventory 
208 
stock 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏/2. This means that a term must be added to the supplier’s average profit 
function.  
Research question 2. Why the joint profit function from an independent buyer and 
supplier in the supply chain under the classical inventory assumption cannot lead to 
correct the model for solving in the joint optimal policy? 
The main missing link in the joint profit function from an independent buyer 
and supplier in the supply chain under the classical inventory called the ‘supplier’s 
reward’ is identified to solve the contradiction. The supplier reward can be found in 
the supplier’s profit function from the model derived from the NPV framework, but it 
never incurred in the model derived from the classical framework. This can only be 
corrected by changing the supplier’s profit function. The NPV model, with the proper 
choice of Anchor Point, automatically leads to the identification of what is to be 
corrected. The error is that the omission of this effect in the classical models has been 
analysed by comparing the optimal decision variables analytically and presenting 
further numerical evidence through some particular examples based on instances 
previously used in the literature.  
In this question, two classical inventory models from Goyal (1976) and 
Banerjee (1986) are used to compare and also find the optimal solutions between the 
classical and the NPV frameworks. In the buyer’s profit function, the results shown 
that the optimal lot-size and profit function from both models are the same but it is 
significantly different in the supplier’s profit function which the NPV framework is 
given higher profit than the classical framework. This can be implied that the 
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supplier’s reward which derived from the NPV framework has been affected to the 
supplier’s profit function but will not incur in the classical model. 
The general tendency is that in the joint optimum, lot-sizes for the buyer are 
too small and lot-sizes for the supplier are consequently relatively too large, and the 
difference increases with the ratio of transfer price of variable production cost and the 
ratio of production rate to demand rate. Not only are the optimal decision variables 
different, the judgment of relative direct profits or costs incurred by the buyer and the 
supplier is affected as well, and may lead to completely distort proposals of how the 
overall gains from a joint optimal policy should be distributed. 
The following models are therefore found to be in contradiction with the NPV 
framework: 
 
• constants   ℎ𝑠𝑠 and   ℎ𝑏𝑏 but omission of the supplier's reward term: Goyal 
(1976, 1987b, 2000);Weng (1995b); Hill (1997); Viswanathan (1998); Goyal 
and Nebebe (2000); Munson and Rosenblatt (2001); Gurnani (2001); Chen et 
al. (2001); Wang (2001); Wang (2004); Viswanathan and Wang (2003); Kim 
and Daesung (2003); Wu and Ouyang (2003); Ben-Daya and Hariga (2004); 
Li and Liu (2006); Joglekar et al. (2006); Kwak et al. (2006); Jain et al. 
(2006); Qin et al. (2007); Sarmah et al. (2007); Wee and Chung (2007); 
Sarmah et al. (2008); Dong et al. (2007); Lau et al. (2008); Zhou (2009) 
• a channel function in function of 𝑤𝑤: Banerjee (1986); Goyal (1988, 1995); 
Chakravarty and Martin (1988); Abad (1994); Li et al. (1996) 
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• a buyer's function with a holding cost term in 𝑤𝑤 but no corresponding term in 
the supplier's function in 𝑤𝑤 such that the sum gives a channel function in 𝑤𝑤: 
Monahan (1984); Goyal (1987a); 
Research question 3. Whether or not the price discount mechanism leads to solutions 
that are equal or close to the solution that would optimize the joint profit function? 
Based on the NPV analysis for the system with constant deterministic demand, 
the contribution shows that the positive financial effect of larger lot-sizes for the 
supplier should be taken into account when determining the optimal price discount 
scheme and its impact if a price discount scheme is context dependent. In general, 
however, the impact of a price discount scheme can be expected to be significantly 
larger than what is derived in the classical inventory framework. The importance of 
the supplier’s reward in Chapter 4 of the quantity price discount policies is hereby 
confirmed that the optimal price discount scheme for the supplier gives lot-sizes 
which are typically fairly close to the joint optimal policy for buyer and supplier. The 
equivalence property of Banerjee (1986) thus seems to hold approximately in more 
general circumstances within the classical framework and also within the NPV 
framework.  
The price discount model in Chapter 5 is to examine in the case of constant 
deterministic demand, the results are not intended to contribute to the debate on the 
relative value of lot-size coordination when demand is price-sensitive. This model 
does also not compared its results with models related but not identical to the system 
considered, such as the model in Goyal (1995); Hill (1997); Viswanathan (1998); 
Goyal and Nebebe (2000), where the supplier supplies the buyer in batches of unequal 
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size. In addition, there are other machanisms beside price discounts to help achieve 
coordination in a supply chain. For reviews of inventory (coordination) models, see 
Goyal and Gupta (1989); Thomas and Griffin (1996); Munson and Rosenblatt (1998); 
Sarmah et al (2006); Li and Wang (2007), and for more general reviews on supply 
chain partnerships and coordination. 
Research question 4. Which VMI policy can achieve perfect coordination that 
solutions are equal or closes to the solution that would optimize the joint optimal 
solution? 
When parties in a supply chain wish to retain both their independent decision 
making, coordination can be achieved by restructuring the costs and rewards between 
them, often through a well-designed contract to align their individual objective 
(maximising their own profits) with the supply chain objective. If this restructuring 
results in profits across the whole supply chain that are equal to those under a joint 
optimisation system, the coordination mechanism is said to be perfect. 
 The positive financial effect of the VMI derived from the NPV framework 
gives the largest lot-size which results in the highest profit in the supply chain and the 
buyer’s profit function. VMI models  𝑉𝑉𝑀𝐼𝐼−,𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 and 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑅𝑅 cannot guarantee an 
efficient coordination, but VMI+ can definitely achieve an efficient coordination. 
This model guarantees that the profit function for both players remains the same 
without coordination and increases as a result of coordination.  
Research question 5. Which one among of the four VMI policies can give the results 
in the best system performance? 
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VMI+ achieves the same outcome as the joint optimal solution. It is said 
that  VMI+ achieves perfect coordination. Other policies from VMI−, CI and VMR cannot guarantee an efficient coordination, but VMI+can definitely achieve 
an efficient perfect coordination. This model guarantees that the profit function for 
both players remains the same without coordination and increases as a result of 
coordination. Comparing the solutions between VMI and the classical models from 
Goyal (1976) and Banerjee (1986), the profit function from VMI with the NPV 
framework gives the mathematical modelling has been developed from cash-flows in 
order to derive the optimal lot-size for buyer 𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏 and supplier 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 and maximise profit 
for supply chain system as the performance measure. Although,  VMI+can generates 
the highest profit for the buyer and the supply chain system, the supplier’s cost 
increases, which the supplier may not be happy to agree with this policy. Therefore, 
buyer should make offers the side-payments to the supplier to induce him for agreeing 
with the VMI+ policy. 
 
7.2 Major contributions of this study 
The main contribution of this research is to propose the new coordination 
model based on the NPV framework in supply chain management. It is shown that the 
potential of the developed model gives higher profit for all actors better than the profit 
derived from the classical framework. The research taken in the thesis has achieved 
the follow contribution. 
Firstly, we proposed the different viewpoints of holding costs that are 
influenced to the buyer-supplier average cost function in the supply chain models. We 
213 
explained what the right valuation of inventory holding cost should be valued in the 
models.  The vital questions have been answered why to value the holding cost of the 
buyer’s average cost function at the level of purchasing cost at rate 𝑤𝑤 not the product 
price at rate 𝑝𝑝, and similar augmentation may be explained why the supplier values 
his holding costs at the production cost rate 𝑐𝑐 not purchasing price at rate 𝑤𝑤. 
Secondly, we developed the production and inventory models derived from 
the NPV framework for buyer-supplier in the supply chain. The optimal lot-size and 
average profit function are the main objectives to analyse and identify gaps between 
classical models from the literature and the developed model from the NPV 
framework. The contribution achieved is that the “supplier reward” is missing in the 
supplier profit function in the classical model. Indeed, it has been proved that major 
corrections to the classical models lead to a channel function free of the transfer price 
and in agreement with the supply chain profit function. The apparent paradox is that 
the subjective viewpoint seems the matter to resolve in buyer-supplier coordination 
models including the supplier’s reward are now also in agreement with multi-echelon 
inventory theory. 
Thirdly, we developed the NPV models with an Anchor Point decision to 
derive the independent and joint optimisation in single-buyer single-supplier 
inventory models. The contribution achieved that the NPV model is leading to large 
numerical differences in the optimal policy variables and optimal profits. The 
classical models are not leading to the correct join optimal policy from the NPV, and 
cannot adequately describe the relative gains or losses. The additional error in the 
relative division of individual profits obtained in the joint optimal policy and the 
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classical model lead to large errors when it comes to determining how to share overall 
costs in a fair manner. The cost sharing by Goyal (1976) and side payment can 
guarantee a rational fairness manner to induce a buyer to change policy from 
independent to coordinate policy. 
Fourthly, the contribution of the quantity price discount model derived from 
the NPV framework can help the supplier increase the profits compared to the 
classical framework under constant demand. The solutions from quality, price 
discount model show that the positive financial effect of the larger lot-sizes for the 
supplier should be taken into account when determining the optimal price discount 
scheme and the impact on the profits. The influence of the supplier’s reward affects 
the supplier’s profit function which can be confirmed by an increase in the lot-size of 
the quantity price discount and increase in the profit to the supplier. Furthermore, 
price discounts often lead to a solution very close to the joint optimal policy for buyer 
and supplier where the supplier’s reward term may prevent the price discount scheme 
from adopting lot-sizes close to the joint optimal lot-size. 
Fifthly, the different models of VMI policy derived from the NPV framework 
are compared with each other and also with the classical framework. The contribution 
outcome can be concluded that the highest profit for the supply chain can be 
guaranteed with VMI+model compares to the other VMI models and model from the 
classical framework for all instances. Moreover, VMI+ achieves the same outcome as 
the joint optimal solution. It is said that VMI+ achieves perfect coordination. 
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7.3 Limitations and further research 
A real supply chain system in the industry typically has a multi-staged and 
much more complex structure of multiple suppliers and buyers or multiple products. 
Thus, the inventory models proposed in this thesis from the deterministic condition 
may not respond to the complexity of the real world situation. The quantity price 
discount scheme with the NPV framework can be applied to the stochastic model, 
price-sensitive demand. The VMI coordination mechanisms could be extended to 
evaluate their performance on multi-staged and multiple suppliers in supply chain 
systems. Finally, future research should investigate the transportation cost and the 
impact of the inventory decision. 
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